# **OFFSHORE HELICOPTER SAFETY INQUIRY**

October 28, 2009 Tara Place, Suite 213, 31 Peet Street St. John's, NL

## PRESENT:

John F. Roil, Q.C./ Anne FaganInquiry Counsel
Amy Crosbie/ Canada-Newfoundland and Labrador Offshore John Andrews Petroleum Board (C-NLOPB)
Ian Wallace/
D. Blair PritchettSuncor (Petro-Canada)
Alexander C. MacDonald, Q.C Husky Oil Operations Ltd.
Geoffrey Spencer Helly Hansen Canada Ltd.
Rolf PritchardGovernment of Newfoundland and Labrador
Jonathan Tarlton/Mark FreemanDepartment of Transport Canada
Norman J. Whalen, Q.CCougar Helicopters Inc.
Jamie MartinFamilies of Deceased Passengers
Gerald O'Brien, Q.Cagent on behalf of Douglas A. Latto for Lanouette Estate (Co-pilot)
Randell Earle, Q.CCommunications, Energy and Paperworkers Union Local 2121
David F. Hurley, Q.C Offshore Safety and Survival Centre, Marine Institute

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1 October 28, 2009	1	I recognize this Inquiry is important to
2 COMMISSIONER:	2	your community and particularly to the
3 Q. Good morning, ladies and gentlemen. I'd like	3	families who lost loved ones in the crash of
4 to welcome this morning Mrs. Wendy Tadros,	who 4	Cougar Flight 491. It's also very important
5 is the Chair of the Transportation Safety	5	to us at the TSB, no more so than to the team
6 Board, and with her and assisting her is Mr.	6	of investigators who arrived in St. John's in
7 John Cottreau and I'm very pleased to welcome	e 7	the days following the accident and whose
8 them both and Ms. Tadros, you'll recall that	8	faces you have come to know. Those same
9 at the beginning of my remarks, at the very	9	investigators are still hard at work in
10 beginning, I mentioned that it was important	10	pursuit of the facts and the answers that we
11 that I felt that we get the view from the	11	all need to ensure this tragedy does not
12 Offshore Petroleum Board and then Transport	12	repeat itself. This investigation is one of
13 Canada and particularly important, of course,	13	the Safety Board's top priorities. A very
14 is the role of the Transportation Safety	14	strong and capable team of professionals has
15 Board, which is the investigative body of	15	been assigned to this work.
16 incidents and accidents in all fields in	16	While the team focuses on their work, I'm
17 Canada, but particularly in our case, we're	17	happy to be here to explain to you what to
18 concerned with the aeronautics side and so I	18	expect as the TSB investigation unfolds and
19 welcome Ms. Tadros and she will make a	19	discuss the role of my organization and what
20 presentation to us and there will be an	20	we do to advance transportation safety. We're
21 opportunity afterwards for her to take	21	not a regulator. We are an independent
22 questions from you. Okay then, Mrs. Tadros.	22	investigative body. Over the last 20 years,
23 MS. TADROS:	23	the Transportation Safety Board has built an
24 A. Thank you, Mr. Commissioner. I must say I'n	n 24	international reputation as a leader in
25 very pleased to be here in St. John's and to	25	accident investigation. To this end, our
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1 participate in your Inquiry and to help you	-	annual report reflects the volume of
2 out in any way we can at the TSB. It also	2	investigations and activities undertaken in
3 gives me an opportunity to visit your	3	the last year to advance safety in marine,
4 community and to personally thank the ma		rail, pipeline and aviation. Our annual
5 REGISTRAR:	5	report is Document No. 1.
6 Q. Excuse me, sorry to interrupt. Mr.	6	I'm sure a question on the minds of many
7 Commissioner, should I swear Ms. Tadros.		is how does this Inquiry, your Inquiry, differ
8 COMMISSIONER:	8	from the TSB's investigation. So right off
9 Q. Not for the moment.	9	the top, let me clearly distinguish your
10 REGISTRAR:	10	Inquiry from a TSB investigation.
11 Q. Okay.	11	Offshore oil workers move back and forth
12 COMMISSIONER:	12	by helicopter every day. You will look
13 Q. Okay.	13	carefully at the role of the C-NLOPB and what
14 MS. TADROS:	14	they can do to ensure workers get safely to
15 A. Okay, maybe when we finish the presenta		and from offshore rigs. I would maintain that
16 then we'll do that.	16	the Offshore Petroleum Board can influence
17 COMMISSIONER:	17	aviation safety indirectly through its
18 Q. Yes.	18	regulation of petroleum producers. It can
19 MS. TADROS:	19	also raise the safety bar through the
20 A. Okay. Yes, I was saying it gives me the		imposition of license conditions and the
21 opportunity to personally thank the many, r		setting of contract provisions, and this is a
22 people who helped our investigators last M	-	good thing.
23 in the very early days after the accident wh		By contrast, the TSB's role is to advance
24 an awful lot needed to be done and it need		the safety of aviation and helicopter
to be done very, very quickly.	25	operations worldwide. We do this by
	25	Dage 1 Dage 4

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1	investigating accidents, whether in the	-	1	sole purpose of advancing safety.
2	offshore or elsewhere in the world. We see	ek	2	Three fundamental principles form a solid
3	to find out what happened and why it happe	ned.	3	foundation for this approach. The first
4	In accordance with our legislation, we take a		4	principle is to separate the investigation
5	systemic approach to all our investigations.		5	from the influence of regulators, airlines,
6	We run the gamut of issues from the immed		6	manufacturers and any other body with an
7	causes of an accident to the risks Canadians		7	interest. This is because all of our
8	may encounter and we do all of this to learn	1	8	investigations look at these players and at
9	lessons to make the system safer.		9	their roles. Let me give you an example of
10	At the end of the day, it really is my		10	one player, the regulator, who you heard from
11	belief that this Inquiry and the TSB		11	earlier this week, Transport Canada. They set
12	investigation, each in their own way, will		12	safety standards for the industry. They
13	improve safety for the people of Newfoundl	and	13	license air carriers and crews and enforce the
14	and Labrador.		14	Canadian Aviation regulations. In all our
15	Before I tell you about how we work, let		15	investigations, we can and must look at the
16	me put the TSB's independent investigation of	of	16	role of the regulator and we look specifically
17	aviation accidents in perspective. Let me		17	at their role in overseeing the industry.
18	give you a little bit of context.		18	This means that Transport Canada has a direct
19	In 1990, the Government of Canada passe	ed	19	interest and therefore cannot objectively make
20	the Canadian Transportation Accident		20	findings on their own role. The TSB, because
21	Investigation and Safety Board Act, and that	t's	21	of its independence, can follow the evidence
22	a very long title, and so we refer to it as		22	wherever it may lead and say what we need to
23	the CTAISBA Act. This legislation contains a	a	23	say.
24	set of principles and gives the TSB its power		24	The second principle is to separate the
25	to investigate accidents and incidents. When	n	25	investigation from legal proceedings. Having
		Page 6		Page 8
1	there is a transportation accident in rail,	-	1	served on the Bench for many years, sir, I'm
2	marine, aviation or pipeline, the legislation		2	sure you know well that issues of criminal or
3	allows the TSB to occupy the field. When th	ne	3	civil liability rightly belong with the
4	Safety Board is investigating, no other		4	Courts. Whereas the TSB's sole purpose is to
5	Federal Government Department, other than	n the	5	advance transportation safety and we do not
6	Department of National Defence, can		6	lay blame. Moreover, TSB investigators cannot
7	investigate for the purpose of determining		7	be called into Court and the Board's findings
8	causes and contributing factors. This		8	cannot be used in Court or disciplinary
9	exclusivity goes beyond Canada's borders		9	proceedings.
10	When we are investigating an aviation accid		10	The third principle is to conduct our
11	in accordance with international agreements	s,	11	investigations in accordance with agreed upon
12	no other country can investigate, period.		12	international practices and standards. Canada
13	An example very close to home is our		13	follows the International Civil Aviation
14	investigation of the Swissair 111 crash. The		14	Organization's Annex 13 to the Convention on
15	aircraft was manufactured and certified in th		15	Civil Aviation, and that is Document No. 4.
16	United States. It took off from New York		16	This Annex sets out the protocols for
17	bound for Switzerland. The carrier and the		17	determining which state will conduct the
18	crew were Swiss and the passengers came f		18	investigation, the roles and responsibilities
19	many places in the world. The Canadian		19	of other states in an investigation and how
20	connection, if you will, was the waters off		20	the investigation is to be conducted. Above
21	Nova Scotia or the crash site. This gave		21	all, it states clearly that the sole objective
22	exclusive jurisdiction to the TSB. Canada is	.1	22	of an investigation shall be the prevention of
23	one of about a dozen nations, in keeping wit	tn	23	accidents. That is the only objective.
24	international protocols, that conduct		24	The application of these three important
25	independent accident investigations for the	•	25	principles, the independence of the

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1	investigation, the separation from legal	1	involving ships, pipelines, railway rolling
2	proceedings and the adherence to international	2	stock or aircraft that are registered,
3	agreements help ensure public confidence in	3	licensed or manufactured in Canada. Reporting
4	the TSB and the work we do to advance aviation	4	directly to Parliament through the President
5	safety. This process or this approach has	5	of the Queen's Privy Council, the
6	proven very successful. As I mentioned	6	Transportation Safety Board of Canada is an
7	before, it has put the TSB at the forefront of	7	independent agency and a recognized leader in
8	accident investigation worldwide. But a	8	transportation safety investigation. In
9	process is nothing without a dedicated	9	addition to its head office and engineering
10	workforce to put it into action.	10	laboratory in the National capital area, the
11	I really hope you will take away with you	11	TSB has eight regional offices across the
12	a sense of my pride in the work of the 235 men	12	country in strategically placed locations to
13	and women who make up the TSB. These peopl	le 13	better enable rapid response to accident
14	are specialists in investigations,	14	sites.
15	engineering, metallurgy, human factors,	15	Canada is a vast country and the
16	communications and human resources, to name	e 16	transportation industry plays a vital role in
17	just a view. They are focused and dedicated	17	the Nation's economy. The marine
18	to our mission. They are engaged every day in	18	transportation sector involves more than 300
19	making transportation safer than it was the	19	million tons of cargo and over 55 million
20	day before, not only for Canadians, but for	20	passengers per year. Freight and passenger
21	people around the world. They are the ones	21	trains travel over more than 80,000 kilometres
22	who, after careful science and thorough	22	of rail. Natural gas and oil pipelines
23	analysis, nail the causes and contributing	23	stretch for over 50,000 kilometres across
24	factors leading to accidents, and they provide	24	Canada and there are over seven million air
25	the Board with the information it needs to	25	movements within Canada's air space to
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1	make recommendations, recommendations that can	1	transport more than 70 million passengers per
2	be credited with changing the way aircraft are	2	year.
3	operated and maintained and with improving the	3	On average, over 4,000 transportation
4	way they are designed, built and certified.	4	related occurrences are reported each year to
5	Now I would like to show you our	5	the TSB. Investigations are initiated when
6	corporate video. We'll just give you the	6	occurrence analysis will lead to a reduction
7	short version this morning. This was created	7	in risks to persons, property or the
8	in house at our engineering laboratory. It	8	environment. At accident sites, TSB personnel
9	will provide you with an overview of the work	9	work in cooperation with various
10	we do day-to-day. I'll add a few details	10	organizations, whether they be international,
11	after the video, but just in passing, I can	11	federal, provincial, municipal or private
12	tell you it's also available in French.	12	companies, in order to investigate an
	COMMISSIONER:	13	occurrence in an efficient and timely manner.
14	Q. Okay.	14	Often representatives from the transportation
15	(VIDEO PLAYED)	15	industry are invited to watch a TSB
16	The TSB's mission is to conduct	16	investigation in progress.
17	independent safety investigations and	17	A TSB investigation consists of three
18	communicate risks in a transportation system.	18	phases, the field phase, the post-field phase
19	No matter where in Canada the accident occurs, isolated in the middle of the bush, out at	19	and later, the report production phase. The TSB concentrates on the dangerous conditions
20 21	sea, or in the high Arctic, TSB's diverse	20 21	that could compromise the safety of people,
21	workforce has the necessary experience,	21 22	property or the environment as revealed by
22	training, tools and equipment to perform	22 23	transportation accidents. The TSB will not
23	specialized tasks. The TSB also represents	23 24	hesitate to issue preliminary recommendations
24 25	Canadian interests in foreign investigations	24 25	or other safety communications if they could
Ľ"	Canadian interests in Toreign investigations	25	or other safety communications in they could

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1	have an immediate impact on transportation	1	and that's Document No. 6. The first phase is
2	safety.	2	the field phase. An investigator in charge,
3	On site, TSB staff examine and document	3	or IIC, is appointed and an investigation team
4	everything in detail. Investigators use all	4	is assembled. The make up of the team is
5	possible methods and resources to enable a	5	based on the circumstances of the occurrence
6	thorough and objective investigation in order	6	and investigation needs and may consist of
7	to draft accurate findings and identify safety	7	operations, equipment, maintenance,
8	deficiencies. After each investigation, a	8	engineering, scientific and human performance
9	draft report is sent by the Board on a	9	specialists. The number of investigators sent
10	confidential basis to designated reviewers who	<b>)</b> 10	to an occurrence site varies from one or two
11	have a direct interest in the occurrence.	11	for a relatively straightforward investigation
12	They may suggest corrections, dispute or	12	to ten or more for a major investigation.
13	contradict the draft report if it is believed	13	The field phase can last from one day to
14	that the information is inaccurate or	14	several months. During the phase, team
15	mistaken. The Board carefully considers all	15	members will secure the occurrence site,
16	comments on a draft report. The TSB report is	16	examine the equipment, vehicle or wreckage on
17	then finalized, depicting the description of	17	site, interview witnesses, company and
18	the occurrence, analysis of the issues,	18	government personnel, collect pertinent
19	findings, deficiencies and safety actions	19	information, select and remove specific
20	taken or required. The final report is then	20	wreckage for further examination, review
21	released to the public in both official	21	documentation and identify potential unsafe
22	languages. The Board will continue to monito	or 22	acts and unsafe conditions.
23	the actions of industry, the regulator and	23	The second phase of the investigation is
24	operator as to how they address the Board's	24	the post-field phase. Significant
25	safety concern.	25	investigation activity takes place after the
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1	In recent years, the TSB has issued	1	TSB departs the occurrence site and this is
2	recommendations addressing numerous safe	ety 2	the phase that we are in in our investigation
3	issues, including crew fatigue, electrical	3	of Cougar 491. The post-field phase can take
4	wiring, recorder capacity, outdated life	4	many, many months, depending on the size and
5	rafts, rail passenger safety and overheated	5	complexity of the investigation. During the
6	brake systems. Canada is recognized	6	post-field phase, the TSB typically examines
7	internationally to have one of the safest	7	all relevant company, vehicle, government and
8	transportation systems in the world. The	8	other records, examines selected wreckage in
9	important work mandated to and conducted	by 9	the laboratory and tests selected components
10	the TSB contributes to safer waterways,	10	and systems, analyses records and data,
11	railways, pipelines and skies, not only in	11	creates simulation and reconstructs the
12	Canada, but around the world. The TSB will	12	events, conducts further interviews,
13	continue to build awareness of safety issues	13	determines the sequence of events, what
14	and to promote the development of a strong	g 14	happened and when it happened, and identifies
15	safety culture within the transportation	15	safety deficiencies by looking at occurrences
16	industry to advance transportation safety.	16	in Canada and abroad.
17	This is the number one priority of the	17	At the end of the post-field phase, the
18	Transportation Safety Board of Canada.	18	IIC produces an initial draft investigation
19	(VIDEO ENDS)	19	report that is reviewed by other TSB experts.
20 MS	. TADROS:	20	At this stage, this is really a form of
21 A	A. Okay. So you now know that there are three	e 21	scientific challenge, as all the experts get
22	basic phases to a TSB investigation. I want	22	together and test the theories on one another,
23	to tell you a little bit more about those	23	look at the evidence and there's a challenge
24	phases. They are described in some detail in	24	process. When everybody is settled on exactly
25	our pamphlet entitled "Investigation Process"	25	what the facts are and what they mean, then

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1	the report moves forward through the director	1	l	TSB keeps survivors and next of kin informed
2	of investigations.	2	2	and may request interviews with them to assist
3	During the first two phases of the	3	3	in the investigation. TSB investigators
4	investigation, a built-in independence	4	1	conduct interviews with anyone who may be able
5	separates the work of the investigators from	5	5	to assist them with their investigation. The
6	the Board. The Board is not involved in the	6	5	statements and the interviews are protected
7	work and exercises no control or influence	7	7	under our Act and individuals are never named
8	over the direction of the investigation. This	8	3	in a Board report.
9	really leaves investigators free to ask any	Ģ	)	The Board may also grant observer status
10	questions and to follow all leads. So for	10	)	to anyone who, in its opinion, can contribute
11	instance, in the investigation of Cougar 491,	11	l	to the investigation. In this regard,
12	while the Board has been kept apprised of the	12	2	representatives from transportation companies,
13	conduct of the investigation, they have not	13	3	equipment manufacturers and regulatory
14	been involved in any of the investigative or	14	1	agencies often attend our investigations,
15	communications developments.	15	5	under the supervision, of course, of the
16	The third phase is the report production	16	5	investigator in charge, and in accordance with
17	phase. In this phase, the Board steps up to	17	7	certain conditions that may be imposed.
18	review the draft investigation report, which	18		International agreements also entitle
19	may be approved, amended or returned for	19	)	other countries to designate accredited
20	further staff work. Once the draft report is	20		representatives to Canada's investigations.
21	approved, the TSB legislation requires this	21		The TSB also sends its people to
22	report to be sent to designated reviewers on a	22		investigations in other countries. These
23	confidential basis. The designated reviewers	23		representatives really bring technical
24	are persons and corporations whose performanc			expertise to those investigations.
25	or products are being remarked on in the	25	5	I want to give you more detail and when
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1	report. They are most qualified to comment on	1	l	and why we investigate and the methodology we
2	the accuracy. For this reason, they are given	2	2	use.
3	the opportunity to dispute, correct or	3		FAGAN:
4	contradict information they believe is	4	4 Q.	Commissioner, just like to interrupt for one
5	incorrect or unfairly prejudicial to their		5	moment. The technology is not working. I
6	interests. This process really is intended to	6	5	understand there's a PowerPoint that will go
7	both ensure procedural fairness and the	7		with this portion of the presentation, and if
8	accuracy of the Board's final report, and the	8		we could just take a two-minute break because
9	Board considers all comments and will amend			we'd just like to correct that, so that the
10	the report if it is convinced that a change is	10		PowerPoint -
11	warranted. Once the Board approves the			MISSIONER:
12	report, the final report, it is then released	12	-	You think it's a matter of two or three
13	to the public.	13		minutes or ten minutes? Any idea?
14	Many cooperate with the TSB during an			FAGAN:
15	investigation. We work with all levels of	15	-	Could be -
16	government, transportation companies,			ISTRAR:
17	equipment manufacturers and individuals, such			I have no idea.
18	as survivors, witnesses, next of kin and			FAGAN:
19	operators. We also work with coroners,	19	-	No more than five. If it can't be corrected
20	police, fire departments and search and rescue	20		in five minutes, we'll just have to move on.
21	teams. This cooperation is absolutely			MISSIONER:
22	essential to a successful investigation.	22		All right, well then we canno need for us to
23	When fatalities occur, the police,	23		sit in our seats. We'll just come back in five minutes.
24	coroner or the transportation company will	24		
25	advise the next of kin, and along the way, the	25	) WIS. I	FAGAN:

1       Q. Thank you.       1       controlling the risk didn't exist or they         2       (BREAK)       2       didn't function as intended. There are two         3       COMMISSIONFR:       3       administrative. Physical defences, physical and         4       0 are we able to do now?       4       administrative. Physical defences, physical and         5       O. Well, the equipment is now working and I       6       cockpit, runway lighting and air traffic         7       understand wc'll be able to move through the       7       control radar and administrative defences         8       silde presentation.       8       include standards, regulations, operating         9       COMMISSIONER:       9       procedures, supervision, training and the         10       0. Okay.       10       little bit more detail about when and why we       13         11       Every investigation stars with a nofification       pilot did not select the landing gear down.         16       of an occurrence with over 4,000 occurrences       10       This is an unsafe condition. If 's clear that the         18       information must be assessed against our       10       cost avery carefully is whether       11         18       information must be assessed against our       10       this an unsafe condition. If 's clear that the	Octo	ber 28, 2009	Multi	-Page <sup>TI</sup>	M Offshore Helicopter Safety Inquiry
2       (BRLAK)       2       didn't function as intended. There are two         3       COMMISSIONER:       3       categories of defences, physical and         4       0 are we able to do now?       4       administrative. Physical defences include,         5       MS.FAGAN.       5       for example, alarms and warning lights in the         6       0. Well, the equipment is now working and I       7       control radar and administrative defences include,         8       side presentation.       9       procedures, supervision, training and the         10       Q. Okay.       10       like.         11       MS.TABOS:       10       like.         12       A. Okay, John? Okay. I want to give you a       12       hypothetical investigation. A commuter         13       little bit more detail about when and why we       13       iadrift nuction and administrative defences         15       Every investigation starts with a notification       15       pilot did not select the landing gerd down.         18       information must be assessed against our       18       gear was not in the down and locked position.         18       the waitable evidence is enough for the Board       2       and wais significantly faigued. In this         21       the avaitable evidence is enough for the Board		]	Page 21		Page 23
2       (RRLAK)       2       didn't function as intended. There are two         3       COMMISSIONER:       3       categories of defences, physical and         4       Q are we able to do now?       4       administrative. Physical defences include,         5       MS.FAGAN:       5       for example, alarms and warning lights in the         6       Q. Welt, the equipment is now working and I       7       control radar and administrative defences         8       silde presentation.       9       procedures, supervision, training and the         10       Q. Okay.       10       like.         11       MS.TADROS:       10       like.         12       A. Okay, John? Okay. I want to give you a       12       hypothetical investigation. A commuter         13       little bit more detail about when and why we       13       liandin no courrence vith over 4,000 courrences         15       Every investigation starts with a notification       15       Fibit did not select the landing ger down.         18       information must be assessed against our       18       gear was not in the down and locked position.         18       the available evidence is enough for the Board       2       and wais significantly faigued. In this         21       uncovered. If there's a real potentil to       1<	1		0	1	-
4       administrative. Physical defences include,         5 MS. FAGAN:       administrative. Physical defences include,         6 Q. Well, the equipment is now working and I       for example, alarms and warning lights in the         7       understand we'll be able to move through the       for example, alarms and warning lights in the         8       Side presentation.       for example, alarms and warning lights in the         9       COMMISSIONER:       procedures, supervision, training and the         10       Q. Okay.       training and web weild         11       MS. TADROS:       10         12       A. Okay, John? Okay. I want to give you a       12         13       inticule standards, regulations, operating       procedures, supervision, training and the         14       investigation starts with a notification       10       landing. On examination, it's clear that the         15       information must be assessed against our       18       is an unsafe condition. In trying to         16       the available evidence is enough for the Board       22       add was significantly fatigued. In this         23       to determine the causes and contributing       23       in devel of risk. The y want to know is this         24       advance safety deficiencies would likely be       25       reasons for the pilot's fatigue to determine <td>2</td> <td>•</td> <td></td> <td>2</td> <td>- · ·</td>	2	•		2	- · ·
4       administrative. Physical defences include,         5 MS. FAGAN:       administrative. Physical defences include,         6 Q. Well, the equipment is now working and I       for example, alarms and warning lights in the         7       understand we'll be able to move through the       for example, alarms and warning lights in the         8       Side presentation.       for example, alarms and warning lights in the         9       COMMISSIONER:       procedures, supervision, training and the         10       Q. Okay.       training and web weild         11       MS. TADROS:       10         12       A. Okay, John? Okay. I want to give you a       12         13       inticule standards, regulations, operating       procedures, supervision, training and the         14       investigation starts with a notification       10       landing. On examination, it's clear that the         15       information must be assessed against our       18       is an unsafe condition. In trying to         16       the available evidence is enough for the Board       22       add was significantly fatigued. In this         23       to determine the causes and contributing       23       in devel of risk. The y want to know is this         24       advance safety deficiencies would likely be       25       reasons for the pilot's fatigue to determine <td>3 C</td> <td>OMMISSIONER:</td> <td></td> <td>3</td> <td>categories of defences, physical and</td>	3 C	OMMISSIONER:		3	categories of defences, physical and
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24 Inadequacies in safety defences are found 24 away. It may be by way of interim safety	23	the risk controls or safety defences in place.		23	the final report. We report on them right
as in around and Dither the many of the many detines and did to d. D.	24	Inadequacies in safety defences are found	I	24	away. It may be by way of interim safety
125 In every accident. Either the means of 125 recommendations, as we did in the Ryan's	25	in every accident. Either the means of		25	recommendations, as we did in the Ryan's

Octob	oer 28, 2009 Mu	l <b>ti-Page</b> <sup>TI</sup>	M Offshore Helicopter Safety Inquiry
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1	Commander investigation, or we may choose to	1	laws take time and many of our recommendations
2	send out safety advisories or safety	2	have not been fully implemented. Meanwhile, I
3	information letters to the regulator and	3	would argue that nothing stops the offshore
4	industry. Where helicopters are concerned,	4	industry or the C-NLOPB from striving to reach
5	over the past ten years, the TSB has issued	5	a higher standard. For example, many in the
6	many safety information letters and safety	6	oil and gas industry require subcontractors to
7	advisories in the course of the ongoing	7	maintain ISO standards, or to have integrity
8	investigations. I am providing all of these	8	management systems. The regulator, the C-
9	to you for your consideration, sir.	9	NLOPB in Newfoundland and Labrador, could
10	A little more than a week into the Cougar	10	require similar things. You could think about
11	491 investigation, the TSB revealed the	11	advising them on the setting of licence
12	failure of the damaged titanium studs on the	12	conditions for petroleum producers, or you
13	main gearbox filter bowl assembly. This led	13	might want to consider whether contract
14	the manufacturer to immediately replace the	14	provisions for any carrier wishing to provide
15	studs on these aircraft worldwide. But it	15	helicopter services in the offshore would be
16	didn't stop there. Fast on the heels of that	16	of value. In looking at what improvements
17	came an FAA emergency airworthiness directive	17	should be made, a starting point may be TSB
18	aimed at reducing the risk of a similar	18	recommendations from our past investigations.
19	failure. These actions have led to reduced	19	If you think that might be useful, we would
20	risk for S-92 operators early and while the	20	certain assist in that regard and provide you
21	investigation is ongoing. The big safety pay-	21	with the recommendations that may be on point.
22	off for us really occurs when everyone agrees,	22	Helicopters operate worldwide and there are
23	during the course of an investigation, about	23	many strong players in aviation accident
24	what needs to be done. Safety deficiencies	24	investigation. You may also wish to look at
25	are addressed quickly and rather than making	25	the work of international counterparts. In
	Page 2	26	Page 28
1	recommendations, we report on the progress in	1	North America, the United States conducts a
2	our final report.	2	huge number of aviation investigations. Great
3	This being said, the TSB does not impose	3	Britain, Sweden, Norway, and Finland, the
4	changes on the transportation industry or	4	Netherlands, France, and Russia, all have
5	regulators. Solutions to safety are a shared	5	excellent capabilities. In the far east,
6	responsibility amongst many players and our	6	Japan, Korea, and Taiwan, are leaders, and
7	job is to make a convincing case for change.	7	down under, Australia and New Zealand, both
8	I spoke in the opening about the indirect	8	excel at accident investigation. Now I would
9	ways that your inquiry can influence the	9	be pleased to answer your questions. If
10	safety of helicopters operating in the	10	required, I would be happy to speak about the
11	offshore. I know you will look carefully at	11	facts that we've published to date on the
12	our public report on this accident. There you	12	Cougar 491 accident, but in the interest of
13	will find the Board's final word and its	13	accuracy, I will not be providing detailed
14	definitive findings as to the causes and	14	technical information or explanations beyond
15	contributing factors that led to this	15	that scope. I'd also remind you that I will
16	accident. I will draw your attention to	16	not be able to comment on any ongoing aspects
17	Section 4, which as in all TSB Reports, will	17	of the investigation, but would be happy to
18	contain the Board's opinion on what needs to	18	speak in general terms about the TSB and its
19	be done to advance aviation safety. Most TSB	19	processes, and I thank you for your
20	recommendations are made to the regulators	20	understanding in that regard.
21	like Canada's Department of Transport and the	21 COM	MISSIONER:
22	Federal Aviation Administration in the United	22 Q.	Thank you, Mrs. Tadros. I understand from Ms.
23	States. The reason for this is if we find a	23	Fagan that you have something to enter or
24	safety deficiency, the fix should really apply	24	there is something to be entered as an
25	to the whole industry worldwide. Changes to	25	exhibit. This might be a good opportunity

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	Page 29				Page 3
1	before you take questions and before you enter				AGAN:
2	that exhibit for you to be sworn, and then	2		Q.	Thank you. I was going to ask a few questions
3	we'll carry on.	3			and then leave it to the group to see if
	MS. WENDY TADROS (SWORN) EXAMINATION BY MS. ANNE FAGAN	4			anybody else would like to ask questions.
	MS. FAGAN:				IISSIONER:
6	Q. Thank you, Mr. Commissioner. Thank you, Mrs.	6			Yes, okay then.
7	Tadros. Mrs. Tadros and the TSB were kind				AGAN:
8	enough to put together a package of documents.	8		Q.	Thank you very much for the information you've
9	Those documents have been disclosed to the	9			provided so far. We heard in the past few
10	parties and their counsel, and they are now	10			days about incidents and accidents, and if you
11	marked and we'd like to have them entered as	11			would be good enough to explain or define, we
12	Exhibits 1 through 10, and Mrs. Tadros	12			don't need to drill down into an exact
13	referred to most of these exhibits as	13			definition, whichever you believe is the best
14	documents and her document number matches the	14			way to explain what is it that needs to be
15	exhibit number, and for the record, the first	15			reported. I understand under the Act, I
6	exhibit is the Annual Report to Parliament in	16			believe they use language "occurrence", and
17	French and in English and these will all be	17			then occurrence is broken into "accident" and
18	posted on the website for the public and for	18			"incident". An accident may be fairly easy to
19	their convenience. Most of these documents	19			understand, yet people may not have the right
20	would also be available on the TSB website,	20			understanding, and an incident may even be a
21	and other information is available on the TSB	21			little bit more difficult to grasp. So if you
22	website. However, for ease of convenience, we	22			could take us through what those concepts
23	will post them on our website under today's	23			mean?
24	evidence. The second is the Canadian				ADROS:
25	Transportation Accident Investigation and	25		A.	Okay. I think the easiest way to do this is
	Page 30				Page 33
1	Safety Board Act, a long name, but the Act is	1			just to go through a short scroll of the Act
2	there. The third is the Transportation Safety	2	2		and the Regulations, which I think you said
3	Board Regulations. The fourth is Annex 13, the	3	;		were Documents 2 and 3.
4	International Convention on Civil Aviation	4	M	S. FA	AGAN:
5	Accident and Incident Investigation. Most of	5	i	Q.	That's correct, the Act is 2, and the
6	these are in French and English. The	6	<u>,</u>		Regulations are 3.
7	Convention is actually in a number of	7	M	S. TA	ADROS:
8	languages. The video that was played, in the	8	5	A.	So if you take a look at Section 2 of the Act,
9	event viewers would like to look at that video	9	)		there's a definition of aviation occurrence,
10	again, or any of the parties. The	10	)		and aviation occurrence includes an accident
11	Investigation Process Pamphlet, that's number	11			or incident associated with the operation of
12	six. The video is number five. The Occurrence	12			the aircraft.
13	Classification Policy, which assists the Board	13	М	S. FA	AGAN:
14	in determining which occurrences they're going	14		Q.	My colleague is gone to get the Registrar to
15	to investigate, that's number seven. The	15			pull up the Act.
16	PowerPoint which includes the slides on the	16	M	S. TA	ADROS:
17	methodology is number eight. The Integrated	17	,	A.	Okay, I'll just standby.
18	Safety Investigation Methodology, the	18	M		AGAN:
19	reference manual that explains that	19	)	Q.	She's multi-tasking, trying to post them on
20	methodology, is nine. There is a long list of	20	)		the website, and she'll be right in.
21	helicopter related safety advisories and	21	C	OMM	IISSIONER:
22	safety letters, and that's number ten.	22			I suppose most people may have the document in
	COMMISSIONER:	23		-	front of them, in any event, this binder.
24	Q. Okay, thank you, these documents are entered			S. FA	AGAN:
	now.	25			Most of them here she comes.

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1 REGISTRAR:	1	3, we have this Act applies in respect of
2 Q. The exhibits have been delivered to the media	a 2	aviation occurrences, which we've just
3 room.	3	defined, and we have some of the geographic
4 COMMISSIONER:	4	parameters. So in or over Canada, in or over
5 Q. Thank you.	5	any place that is under Canadian air traffic
6 REGISTRAR:	6	control, in or over any other place, if Canada
7 Q. You're welcome.	7	is requested to investigate the aviation
8 MS. FAGAN:	8	accident by an appropriate authority, or the
9 Q. We are looking for the Act, which is Docume	ent 9	aviation occurrence involves an aircraft in
10 2.	10	respect of which or that is operated by a
11 MS. TADROS:	11	person to whom a Canadian aviation document
12 A. If you can scroll down to Section 2 there.	12	has been issued under Part I of the
13 MS. FAGAN:	13	Aeronautics Act. So that's basically our
14 Q. Just another page or two.	14	jurisdiction. The next question that I think
15 MS. TADROS:	15	you posed had to do with what needs to be
16 A. There we go.	16	reported, and that's found in the Regulations,
17 MS. FAGAN:	17	which is the next document.
18 Q. Occurrence, aviation occurrence is what we'r	e 18 MS.	FAGAN:
19 okay. Your assistant can do this too.		. Number 3.
20 Once it's up, he can move.		TADROS:
21 MS. TADROS:		. Number 3. There's some definitions right up
22 A. Okay.	22	front in Section 2, and it's about half way
23 MS. FAGAN:	22	along you'll find reportable aviation
24 Q. Let's go.	23	accident, John. There we go, yeah. So we
25 MS. TADROS:	25	have reportable aviation accident and
	ge 34	Page 36
A. Okay. So that's the definition of an aviation	ge 54	reportable aviation incident, and they're
2 occurrence, and the aviation occurrence is the		rather long. Would you like them read into
3 umbrella. Within that umbrella, we have		the record?
4 accidents or incidents and you can see the	-	FAGAN:
5 definitions there, and they're fairly broad.		No, but perhaps you could as best you can,
6 MS. FAGAN:	6	just describe - the lawyers in the room may
7 Q. And would you be good enough to read tho		wish to read the definitions at a later time,
8 definitions in because this is probably not	8	but if you could just explain, so that the
<ul><li>being seen by the viewers on the webcast.</li></ul>	9	viewers would understand what an accident is
10 MS. TADROS:	10	and what an incident is, and then we could
11 A. Okay.	10	move into who has to report and the protocol
12 MS. FAGAN:	11	for reporting.
13 Q. They can't see what's here unless they have a		TADROS:
13 Q. They can't see what's here unless they have a 14 split screen at home, which is very unlikely.		. Okay. To make it really, really short, an
14 spin screen at nome, which is very uniffery. 15 MS. TADROS:	14 A	accident is more serious, and an incident is
16 A. Okay. An aviation occurrence means any	-	less serious. So that's the basic
17 accident or incident associated with the	10	demarkation.
17 accident of incident associated with the 18 operation of an aircraft, and any situation or	-	FAGAN:
19 condition that the Board has reasonable		And what types of things would be an incident?
20 grounds to believe could, if left unattended,	20	I mean, I think an accident I think that
21 induce an accident or incident described in	20	might be fairly easy to understand, but what
22 Paragraph A. So then if we flip over a little	21	types of things would fall into an incident?
bit to Section 3, the Act is really intended		TADROS:
to set out what we can investigate, where the		Well, there's a whole list there in the
25 jurisdiction of the Board lies. So in Section	24 A 25	definition. We've got engine failure or
	23	adminute it for for engine future of

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1 shutdown as a	precautionary measure,	1		information as is listed in Subsection 2, as
2 transmission gear b	box malfunction, smoke or	2		is available, as soon as possible and by the
3 fire occurs, difficul	lty in controlling the	3		quickest means possible, so right away.
4 aircraft, the aircraft	fails to remain within	4	MS. FA	AGAN:
5 the intending landir	ng or take off area, and	5	Q.	And they have to report, and what we're
6 then there is anoth	er section on the crew	6		interested in here really is helicopter
7 duties related to the	e safe operation of the	7		transportation, and I realize you're speaking
	are unable to perform	8		from all the aviation type terminology. I
	have incapacitation,	9		understand there is reporting requirements in
-	uel shortage, the wrong	10		the marine and the rail, and they would have
	into the aircraft, a	11		different types of incidents. I understand
	collision, or a loss of	12		they must report to the TSB. Do would this
<b>^</b>	re air traffic control	13		type of thing also have to be reported to
	nber declares an emergency.	14		anyone else, to the best of your knowledge,
-	opter with a slung load and	15		such as Transport Canada, or any other
	ntionally. So these are	16		regulatory body?
	e demarkation again with			ADROS:
-	n accident is the	18	А.	There may be separate reporting requirements
19 seriousness of what	happens.	19		for Transport Canada, but I can't speak in any
20 MS. FAGAN:		20		kind of detail about those reporting
-	to report and to whom do	21	. KG E	requirements.
	rt, and I know you're			AGAN:
	Fransportation Safety Board, t to you, and what do they	23 24	Q.	I wouldn't expect you to be able to speak in detail. We understand that from Transport
-	when do they have to	24		Canada that this type of activity would have
	Page 38	25		Page 40
1 report it?	Tage 38	1		to be reported to both authorities, both
2 MS. TADROS:		2		regulators, and one being the TSB. Is there
3 A. Okay.		3		any coordination or linkage or communication
4 MS. FAGAN:		4		between the TSB and Transport Canada? Now
5 Q. That kind of thing.		5		you've said, of course, they're the regulator
6 MS. TADROS:		6		and your recommendations would go at the end
7 A. If we scroll down	to Section 6 of the	7		of the day, quite often, if it's aviation,
	have something that falls	8		would certainly go to the Transport Canada
, s	ons that we just spoke	9		aviation people because they are the
	mandatory reporting under	10		regulator. What about from a reporting
11 Section 6.		11		perspective before you even start your
12 MS. FAGAN:		12		investigation?
13 Q. So would that be ac	cidents and incidents?	13	MS. T.	ADROS:
14 MS. TADROS:		14	А.	Well, in terms of reporting, the reporting
15 A. Yes.		15		requirements to the TSB are separate from the
16 MS. FAGAN:		16		reporting requirements to Transport Canada.
17 Q. Okay, and who wou	ald have to report?	17		So we maintain carriage of all of the
18 MS. TADROS:		18		information that comes into the TSB, and the
19 A. There's a list in the		19		reason for that is our independence as an
	lot in command, any crew	20		investigative body. There will be sharing of
	aft, and where the accident	21		information when there is an accident,
	s a loss of separation or a	22		particularly a large accident, and the
	y air traffic controller	23		Minister has the option of appointing a
-	ledge of the accident or	24		Minister's observer to the investigation, and
25 incident, shall repor	rt to the Board as much	25		in that way there's a single point for the

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1 information to flow to Transport Canada.	1	m	e about the aircraft itself in terms of the
2 MS. FAGAN:	2	W	reckage, is that what you wanted me to
3 Q. In addition to the reporting, what types of	3	MS. FAC	JAN:
4 documents would you receive, either they'	re 4	Q.D	ocumentation on the you can go there as
5 presented in a sort of proactive, somebody	y 5	W	ell, but the documentation on the aircraft
6 submits them, or you seek them out? Wh			om Transport Canada, and then anything else
7 types of documents for example, from			at you'd get, such as from the wreckage?
8 Transport Canada, what documents would	-		hat would you take in with respect to the
9 expect in a major accident where there's los			rcraft?
10 of life, what would you expect to receive, or		MS. TAE	
11 what do you go collect?	11		terms of documentation?
12 MS. TADROS:		MS. FAC	
13 A. Well, this is speaking broadly, not about any	•	Q. Y	
14 particular accident, because the information		MS. TAE	
15 that we would require would depend on th			Vell, we would want to know the number of
16 facts of the accident. So it would depend on			ours, for instance, that the aircraft had
17 what the investigators are looking for, but			een flown, but that would normally come from
18 they would normally ask and receive all of t			e carrier, not from Transport Canada, but we
<ul><li>information that has to do with Transport</li><li>Canada's interaction with that carrier. If</li></ul>			ould want to know everything that they know
	20		bout the operator and about that particular
			rcraft, if they have any information on it. o it's any relevant information.
<ul><li>do with the interaction between Transport</li><li>Canada and the air traffic control system.</li></ul>		MS. FAC	-
24 MS. FAGAN:	23		o if Transport Canada type certified an
25 Q. What about the vehicle itself, whether it was			rcraft, you would look for the
		- Ch	
	Page 42	0	Page 44 ertification, the documents in connection
1 the aircraft or the ship, would you you 2 dealt with the carrier, and in our			ith the certification, for example?
3 terminology, we use an air operator.		MS. TAE	-
4 MS. TADROS:			es, if we were if we were looking at
5 A. Okay.	5		hything to do with the aircraft, we would
6 MS. FAGAN:	6		ant to know what issues arose during the
7 Q. Who's commuting passengers, so would I ta	-		ertification, if any.
8 that the carrier if Transport Canada has a		MS. FAC	
9 relationship with the air operator, especially			ou had mentioned that you work closely with
10 if they issued the certificate, that	10		e FAA, or there's a connection between the
11 information would come to you?	11		AA. As I understand it, the FAA in the
12 MS. TADROS:	12		nited States is the equivalent of Transport
13 A. Yes.	13		anada, if you wanted to look at a
14 MS. FAGAN:	14	С	ounterpart. In the United States, what's the
15 Q. You know, the communications back and for	orth. 15	in	vestigative arm in the United States, their
16 What about information with respect to the	ie 16	di	ivision or branch? In Canada, it's the TSB.
17 particular vehicle involved, let's say, an	17	MS. TAE	DROS:
18 aircraft, what information would you get?	18	A. O	kay. In the United States, the National
19 MS. TADROS:	19	Т	ransportation Safety Board, and you've
20 A. If there's we would get whatever	20	-	robably seen that on the news. You'll see
21 information Transport Canada has on tha	at 21		TSB. They are an independent body, as we
22 particular aircraft or on that aircraft type	22		re, and investigate they have a slightly
23 in terms of the certification of the aircraft.	23		fferent mandate, but they investigate in
24 So we would receive we would ask for a			such the same way that we do.
25 receive all relevant information. You asked	d 25	MS. FAC	GAN:

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1	Q. Would the TSB interact, you'd mention	ned 1		sent information off site, but they are kept
2	earlier, with the manufacturer? Could y			apprised of the investigation as it moves
3	give us an example or I guess, an exam			forward, and the reason they're doing that,
4	or a situation, or what type of interaction	-		for instance, with the NTSB, that's the state
5	I mean, is it a phone call, or would you			of manufacture, and there's an interest there.
6	physically go to see the manufacturer?	I 6		They want to keep on top of all the safety
7	mean, how far does the TSB go with	h 7		issues as they're coming out in the
8	investigating or interviewing manufacture	ers of 8		investigation. So that's their primary
9	the equipment that was in the accident?	9		interest.
10	MS. TADROS:	10	MS. FA	AGAN:
11	A. Well, there's really two things that can	11 II	Q.	So they might be there, the manufacturer may
12	happen. We can interview the manufact	urer, 12		be a representative or an observer, they may
13	but the manufacturer can also work with	the 13		have a similar type role in that they may
14	investigation, if there are specific things	14		be there. You mentioned supervised, of
15	that need to be known about that machine	e. I 15		course.
16	think that you can appreciate that there are		MS. TA	ADROS:
17	many, many different aircraft operating in	n the 17	А.	Yes.
18	world, and so when you're investigating	g a 🛛 18	MS. FA	AGAN:
19	particular aircraft, as we were with Swissa	air, 19	Q.	But they have been there as part of the
20	the manufacturer has all of the as-builts, it	f 20	MS. TA	ADROS:
21	you will. They have all of the drawings, t	they 21	A.	Well, I'll give you an example. If you're
22	know where every wire was placed in	the 22		dealing with an engine and you have to do a
23	aircraft, so we work very closely with the			tear down of an engine, then there are a
24	manufacturer. They provide us with the			number of people who would attend that tear
25	information that they have.	25		down and observe, and one of them would be the
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1 1	MS. FAGAN:	1		company that manufactured the engine.
2	Q. Do you work if the accident occurs i		MS. FA	
3	Canada, then the TSB would have the excl	usive 3		When it comes to coordination and exchange of
4	jurisdiction, is that correct?	4		information, I understand the TSB has the
	MS. TADROS:	5		exclusive jurisdiction. Sometimes with
6	A. Correct.	6		accidents you may end up with a police force,
	MS. FAGAN:	7		for example, also involved in some aspect of
8	Q. So the NTSB, the investigative arm, the U			the accident. Could you explain how that
9	equivalent, would they be involved in t			works physically if, say, the RCMP is there?
10	accident in your investigation in any wa	-		You've said DND can the Department of
11	if it was an American aircraft?	11		National Defence, they can investigate on
	MS. TADROS:	12		their own, but let's just say it's a police
13	A. They would have the right under internati			force and it's the TSB?
14	agreements to appoint accredited		MS. TA	
15	representatives. MS. FAGAN:	15 16		Okay, let's say it's a civilian aircraft. The best example of this was Swissair 111. In the
17	Q. And what do the accredited representative			early days of an accident, you don't always
18	in that where are they physically? Ar			know whether there was a criminal act or not.
19	they sent information by e-mail, are the			So we work in tandem and we have a very good
20	physically part of the field or the reporting	•		relationship with the RCMP, and sometimes they
20	phase? Where do they come in in the	-		have a lot more resources than we have, so we
22	investigation?	22		work in tandem until a decision is made about
	MS. TADROS:	23		whose jurisdiction primary jurisdiction it
24	A. They may do both. They may attend on			would be. So if it is determined absolutely
25	they may attend group meetings, they m			from a scientific perspective that it wasn't a

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1 criminal act, then the RCMP will drop of	off and 1	I MS. FA	GAN:
2 we will continue. If it is determined t	here 2	2 Q.	So for the Atlantic region, where would the
3 was a criminal act, then we will drop of	off and 3	3 :	field office be?
4 the RCMP will continue, and that's	what 4	4 MS. TA	DROS:
5 happened in the situation with Air Ind	ia. 5	5 A.	Halifax.
6 MS. FAGAN:		5 MS. FA	
7 Q. Because a criminal act, for example, v	vould be 7		Halifax. And do you know approximately how
8 a bomb or some type of sabotage?	8		many people there are in the field office in
9 MS. TADROS:	Ģ		Halifax? Or just a sense, we have 235, sort
10 A. Yes, they're good example.	10		of how are they spread across?
11 MS. FAGAN:		I MS. TA	
12 Q. So if that was the cause, then RCMP we			Well, the decisions are made about who will be
13 its labs and its personnel and take th			in our regional office based on the modes
14 take over the accident. Would that be			(phonetic), so in Halifax we have aviation
15 or does TSB are you still involved, or			expertise, we have marine expertise and we
16 they the lead?	16		have rail expertise. In some other offices,
17 MS. TADROS:	17		for instance on the Prairies, we don't have
18 A. They're the lead and we wouldn'			too much marine expertise.
19 investigating for causes and contrib	-	MS. FA	
20 factors once it had been determined t			And what happens when there is an accident, I
21 was a criminal act, but we may assist Ear instance in Air India it was the			mean, Newfoundland and Labrador, like many
For instance, in Air India, it was the investigator who determined that it wa			jurisdictions where we seem to have a fair
			number of accidents, not only in aviation, in the marine area it seems to be fairly, fairly
<ul> <li>on board the aircraft. It's up to the RCI</li> <li>decide whether they're going to con-</li> </ul>			constant in the news.
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1 further criminal investigation and pros	ē	I MS. TA	_
2 MS. FAGAN:			Yes.
3 Q. The Department of National Defer		3 MS. FA	
4 understand that's sort of a separate			So you have your field office, could you just
5 does that work?			take us through, I mean there's aI wouldn't
6 MS. TADROS:			want to say a skeleton group, but there's a
7 A. They investigate their own accidents.			group of experts there. Now there's some
8 MS. FAGAN:	3		major accident or catastrophe, how does it
9 Q. So if there's an accident with DND air			work? Do people from Ottawa or the main
10 they have the jurisdiction to investig			office or other jurisdictions come to support?
11 their own accidents and they have a g	-	I MS. TA	
12 very capable investigators.	12		If there's a big investigation, like Swissair
13 MS. FAGAN:	13		111, we will pull on our people from across
14 Q. You had mentioned that you have 23	5 people. 14		the country. In a situation with Cougar 491,
15 Are they all at headquarters or is the 2			the two investigators from our Halifax office
16 headquarters and in those fields, sort			deployed immediately and they were joined by
17 satellite offices or branch offices that			experts from head office. So it really
18 on the slide?	18	3 (	depends on the accident and the investigator
19 MS. TADROS:	19	<b>)</b> i	in charge, what his needs are.
20 A. It's 235 all the way across the countr	y. So 20	) MS. FA	-
21 it's a very small organization with a ve	ery big 21	I Q. '	The facilities, could you just elaborate a
22 mandate, if you will, and the reason the	hat we 22	2	little bit more on the types of people, the
have people across the country is we	have to 23	3	credentials, I mean, are the people thatare
be able to deploy quickly to accident	sites 24	1 1	they in laboratories, do they have Ph.D's,
25 all over Canada.	25	5 ,	what types of equipment do you have,

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1	especially in an aviation, you know, the		1	records parameters on the aircraft and
2	Swissair was a major catastrophe. We hear,		2	depending on how sophisticated that recorder
3	although not able to look at the 491 accident,		3	is. There will be more parameters the more
4	that's your jurisdiction, but what types of		4	sophisticated the recorder is, so it's
5	equipment and what types of expertise would b	e l	5	recording more things. There's also the
6	brought in an aviation type accident?		6	cockpit voice recorder and that records not
7	MS. TADROS:		7	only the voices in the cockpit, but any sounds
8	A. Whatever type of expertise we require and if		8	that may be heard. So for instance, they will
9	we don't have that expertise, we can borrow		9	be looking for whether certain instruments
10	from National Research Council or several	1	0	were activated by the sounds that they can try
11	other bodies, but normally we do have the	1	1	to pick up off of the recorder and it's the
12	expertise and in an aviation occurrence, you	1	2	CVR or the cockpit voice recorder that's
13	would have people with an operation's	1	3	privileged. The reason for that is the same
14	background, so you would have pilots. If you	1	4	reason that the witness statements are
15	have something like a near miss, you have air	1	5	protected, it is because we want to have this
16	traffic control specialists, people who've	1	6	information for future investigations, so in
17	actually been air traffic controllers and know	1		Canada, in particular, that's a very important
18	how the system works. You have people with		8	principle.
19	maintenance background, so you have AMEs w		9 MS. FA	
20	understand the physical make up of the			I understand in the Swissair, I believe, in
21	aircraft. You have lots and lots of engineers		1	some accidents you will hear that the recorder
22	and they may be specialists in fire, they may		2	stopped or there wasn't enoughthe tape
23	be specialists in metallurgy. We have human		.3	stopped. Are there recommendations out there
24	performance experts who look at the		4	or how does that come about? Is there
25	interaction between the person and the		.5	equipment that now allows the tapes to run
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1	machinery and all of the factors that can	-	1	right through or do the tapes still stop?
2	impact on that, on those dynamics. We have		2 MS. TA	
3	chemists, we have practically every scienti			The tapes still stop from time to time and
4	background that you can imagine and with		4	when they do, we have to set about trying to
5	those backgrounds they are sub, sub, su			figure out why. But in answer to your
6	specialized.		6	question about the recommendations, there were
	MS. FAGAN:		7	recommendations in the Swissair investigation
8	Q. The recorders, they're often referred to as		8	that dealt with recorders. One recommendation
9	the "black box".		9	pertained to the length of time when the
	MS. TADROS:		0	recorder will record, and our recommendation
11	A. Yes.		1	is that that be bumped up from 30 minutes to
	MS. FAGAN:		2	two hours, so that-there may be a
13	Q. Could you just describe the process, when		3	misunderstanding that you only want the
14	that goes, where is it and I understand that			information right around the occurrence, but
15	information is privileged, but I'd just like		5	in fact, investigators want to know all of the
16	for just a general understanding and an ans		.6	preceding events because there may be
17	as toI understand that information is neve		7	something they can learn in the first ten
18	released, but could you just explain what		8	minutes that will help them understand at the
19	happens to that recording, where are they a		9	very end. So that's the one recommendation.
20	what happens to them.		20	The second recommendation deals with the power
	MS. TADROS:	2		supply to recorders and the recommendation
22	A. Okay, what people refer to as the "black bo		2	asks that there be separate power supplies, so
23	actually has two components and sometime		3	that if one stops, the other doesn't
24	are together and sometimes they are separa	-	4	automatically stop.
25			5 MS. FA	
L				

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1 Q. You had said that in the flight 491 acciden	t, 1		one person whose job it is to do that, they
2 the FAA issued an emergency airworthin	iess 2	2	are dedicated to keep in touch with the
3 directive.	3	3	families and so all of the communication goes
4 MS. TADROS:	4	Ļ	through that one person and they work at the
5 A. That's correct.	5	5	board.
6 MS. FAGAN:	6	6 MS. F	FAGAN:
7 Q. You also said that the TSB informs the FAA	, is 7	. Q.	Commissioner, I have a couple of more
8 that correct? Did I miss something? How	did 8	3	questions and I know we've had a break, so I
9 that come about, I mean I'm getting at th	ne 9	)	don't know what your wish is. I know I've run
10 reporting and the communication and qu	lite 10	)	past10:45 is the normal break time, so I
11 often you may be investigating an aircraft	ft  11		don't know if you want to -
12 that's manufactured somewhere other than	n in 12	COM	MISSIONER:
13 the United States or in Canada and there's	the 13	8 Q.	If you just have a couple more questions, why
14 manufacturing certified authority, and we	've  14		not do that then.
15 heard yesterday that the airworthiness		MS. F	AGAN:
directives usually come from the origina		5 Q.	Only have a few more questions, okay. On your
17 certified authority from the country whic			investigative methodology and then you're
18 typed certified the aircraft from a design		3	reporting. Do youI know you don't assign
19 manufacturer perspective.	19	)	fault, but in the report itself, do youare
20 MS. TADROS:	20	)	there different categories in that there may
21 A. From the state of manufacturer, yes.	21		beyou may determine that something caused
22 MS. FAGAN:	22	2	the accident, but you may make other findings
23 Q. State of manufacturer. So could you expla	ain 23	5	or have other recommendations that aren't
the reporting or the interaction between th		Ļ	related to the cause, are there different
TSB and that state of manufacturer?	25		categories?
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1 MS. TADROS:	-	MS. T	ADROS:
2 A. Well I can tell you what it normally would	l be, 2	2 A.	Okay, I think there's really two questions
3 something would be drafted up outlining w			there. Yes, in the report there are three
4 the safety deficiency was that was found a		Ļ	categories of findings. The first is finding
5 it would be sent off. But in the case of this	5	5	as to causes and contributing factors, and
6 investigation, it happened much more quid	ckly 6	ó	those are things that have been demonstrated
7 is my understanding and we spoke earlier a	-	,	to have played a role in the accident. The
8 the team being on site, together with the		8	second is findings as to risk and those
9 accredited representatives and the observe		)	findings are things that have not necessarily
and apparently this is what happened in the		)	played a role in the accident, but they're
11 situation when the stud was discovered is t			risks in the system. So we would make
12 the key people were there and so action w	vas 12	2	findings on all of those. We may make
13 taken very quickly. We didn't actually p		5	recommendations on them if something needs to
14 out a long description of what the problem			be done that we learn along the way. And the
15 because the people who needed to know,			third is other findings and those are really
<ul><li>immediately what the problem was.</li></ul>	16		more minor. They're designed sometimes to put
17 MS. FAGAN:	17		an issue to rest. If any issue has come up in
18 Q. You mentioned that you keep the survivors			an investigation and it's being publicly
19 next of kin informed. How do you go ab			discussed, then if we find that it didn't play
20 that, do you send letters or do you work			a role, we will say so, or other factual
21 through counsel or do you offer that and th			information that we feel should be in the
22 leave it up to the next of kin or survivors o			findings. So that was, I think, the second
23 other passengers to contact the TSB?	23		question that you asked. The first question
24 MS. TADROS:	23		that you asked was about blame and there is a
25 A. Well in the case of a large accident, we have			section in our Act that basically says it is
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1	not the role of the Board to assign fault or	1	report and any of the engineering laboratory
2	blame, but that we should not hesitate to	2	reports that are produced in support of the
3	report on anything that may infer blame.	3	draft support. They are entitled, if they
4	Those aren't the exact words, but that is the	4	wish, to have any information on the
5	general idea, so we still have to report	5	investigation that is public.
6	everything that we learn, everything that we	6 MS	. FAGAN:
7	find. If somebody else infers blame from	7 (	Q. Are the designated reviewers the same people
8	that, well then that's their business, but the	8	who are observing or could they be different
9	purpose of the investigation is not to assist	9	groups or could there be some overlap? For
10	that process.	10	example, the manufacturer or let's say the
11 MS	. FAGAN:	11	people who are involved, it might be an
12 (	Q. One of the last areas is with respect to the	12	American manufacturer, maybe the American
13	report and I understand that you issue a	13	investigative body is there, maybe the
14	report but that it's not the final report,	14	operator might be there, there may be a number
15	that there's an interaction or an opportunity	15	of people who are sort of the stakeholders who
16	for feedback for the interested parties to	16	are interested in the process, are they the
17	maybe contest or bring other information	17	same people as the designated reviewers or is
18	forward. What is distributed and who receives	18	the groups different?
19	the draft report, and I don't know if that's	19 MS	. TADROS:
20	what it's called, but the section before it's	20 /	A. They're not necessarily, but you're pretty
21	going to be final, can you explain who is	21	close.
22	going to get it and what's in it?	22 MS	. FAGAN:
23 MS	. TADROS:	23 (	Q. There's some overlap.
24	A. Okay, the people who receive the draft report	24 MS	. TADROS:
25	are designed reviewers and those are persons	25 /	A. There's some overlap. So, normally in
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1	or corporations with a direct interest. And	1	aviation investigation, the manufacturer, if
2	the reason that we circulate the draft report	2	it's a foreign manufacturer, then that state,
3	is for two purposes. One is to satisfy	3	the pilot, the co-pilot or their next of kin
4	fairness, which you understand in law what	4	would normally be designated reviewers; the
5	that means, and the second is to ensure the	5	company, the regulator, those are all
6	accuracy of the report. So in a sense, it's a	6	examples. When you talk about manufacturer,
7	form of scientific challenge and if there's	7	you have many portions of aircraft are
8	anything that isn't correct in that report, we	8	manufactured by different companies, so the
9	want to know about it, we'd go back and take	9	actual aircraft may be manufactured by one
10	another look at it and a decision will be made	10	company, the engines may be manufactured by
11	as to whether that point of view is valid or	11	another company or some component within the
12	not.	12	avionics may be manufactured by another
13 MS	. FAGAN:	13	company. So you're dealing with anybody whose
14 (	Q. If there are certain findings in the draft	14	product or behaviour may be commented on.
15	report, does that also include the grounds or	15 MS.	FAGAN:
16	the information upon which that findingI	16 (	Q. What happens when the draft report goes out
17	mean, how much do the designated reviewers g		and then you wait for response? What's the
18	in order to determine, there may be some	18	process after you receive the response or the
19	things which they know, look, that's not true.	19	feedback from the designated reviewers?
20	There may be some obvious things where they	20 MS.	TADROS:
21	know that's not true, they have it wrong. But		A. It's a very time consuming process, I can tell
22	how much information is there so that these	22	you that because we go through each and every
23	designated reviewers can make that assessment		comment, so on a small investigationwell it
	. TADROS:	24	doesn't necessarily depend on the size of the
		1	investigation because you may get a very small

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1 accident where people are quite interested and	-	1 (	2. So from start to finish, you have your
2 you may get hundreds and hundreds of commen	nts,	2	accident and then you have your final report,
3 but I think at the top range we would have a		3	I take it that process would take more than a
4 thousand to twelve hundred comments on a		4	year if you have six months between the draft
5 particular report, that would be at the very		5	and the coming back and forthand I know it
6 top range. At the lower end of the scale, the		6	may be impossible, but even a range as to, on
7 report maybe totally accepted and not disputed		7	average or how long does it take to get that
8 at all. So we go through each and every one		8	final report?
9 of those and we provide the answer to each and	1	9 MS.	. TADROS:
10 every one to the individual that commented.		10 A	A. To get the final report out to the public, it
11 MS. FAGAN:		11	could take anywhere from, for a fairly
12 Q. And then youI mean, could sometimes the		12	straightforward investigation, it could take
13 comments result in the requirement to conduct		13	eight months to a year; for our largest
14 further investigation or further interaction?		14	investigation thus far, Swissair, it was four
15 MS. TADROS:		15	and a half years, but I think you can
16 A. Yes, they couldit could result in further		16	appreciate that that was a very, very complex
17 investigation in order to determine if you		17	investigation and the field phase itself, the
18 have opposing viewpoints on a particular piece		18	recovery of the wreckage took more than a
19 of machinery, for instance, the investigators		19	year.
20 will have to figure out which one is right.	,	20 MS.	FAGAN:
21 So that may require further investigation. If	,	21 (	Q. We have had the concepts of a culture, a
22 the report drastically changes, then it may		22	safety culture and you had indicated that the
have to be circulated again.	,	23	main mandateI may have it wrong, but the
24 MS. FAGAN:	,	24	main mandate is to improve and enhance safety,
25 Q. To everybody?	,	25	I mean, that's the goal at the end of the day.
]	Page 66		Page 68
1 MS. TADROS:		1 MS.	. TADROS:
2 A. Yes.		2 A	A. Yes.
3 MS. FAGAN:		3 MS.	FAGAN:
4 Q. What's the timing and I know, I guess we	're	4 (	Q. And this Inquiry is looking for ways to
5 looking at a huge range between thefor th	he	5	improve safety and one of the things that has
6 type of accident, but this process appears to	c l	6	been brought forward is encouraging and
7 be very involved and time consuming, so v	what	7	promoting a safety culture. Just ask if you
8 would the expectation be for the final repor		8	comment on that concept and if there's any
9 I mean, this draft process, does this takeif	f	9	suggestions or recommendations as to how that
10 the draft goes out, is it 60 days later,	30	10	can be promoted?
11 days later, six months later and it may be	:	11 MS.	. TADROS:
12 impossible to gauge.		12 A	A. Very, very complex field and this is part of
13 MS. TADROS:		13	what we look at when we look at organizational
14 A. Well the report can go out for 30 days or	60	14	factors. And you've probably heard about
15 days, depending, but in that range and ofte	en	15	safety management systems, but encouraging or
16 we're asked for extensions if it's a very		16	promoting a safety culture is part and parcel
17 complex report and if the person who is	s	17	of safety management systems and there's been
18 commenting wants to do some research on		18	much written on safety management systems, but
19 own, we'll be asked for an extension.		19	I think it's definitely something that you
20 Normally the comments would come back	within	20	should look at.
21 30 or 60 days and then depending on how		21 MS.	FAGAN:
22 of them there are and whether there's further	-	22 (	2. That would be all the questions that I would
23 investigation, that process can take anywhe	ere	23	have and I don't know if the Commissioner
24 from a month to five, six months.		24	would like to break and then give the parties
25 MS. FAGAN:		25	an opportunity -

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1 COMMISSIONER:	1 MR. PRITCHARD:
2 Q. Yes, we'll take a break now and we'll have	2 Q. Mr. Commissioner, no questions, thank you.
3 questions from the group.	3 COMMISSIONER:
4 MS. FAGAN:	4 Q. Okay, thank you. Mr. Harris is not here.
5 Q. Thank you, Ms. Tadros.	5 Counsel for yes, Mr. Earle, counsel for the
6 (RECESS)	6 CEP, the union.
7 COMMISSIONER:	7 EARLE, Q.C.:
<ul> <li>Q. Now then we'll take questions from the group</li> <li>to Mrs. Tadros, and I have the list here. We</li> </ul>	<ul><li>8 Q. Yes, thank you, Mr. Commissioner. No</li><li>9 surprise, we have questions as usual.</li></ul>
<ul><li>would begin with counsel for C-NLOPB, Ms.</li><li>Crosbie.</li></ul>	<ul><li>10 MS. WENDY TADROS - EXAMINATION BY RANDY EARLE, Q.C.</li><li>11 EARLE, Q.C.:</li></ul>
12 MS. CROSBIE:	12 Q. Good morning, Ms. Tadros. I'm Randell Earle.
13 Q. We have no questions, thank you.	13 As the Commissioner indicated, I represent CEP
14 COMMISSIONER:	Local 2121, and 2121 is the bargaining agent
15 Q. Okay, thank you. Counsel for Transport Canada?	
16 MR. FREEMAN:	16 the Terra Nova FPSO. So what you're looking
17 Q. We also have no questions. We simply thank	17 at is the questioner on behalf of probably a
18 Madam Tadros for her presentation today.	18 majority of the passengers who use helicopter
19 COMMISSIONER:	19 transport to and from their workplaces, and
20 Q. All right, thank you. Mr. Brown, counsel for	20 clearly these people are extremely interested
21 CAPP is not here, is he? No. Okay, and	21 in the work of the Transportation Safety
22 counsel for the operators.	22 Board. My first question for you, and I think
23 MACDONALD, Q.C.:	23 many of my questions will be almost by way of
24 Q. No questions.	24 confirming things that are implicit in what
25 COMMISSIONER:	25 you said earlier, but am I correct in saying
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1 Q. Ms. Strickland.	1 that the work of the Transportation Safety
2 MS. STRICKLAND:	2 Board is occurrence driven?
3 Q. No questions at this time for HMDC.	3 MS. TADROS:
4 COMMISSIONER:	4 A. Yes, but I would add a caveat. We have the
5 Q. Okay, thank you.	5 capacity and we have done what we call Class 4
6 MR. WALLACE:	6 investigations, and those are investigations
7 Q. No questions, Mr. Commissioner.	7 that are not driven by any particular
8 COMMISSIONER:	8 accident, but when we do investigations of
9 Q. No questions, all right, thank you. Mr.	9 particular accidents and realize there may be
10 Whalen for Cougar.	10 an issue in the system, as a whole, we can
11 WHALEN, Q.C.:	11 look into those safety issues. For instance,
12 Q. No questions, thank you, Mr. Commissioner.	12 at the moment we are doing safety issues
13 COMMISSIONER:	13 investigation on fishing vessel safety. So we
14 Q. Counsel for Sikorsky is not here. Counsel for	14 have done a number of investigations over the
15 Helly Hansen, I think, is not here. Oh, you	15 last number of years, over the last 20 years,
16 are.	16 and we have got to the bottom of the causes
17 MR. SPENCER:	and contributing factors of each of those, but
18 Q. We have no questions at this time.	the Board feels that there is an issue in the
19 COMMISSIONER:	19 industry as a whole, and so we are doing an
20 Q. Thank you, and for Memorial University.	20 investigation of the those issues.
21 HURLEY, Q.C.:	21 EARLE, Q.C.:
22 Q. Yes, we have no questions at this time.	22 Q. Would I be fair in saying, though, that even
23 COMMISSIONER:	that investigation is, if you will, derivative
24 Q. Thank you. For the Government of Newfoundland	
25 and Labrador.	25 identified during the course of investigations

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1 in previous occurrences?	1	si	gnificant recommendations relative to safety
2 MS. TADROS:	2		anagement, but given that the work of the
3 A. Yes. I mean, it's issue driven, it's fact	3	Т	ransportation Safety Board is occurrence
4 driven. You have to be able to determine that	at 4		riven, in the regulatory scheme and the
5 there is an issue there, that there's a safety	5		ivestigatory scheme as it relates to
6 issue that warrants a further look before you	6		ansportation, who does the Transportation
7 take a further look.	7		afety Board see as the body or regulator that
8 EARLE, Q.C.:	8		as the burden, if you will, of moving forward
9 Q. You mentioned to Ms. Fagan in response to	her 9		afety management so that we don't have
10 question about the culture of safety, that you			ccurrences that bring Transportation Safety
11 felt that would be a profitable area I	11		oard into the picture?
don't think you used the word "profitable",	. 12	MS. TAE	-
but a good area for the Inquiry to direct	13		n Canada, the regulator is Transport Canada,
14 MS. TADROS:	14		nd Transport Canada is the body that is
15 A. Yes, not specifically the culture of safety,	15		equiring air carriers to implement safety
16 but that falls under the rubric of safety	16		nanagement systems, but just to go back to a
17 management systems.	17		oint that you made in the beginning of your
18 EARLE, Q.C.:	18	-	uestion, to comment on the notion that if you
19 Q. The whole business of safety management?	19	-	ave safety management systems, that you have
20 MS. TADROS:	20		o accidents, I don't think that that's true.
21 A. Yes.		EARLE,	
22 EARLE, Q.C.:	22	Q. N	
23 Q. And would you agree with me that the mod		MS. TAE	
24 approach to safety management is one of			think that transportation systems are very,
25 proactive management, seeking towards be			ery complex and the interactions between
	age 74		Page 76
1 practises, and the challenging of standards to	-	h	umans and the machine are very complex, and
2 see that they can be improved?	2		opefully the accidents can be brought down,
3 MS. TADROS:	3		ut I'm not sure, as long as you have
4 A. I don't disagree with that, but there are	4		ansportation and you have things moving,
5 really three prongs to safety management	t 5		hat you can get to a zero accident rate.
6 systems, and they are proactive means of		EARLE,	
7 managing safety. The first prong is hazard			es. So if our objective is not to see that
8 identification, proactive hazard	8		ou're unemployed, it's that you're an awful
9 identification within a company. The next is			ot less busy. There is in Canada, I'm sure
10 risk analysis and assessment, and then risk			hat you're totally aware of it, a large
11 mitigation. So basically the idea is that you			egime, both federal and provincial, dedicated
12 take a look at the hazards that are out there	12		o occupational health and safety.
13 and you address them before they result in a		MS. TAE	÷ · ·
14 accident, and you have to appreciate that	14	A. Y	
15 that's a very simplistic precis.		EARLE,	
16 EARLE, Q.C.:	16		Where would you see that regime fitting into
17 Q. Yes, I appreciate that. In essence, the	17		ne process of safety management, vis-a-vis,
18 objective should be to keep you unemployed			elicopter transportation safety?
19 MS. TADROS:		MS. TAL	·
20 A. That's my very best dream, sir.	20		Vell, let's be clear that under the
21 EARLE, Q.C.:	20		constitution, aviation is federal. So the
22 Q. So in the scheme of things, given that your			egulator is a federal body, Department of
23 work is occurrence driven, and that you mak			ransport. So that any direct regulation of
			· · ·
<ul><li>- this is not to suggest in the investigation</li><li>of an occurrence you may not in the end ma</li></ul>	24 ake 25		nything in the aviation industry is going to all to the Department of Transport. What

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1	some other bodies can do is work indirectly to	1	MS	S. TADROS:
2	benefit aviation safety.	2		A. If the trip was aborted or if there wasn't
3	EARLE, Q.C.:	3	i	enough fuel on board?
4	Q. Uh-hm. Would you not agree, though, that the	4	EA	RLE, Q.C.:
5	constitutional structure of Canada gives to	5		Q. The trip is aborted because weather conditions
6	the federal government those ancillary	6	i	had changed and there is now not enough fuel
7	jurisdictions like occupational health and	7		to get safely go to the platform and
8	safety when you are dealing with a matter	8	i i	contemplate possibly not being able to land at
9	which is within the constitutional competence	9		the platform and return to St. John's without
10	of the federal government, so that there is	10	)	landing. Would that be considered an
11	room for a federal occupational health and	11		incident?
12	safety regime to interact with air safety, for			S. TADROS:
13	instance?	13		A. Just to be clear, you're telling me that there
	MS. TADROS:	14		is enough fuel to get back to land?
15	A. Yes, it does get very complex, doesn't it?			RLE, Q.C.:
16	For instance, if you're looking in the marine	16		Q. There is enough fuel to get back to land, and
17	world and you're looking at fishing vessels	17		the decision is made to get back to land
18	again, there are some aspects of fishing	18		because there will not be enough fuel if the
19	vessel operation that are provincial and fall	19		original intention is carried out?
20	under Workers Compensation type structures, and there are others that are federal.			5. TADROS:
21		21		A. Okay, just bear with me for a minute.
22	EARLE, Q.C.: Q. And, of course, we have the added complication	22		RLE, Q.C.: Q. Sure.
23	in this particular situation that we have			S. TADROS:
24	joint and overlapping jurisdiction when it	24		A. Well, the definition of reportable aviation
25	Page 78			Page 80
1	comes to the offshore exercise on behalf of	1		incident in Paragraph H says, "A fuel shortage
2	the two governments by our friends at C-NLOPB.	2		occurs that necessitates a diversion or
3	Now the whole business of incidents is	3		requires approach and landing priority at the
4	something that I'd like a little bit more	4		destination of the aircraft". So it's a
5	information on, and that is the process of	5		question of whether coming back to St. John's
6	dealing with incidents and what comes out of	6	j	is a diversion or it's part of the original
7	an incident, and I was very interested when	7	,	planning.
8	you went through the definitions that it	8	EA	RLE, Q.C.:
9	includes such things as fuel shortages, and	9		Q. Okay.
10	I'm going to put to you a factual situation to	10		S. TADROS:
11	see if we've got the triameters right. This,	11		A. So if it's part of the original planning that
12	I gather, is not a totally unusual event, but	12	r V	when you're heading out in the North Atlantic
13	a helicopter may leave St. John's headed to	13	i	that you may have to come back, then my view
14	one of the offshore installations with a	14		is it's not a diversion.
15	certain amount of fuel on. The fuel on board	15	EA	RLE, Q.C.:
16	is calculated for what is often called "the	16	,	Q. Okay. So that wouldn't be an incident, but I
17	necessity of boomeranging", i.e. going out and	17		take it that if part way out the pilot
18	coming back without landing. Weather	18	,	recognized that for some reason or other,
19	conditions change. So deicing equipment is	19		whether it was because of a miscalculation or
20	activated, and as I understand it, that	20		a wrong assumption on somebody's part, there
21	changes the parameters of fuel consumption.	21		is not enough fuel on board to meet this
22	It means that a decision is required to turn	22		boomerang parameter of being able to go out
23	around and essentially abort the trip and	23		and come back, so the trip is aborted part way
24	return to St. John's. Would that be	24		out and back they come, that would very
25	considered an incident?	25		clearly be an incident?

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1 MS. TADROS:	1 si	milar organizations to the TSB?
2 A. Reportable, yes.	2 MS. TAE	DROS:
3 EARLE, Q.C.:	3 A. Y	es, and I believe I believe, but I'm not
4 Q. Reportable.	4 10	00 percent sure, that regulators may be
5 MS. TADROS:	5 in	volved in that.
6 A. And let's go back to the purpose of why w	e 6 EARLE,	Q.C.:
7 have reportable incidents. We want to know	at 7 Q. B	ut there's no contemplation of a public
8 the TSB whether we should deploy and consi	der 8 di	isclosure or public access to such
9 doing an investigation, or if we're not going	9 in	formation, is there?
10 to do that, we want the data so that, say,	10 MS. TAE	DROS:
11 there are a hundred such incidents reported i	n 11 A. Y	ou can get that information if you know
12 a two year period and they're not investigate	ed 12 ex	xactly what you're looking for, but we're
13 because each of them are minor, we want		ooking at thousands and thousands of reports
14 know if there's any kind of pattern there, an	d 14 in	a week. If you're looking through all the
15 if there is a major occurrence that arises out	15 m	nodes of transportation, we're looking at a
16 of similar facts, we want to be able to look		ast amount of data. So we wouldn't, you
17 at those minor occurrences to see if there's a	17 ki	now, proactively publish all of that data,
18 risk in the system.	18 be	ecause out of context, it would be
19 EARLE, Q.C.:	19 m	neaningless.
20 Q. Uh-hm, and I think everybody understands		
21 appreciates the benefit of that. What I'd		Vell, let's put it very specifically. What
22 like to hear from you now is let us assume		yould be the capacity, for instance, of the
23 that this incident is in isolation, considered		bint Chair of an Occupational Health and
a minor incident that is dealt with in a		afety Committee on one of these offshore
25 totally controlled fashion, no negative	25 in	stallations to say I'd like to know, you
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1 consequences other than the economic		now, what kind of incidents are happening
2 consequence of having lost a successful		vith our means of transportation to and from
3 flight. What is the TSB's reporting mechanis	sm 3 w	vork?
4 that follows out of such an incident?	4 MS. TAD	
5 MS. TADROS:		Vell, the reports are being made by the
6 A. We would put that into our database as a Cla		ompany, correct?
7 5 occurrence, and it would remain there and		
8 would be searchable if there's a future if		lh-hm.
9 there's a future occurrence with similar	9 MS. TAD	
10 facts.		and you represent the employees of the
11 EARLE, Q.C.:		ompany.
12 Q. So simply put, these minor incidents stop at		
13 the TSB and go no further?	13 Q. N	
14 MS. TADROS:	14 MS. TAD	
15 A. Well, they're available and there is a		lo. You represent?
16 there is a plan in place or there's a project	16 EARLE,	
17 in place in Europe at the moment called ECC		he employees who ride on the company's
18 AIRS, and that involves sharing of data		elicopter.
19 amongst countries so that you can look no		
20 only to the minor occurrences in Canada, but there can be a sharing of that information and		bh, I see, okay. I see the distinction. You
21 there can be a sharing of that information and somebody can look across the world		now, if you're talking about a narrow band of
22 somebody can look across the world.		ata, it may be best to get that from the
23 EARLE, Q.C.:	_	eople who are supplying the data because then
<ul> <li>Q. And when you say sharing, I take it you're talking about sharing that information amon</li> </ul>		will only represent those incidents in the ffshore, or with that particular helicopter
25 talking about sharing that information amon	gst 25 of	inshore, or writt mat particular helicopter

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1	company, or transporting to a particular oi	1	1		has a problem in the design of that aircraft,
2	rig. We have the data for all of aviation		2		that that is a body that has a very real
3	across Canada, and for rail, marine, and	l	3		interest in both the colloquial and the legal
4	pipeline. So it depends on which is the bes	st	4		sense in the proceeding, and as I understand
5	means of you obtaining the exact informat	tion	5		your evidence, what you tell us that a body
6	that you want.		6		like this would have a designated reviewer who
7 EAR	RLE, Q.C.:		7		would receive the draft report and be able to
8 Q	. But do you have the facility, if you will, for	r	8		comment, is that correct?
9	people who, you know, have a legitima	ite	91	MS. TA	ADROS:
10	interest, like people who are dedicated to	)	10	А.	That's correct.
11	issues of occupational health and safety as	it	11 1	EARL	E, Q.C.:
12	relate to their workplace, to go to you and	1	12	Q.	Okay. Do you have within your system any
13	say, well, we use this mode of transport on	a	13		capacity or means to, if you will, have
14	many times daily basis, we would like to k	now	14		someone review or comment on an issue from the
15	the incidents that are being reported with		15		perspective of the transportation user?
16	respect to this mode of transport? Do you	u	16 1	MS. TA	ADROS:
17	have that?		17	А.	We go that's a touchy issue, and we go back
18 MS.	TADROS:		18		to the legislation which defines a person with
19 A	. We have the facility upon request, yes, but		19		a direct interest, and if if the test is
20	so if there's a specific request, then we can	L	20		met, and this is a determination that's made
21	provide that information, but I think you ca		21		by the Board, if the test is met, the person
22	appreciate that the data isn't broken down l		22		or the body becomes a designated reviewer. If
23	region or by undertaking, so we don't colle	ect	23		the test is not met, they will not. So it
24	it and collate it in that kind of manner. So		24		depends on the facts. You'd have to look at
25	on an ongoing basis, if you wanted to recei	ive	25		each one on its facts. Very rarely would a
		Page 86			Page 88
1	it once a month, for instance, that would b	-	1		travelling member of the public be a
2	quite a burden on my organization.	•	2		designated reviewer. If they were on the
	RLE, Q.C.:		3		flight, they would be interviewed, so they
	). Yes.		4		would be a witness, but they they probably
	TADROS:		5		would not meet the test of a designated
	And it may be better to receive that the		6		reviewer.
7	people who are making the reports.		-		E, Q.C.:
	RLE, Q.C.:		8		You can appreciate, though, that in this
	b. Uh-hm. Now you indicated that the dra	ft	9	×۰	particular circumstance we have a frequency of
10	report is circulated to interested parties,		10		use of a particular design of aircraft and a
11	and as a lawyer, I know that that is a		11		particular methodology?
12	weighted term, has a real legal meaning.			MS T.	ADROS:
	TADROS:		12 1		Yes, and that is why individuals may be
	A. We don't call them parties. We call ther	m	13	А.	interviewed to learn what they know about
14 A	designated reviewers.		14		those things.
	RLE, Q.C.:			FARI	E, Q.C.:
	D. Designated reviewers, but I believe you d	id	17		But even with such a high frequency of use by
18	say in your evidence that designated review		18	ų.	a defined group of people, the people who work
19	are representatives of interested parties.		19		on these offshore installations, or the drill
	TADROS:		20		platforms, you would not have anyone, if you
	A. I don't believe I said parties, but		20		will, a passenger advocate, designated to
1	RLE, Q.C.:		21		review and give input to your draft report?
1	0. Nevertheless, I think we understand ver	v		MS T	ADROS:
23 Q 24	easily that if you're going to say that the	J	23 1		You're asking me a hypothetical question and
24	manufacturer of a particular type of aircraft	`t	24	А.	it's very difficult to answer without the
23	manufacturer of a particular type of alleral	ι	25		it is very unificant to answer without the

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1 context. If you're talking to me abou	t the 1	EARLE, Q.	C.:
2 ongoing investigation of Cougar 491	, then 2	Q. Tha	t's a defence. So an EPERB, an emergency
3 those determinations have not been ma	de. They 3	loca	ator beacon -
4 will be made by the Board when the	draft 4	MS. TADR	OS:
5 report comes forward from the Direc	tor of 5	A. Is a	defence.
6 Investigations here.	6	EARLE, Q.	C.:
7 EARLE, Q.C.:	7	Q an	d if it was one that was supposed to
8 Q. Well, perhaps I've planted a thought	in the 8	auto	omatically activate and it didn't
9 mind of the Board. I'm interested in w	hat you 9	auto	omatically activate, that would be a matter
10 said about your investigation, and you	talked 10	for	your concern?
11 about safety defences, and the exam	ple I 11	MS. TADR	OS:
believe you gave was a warning light	on the 12	A. Abs	solutely, and we would want to know two
panel for an operation, and I'd like to	have 13	prin	nary things. Why didn't it activate, and
14 some sense of how far this notion of de	efences 14	is th	nis a problem in the system or was it just
15 go. You've certainly, unfortunately, h	had to 15	on t	hat vessel on that day?
16 investigate a number of marine incide		EARLE, Q.	C.:
17 our territory over the past few years. S	So if 17	Q. And	l I presume you might also want to know and
18 I could use that as an area to get a sens	se of 18	wha	at alternatives were there to back up that
19 where you go. If you had a marine inci	ident, a 19	unit	in the case of failure?
20 vessel going down, and, of course, ves		MS. TADR	OS:
21 required to be equipped with life ra		A. We	re there other defences that could have been
22 locator beacons, and a variety of sat		of a	ssistance, yes.
equipment, would that be considered a	-	EARLE, Q.	-
24 which you would investigate if, for ins	stance, 24	Q. Nov	w we have a system of support, if you will,
25 one of those malfunctioned?	25		cue support that operates in thewe'll use
	Page 90		Page 92
1 MS. TADROS:	1	the	marine environment. You have everything
2 A. Okay. The defences are either physic	cal or 2	fror	n military based search and rescue. You
3 administrative, so in the case of a fish	ning 3	hav	e Coast Guard. You have Coast Guard
4 vessel, we wouldn't look broadly at the	e whole 4	Aux	ciliary made up of volunteers and we have a
5 vessel when we're looking at a defence	xe. We 5	radi	o communication system, fairly extensive
6 want to look at what is the risk and wh	hat is 6	syst	em of, if you will, responders to
7 the unsafe condition and then what ar	re the 7	acci	idents. Do you consider those responders
8 defences to address that. So it's a much	h more 8	to b	e part of the defences?
9 methodical process issue by issue,	but 9	MS. TADR	OS:
10 basically the thinking is that for rob	ust 10	A. The	y may well be. The first question that has
11 safety systems, there should be defen	ces in 11	to l	be answered is the scope of the
12 depth. So we're looking to see that the	ere is 12	inve	estigation and in many of our
13 more than one defence and how did	l those 13	inve	estigations, we will look at search and
14 defences play out, how did they work	. Did 14		cue and whether it operated effectively.
15 they work? Did they not work, and	what 15	It de	epends on the facts of the accident. So
16 happened if they didn't work? So I'm	having a 16	in n	nany, many of our investigations, we have
17 difficulty answering the question in co	ntext. 17	lool	ked at that, at that issue.
18 Perhaps if there's a particular issue like	e -   18	EARLE, Q.	C.:
19 EARLE, Q.C.:	19		
20 Q. Well, that's a -	20	MS. TADR	OS:
21 MS. TADROS:	21	A. But	we may not necessarily is what I'm telling
22 A the people getting rescued, for insta	nce. 22	you	. It depends on the facts of the accident.
23 You want to look at what's available t		EARLE, Q.	
to communicate with other people so t			it is not ipso facto outside your purview?
be rescued, and that's a defence.	-	MS. TADR	

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1	A. No, because the accident isthe accident, a	as	1	Safety Board has been to cause regulators to
2	a concept, is not a very narrow thing. So	)	2	look at their standards and increase their
3	we're looking at response to the accident, i	if i	3	standards?
4	that comes into play, if that's an issue.		4 MS. 7	TADROS:
5	We're looking at, you know, things that mi	ight	5 A.	Yes. I mean, just to draw a distinction, the
6	have saved the lives of the people who wer	re in	6	investigations that we do are not regulatory
7	the accident. So we broadly scope the		7	audits, so we are not looking primarily to see
8	investigations and that's a determination		8	if the operator met the regulations. We're
9	that's made by the investigator in charge an		9	looking beyond that to all the safety issues.
10	the director of investigations, as to which		0	So if the regulation itself is deficient, then
11	issues are going to be examined in depth a		1	that's something that we will look at and we
12	the way that we come to that determination			will point out, if you take my distinction.
13	through the ISIM methodology.	1	3 EARI	.E, Q.C.:
14 J	EARLE, Q.C.:	14		Yes, and you make recommendations -
15	Q. And you say the investigators make that			TADROS:
16	decision, and we know that search and res			Yes.
17	provided by the military is out of bounds, i			.E, Q.C.:
18	you will, for this Inquiry. However, there		8 Q.	- that have, from time to time, led to a new
19	are some people, at least, who believe that			regulatory scheme?
20	search and rescue provided by other than t			TADROS:
21	military will be clearly within the bounds of			Yes.
22	this Inquiry. How would we know, other			.E, Q.C.:
23	by receiving your final report, that	2		Thanks very much, Ms. Tadros.
24	Transportation Safety Board will be going			TADROS:
25	that area?	2.	5 A.	You're very welcome.
		Page 94		Page 9
	MS. TADROS:			MISSIONER:
2	A. Well, the other way that youyou norma	-		Thank you. Now, counsel for the families, Mr.
3	would find out in the final report, unless yo		3	Martin.
4	were somebody with a direct interest in th			ENDY TADROS, EXAMINATION BY MR. JAMIE MARTIN
5	issue and then you'd be invited to commen			IARTIN:
6	it. The other way you would know is if we	-		Thank you, Mr. Commissioner. I guess it's now
7	out an interim safety communication on issue like that.		7 9 Ma T	good afternoon, Ms. Tadros.
8	issue like that.		8 MS. T	
			•	
91	EARLE, Q.C.:			Good afternoon.
9 I 10	Q. Ms. Tadros, you spoke of how this Inqui	iry 1	0 MR. N	Good afternoon. IARTIN:
9 I 10 11	Q. Ms. Tadros, you spoke of how this Inqui could influence helicopter safety and yo	iry 1 u 1	0 MR. M 1 Q.	Good afternoon. IARTIN: I'm Jamie Martin. I represent several of the
9 1 10 11 12	Q. Ms. Tadros, you spoke of how this Inqui could influence helicopter safety and yo talked about contractual means and conditi	iry 1 u 1 lons 1	0 MR. M 1 Q. 2	Good afternoon. MARTIN: I'm Jamie Martin. I represent several of the families of the Flightof the passengers on
9 1 10 11 12 13	Q. Ms. Tadros, you spoke of how this Inqui could influence helicopter safety and yo talked about contractual means and conditi of license and the like. I was interested, it	iry 10 u 1 ions 11 1	0 MR. N 1 Q. 2 3	Good afternoon. IARTIN: I'm Jamie Martin. I represent several of the families of the Flightof the passengers on the Cougar helicopter on March the 12th '09.
9 1 10 11 12 13 14	Q. Ms. Tadros, you spoke of how this Inqui could influence helicopter safety and you talked about contractual means and conditi of license and the like. I was interested, it seemed to me that you were urging an appr	iry 10 u 1 lons 1 1 roach 1	0 MR. M 1 Q. 2 3 4	Good afternoon. MARTIN: I'm Jamie Martin. I represent several of the families of the Flightof the passengers on the Cougar helicopter on March the 12th '09. I just have a couple of questions, and the
9 1 10 11 12 13 14 15	Q. Ms. Tadros, you spoke of how this Inqui could influence helicopter safety and yo talked about contractual means and conditi of license and the like. I was interested, it seemed to me that you were urging an appu- that says don't just stop at the regulatory	iry 10 u 1 ions 12 roach 14	0 MR. M 1 Q. 2 3 4 5	Good afternoon. MARTIN: I'm Jamie Martin. I represent several of the families of the Flightof the passengers on the Cougar helicopter on March the 12th '09. I just have a couple of questions, and the first one, I just want to follow up on Mr.
9 1 10 11 12 13 14 15 16	Q. Ms. Tadros, you spoke of how this Inqui could influence helicopter safety and yo talked about contractual means and conditi of license and the like. I was interested, it seemed to me that you were urging an appr that says don't just stop at the regulatory standard. Seek to go beyond meeting th	iry 10 u 1 ions 12 roach 14 ne 10	0 MR. M 1 Q. 2 3 4 5 6	Good afternoon. MARTIN: I'm Jamie Martin. I represent several of the families of the Flightof the passengers on the Cougar helicopter on March the 12th '09. I just have a couple of questions, and the first one, I just want to follow up on Mr. Earle's questions on the receipt of that draft
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9 1 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18	Q. Ms. Tadros, you spoke of how this Inqui could influence helicopter safety and yo talked about contractual means and conditi of license and the like. I was interested, it seemed to me that you were urging an appr that says don't just stop at the regulatory standard. Seek to go beyond meeting the regulatory standard, that that's the approace that safety management should have.	iry 10 u 1 ions 12 roach 14 ne 14 h 17	0 MR. M 1 Q. 2 3 4 5 6 7 8	Good afternoon. MARTIN: I'm Jamie Martin. I represent several of the families of the Flightof the passengers on the Cougar helicopter on March the 12th '09. I just have a couple of questions, and the first one, I just want to follow up on Mr. Earle's questions on the receipt of that draft report, the designation process that you use for that purpose. It was my understanding of
9 1 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 1	<ul> <li>Q. Ms. Tadros, you spoke of how this Inquicould influence helicopter safety and you talked about contractual means and condition of license and the like. I was interested, it seemed to me that you were urging an apprint that says don't just stop at the regulatory standard. Seek to go beyond meeting the regulatory standard, that that's the approact that safety management should have.</li> <li>MS. TADROS:</li> </ul>	iry 10 u 1 ions 12 roach 14 ne 14 h 17 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14	0 MR. M 1 Q. 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9	Good afternoon. MARTIN: I'm Jamie Martin. I represent several of the families of the Flightof the passengers on the Cougar helicopter on March the 12th '09. I just have a couple of questions, and the first one, I just want to follow up on Mr. Earle's questions on the receipt of that draft report, the designation process that you use for that purpose. It was my understanding of your evidence that individuals with a direct
9 1 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 1 20	<ul> <li>Q. Ms. Tadros, you spoke of how this Inquicould influence helicopter safety and you talked about contractual means and condition of license and the like. I was interested, it seemed to me that you were urging an apprint that says don't just stop at the regulatory standard. Seek to go beyond meeting the regulatory standard, that that's the approact that safety management should have.</li> <li>MS. TADROS:</li> <li>A. Well, I would always encourage companial</li> </ul>	iry 14 u 1 ions 12 roach 14 he 14 h 17 he 14 h 17 he 2	0 MR. M 1 Q. 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0	Good afternoon. MARTIN: I'm Jamie Martin. I represent several of the families of the Flightof the passengers on the Cougar helicopter on March the 12th '09. I just have a couple of questions, and the first one, I just want to follow up on Mr. Earle's questions on the receipt of that draft report, the designation process that you use for that purpose. It was my understanding of your evidence that individuals with a direct interest would be provided with that draft
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9 1 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 1 20 21 22	<ul> <li>Q. Ms. Tadros, you spoke of how this Inquicould influence helicopter safety and you talked about contractual means and condition of license and the like. I was interested, it seemed to me that you were urging an apprint that says don't just stop at the regulatory standard. Seek to go beyond meeting the regulatory standard, that that's the approact that safety management should have.</li> <li>MS. TADROS:</li> <li>A. Well, I would always encourage companing segments of industries or industries as a whole to go beyond the regulatory standard.</li> </ul>	iry 19 u 1 ions 12 roach 14 h 11 es or 20 ds. 2	0 MR. M 1 Q. 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2	Good afternoon. MARTIN: I'm Jamie Martin. I represent several of the families of the Flightof the passengers on the Cougar helicopter on March the 12th '09. I just have a couple of questions, and the first one, I just want to follow up on Mr. Earle's questions on the receipt of that draft report, the designation process that you use for that purpose. It was my understanding of your evidence that individuals with a direct interest would be provided with that draft report, and I think you included, among others, the operators, any corporate entities
9 1 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 1 20 21 22	<ul> <li>Q. Ms. Tadros, you spoke of how this Inquicould influence helicopter safety and you talked about contractual means and condition of license and the like. I was interested, it seemed to me that you were urging an apprint that says don't just stop at the regulatory standard. Seek to go beyond meeting the regulatory standard, that that's the approact that safety management should have.</li> <li>MS. TADROS:</li> <li>A. Well, I would always encourage companing segments of industries or industries as a</li> </ul>	iry 10 u 1 ions 12 roach 14 he 14 h 17 es or 20 2	0 MR. M 1 Q. 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3	Good afternoon. MARTIN: I'm Jamie Martin. I represent several of the families of the Flightof the passengers on the Cougar helicopter on March the 12th '09. I just have a couple of questions, and the first one, I just want to follow up on Mr. Earle's questions on the receipt of that draft report, the designation process that you use for that purpose. It was my understanding of your evidence that individuals with a direct interest would be provided with that draft report, and I think you included, among

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1 A. I'm just trying to provide you with examples	1 I'm wrong, and I don't think it -
2 from past investigations. In terms of this	2 MS. TADROS:
3 investigation, that determination will have to	3 A. There's two thingsoh, sorry.
4 be made when we're further down the road.	4 MR. MARTIN:
5 MR. MARTIN:	5 Q. I don't think we discussed what the test is.
6 Q. I realize, from your response to Mr. Earle's	6 Can you point us to the test?
7 question, that there's been no decision taken	7 MS. TADROS:
8 on the report because the report is not done	8 A. There's -
9 yet.	9 MR. MARTIN:
10 MS. TADROS:	10 Q. In the regulations or the Act itself.
11 A. That's correct.	11 MS. TADROS:
12 MR. MARTIN:	12 A. There's a test, but there's also a policy
13 Q. But you did provide a number of examples of	13 which I don't have with me here today. I
14 people who would likely get receipt of the	14 could provide it to you, if you wish.
15 draft report and I think you included the	15 MR. MARTIN:
16 operators. You also included the pilots and	16 Q. I think it would be helpful, if you could?
17 the co-pilot or their families. Is that	17 MS. TADROS:
18 correct?	18 A. Okay. John, can we undertake to provide the
19 MS. TADROS:	19 policy on designated reviewers to Mr. Martin,
20 A. That's correct. That is the normal practice	20 please?
21 or that's what I can tell you from previous	21 MR. COTTREAU:
22 investigations that the flight crew are	22 A. Absolutely.
23 normally designated reviewers or their next of	23 MS. TADROS:
24 kin.	A. The reference in the Act, I believe, is
25 MR. MARTIN:	25 Section 24. It's Section 24.2, subsection
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1 Q. Now what about the members of a deceased	1 24.2, and if you look about the middle of that
2 family?	2 paragraph, it's basically the wording that -
3 MS. TADROS:	3 MR. MARTIN:
4 A. They are not normally designated reviewers	4 Q. Can we bring it down a little bit further,
5 because it is not just people with an	5 because I'm24.2, is it?
6 interest, but people with a direct interest,	6 MS. TADROS:
7 which I think you can appreciate that's a	7 A. Okay.
8 legal distinction. But unless they were	8 MR. MARTIN:
9 involved in the operation of the aircraft,	9 Q. Okay, sorry.
10 then there isn't normally a direct interest.	10 MS. TADROS:
11         But again, I cannot say for this particular	11 A. So the draft report, on its findings and any
12 investigation.	12 safety deficiencies that it has identified to
13 MR. MARTIN:	13 each Minister and any other person who, in the
14 Q. So there are exceptions or there have been	14 opinion of the Board, has a direct interest in
15 exceptions used in the past by the	15 the findings of the Board. So that is the
16 Transportation Safety Board to allow that to	16 wording in the Act. The policy further
17 happen? Would that be a fair comment?	17 defines what it means to have a direct
18 MS. TADROS:	18 interest.
19 A. There can be exceptions, if it is clearly	19 MR. MARTIN:
20 demonstrated that the individual meets the	20 Q. Okay, and I know you don't have the policy
21 test.	21 here, but - 22 MS. TADROS:
<ul><li>22 MR. MARTIN:</li><li>23 Q. Okay, can you bring the test up? I believe</li></ul>	<ul><li>22 MS. TADROS:</li><li>23 A. I can give you the basic parameters.</li></ul>
24 you referred to the test as a statutory test,	23 A. I can give you the basic parameters. 24 MR. MARTIN:
<ul><li>25 something that's in the statute, correct me if</li></ul>	25 Q. If you could, please?
25 someting that 5 in the statute, confect the fi	Dece 07 Dece 100

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1 MS. TADROS:	1	write anybody at the Board or you can make
2 A. If you don't hold me to the exact wording.	2	them to the investigator in charge.
3 MR. MARTIN:	3 M	R. MARTIN:
4 Q. No, no, that's fine, I won't.	4	Q. Okay. Now when that process is undertaken and
5 MS. TADROS:	5	the draft report is circulated to the various
6 A. It's a person who may see their behaviour or	6	parties who meet the definition as you've
7 product commented on in the report or who may	7	outlined in the Act, do the comments of each
8 contribute to the scientific fullness of the	8	party then get distributed to the other
9 report, the accuracy of the report.	9	parties who have made comments on the draft or
10 MR. MARTIN:	10	do you restrict them or do you just sent them
11 Q. But is it possible for the members of the	11	back the report with their own comments
12 deceased families to fall within that category	12	reflected? Just explain that process. In
as someone having a direct interest in the	13	other words, what I'm getting at is if I have
14 proceedings?	14	a direct interest and I'm allowed to make
15 MS. TADROS:	15	comments on that report, do I get to know what
16 A. You would have to make a very clear argument	16	the other parties -
17 and demonstrate very clearly why that was the	17 M	S. TADROS:
18 case.	18	A. No.
19 MR. MARTIN:	19 M	R. MARTIN:
20 Q. And who would have to make that argument, the	20	Q. I don't?
21 families themselves or their legal	21 M	S. TADROS:
22 representative?	22	A. Because the comments from the designated
23 MS. TADROS:	23	reviewers, not the parties, but the designated
A. Well, the legal representative represents the	24	reviewers, are confidential. The list of who
25 families so stands instead of the families, I	25	are designated reviewers is also confidential,
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1 would -	1	and the reason for this is that we want
2 MR. MARTIN:	2	anybody with a direct interest, whether they
3 Q. But at what stage do you make those	3	are the head of a major corporation or the
4 representations? Because at some point in	4	fellow who works on the line for \$12 an hour,
5 time, you're going to get to the stage in your	5	to be able to freely comment to the Board and
6 proceedings where you're going to have to	6	to tell us what they know and what their
7 issue a draft report, and then a decision is	7	opinion is without any fear of reprisal. We
8 going to have to be made, well who do we	8	want them to speak openly and honestly to the
9 circulate that report to. So how will we	9	Board and to voice their opinions, and there's
10 know, as their legal representative, or how	10	no back and forth between the designated
11 will the families know that there is a	11	reviewers. The back and forth comes when the
12 decision about to be taken about the release	12	Board analyses each and every comment to
13 of a draft report? Will there be timely	13	determine whether it's valid or not.
14 notification of that?		IR. MARTIN:
15 MS. TADROS:	15	Q. Okay. I'll move on to my second line of
16 A. I would say that, you know, if you make it	16	questioning. In responseand I appreciate
17 known that you're interested in making	17	the opportunity to be getting that policy and
18 representations, then we will be mindful of	18	certainly upon review of that policy and the
19 that, or there's no particular time limit.	19	legislative requirements, we'll discuss that
20 You can make those representations at any time	20	with our clients. The second line of
21 from this day forward.	21	questioning, you were asked by Ms. Fagan as to
22 MR. MARTIN:	22	what constitutes the black box. I mean, it's
23 Q. Okay, and they're made directly to whom?	23	a very common term that we hear about post-
24 MS. TADROS:	24	accident and you indicated that the first
A. They're made directly to the Board, so you can	25	component was a flight data recorder and the

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1 second component was a cockpit voice reco		MARTIN:
2 Is that correct?	2 Q	. Courts canor someone can subpoena the
3 MS. TADROS:	3	records? Would that be a fair exception?
4 A. That's correct.	4 MS.	TADROS:
5 MR. MARTIN:	5 A	. Well, let's put it this way. They can try.
6 Q. Okay. Now you went on to say that the coc	pit 6 MR.	MARTIN:
7 voice recorder is privileged information.	7 Q.	They can try, okay. So there is recourse for
8 It's treated the same as a witness statement.	8	parties if they really want to get at that
9 Is that correct?	9	information?
10 MS. TADROS:	10 MS.	TADROS:
11 A. It's privileged under the Act.	11 A	. There's recoursethe Courts may decide that
12 MR. MARTIN:	12	in the interest of justice that it is either
13 Q. Privileged under the Act, okay. So it's a	13	to be released on a very limited basis or on a
14 statutory privilege. It's not a common law	14	general basis, but this is one of the things
15 privilege. And I knowI'm not trying to ge	15	that we take great pains to protect and
16 legalistic here, but that's where the	16	respect, and so if there are Court
17 privilege arises from, it's a statutory	17	proceedings, we've been very successful in
18 privilege?	18	arguing that the privilege afforded to the CVR
19 MS. TADROS:	19	should be maintained.
20 A. Correct.	20 MR.	MARTIN:
21 MR. MARTIN:	21 Q	Okay, and that privilege only exists for the
Q. And I don't believe that you identified when	22	CVR? It doesn't exist for the flight data
in the Act that privilege would exist. Can	23	recorder?
24 you point us to it?		TADROS:
25 MS. TADROS:	25 A.	. No, there's nothat's not personal
Pa	e 106	Page 108
1 A. Section 28.	1	information in any way. It's not information
2 MR. MARTIN:	2	associated with a person's voice and it's
3 Q. Section 28, and so it's a fairly detailed	3	data, you know. The aircraft was travelling
4 definition. Do you want to just paraphrase	4	at such and such a speed. So there's no need
5 where the authority lies for the privilege?	5	to have privilege afforded to that data.
6 So what is that section saying?		MARTIN:
7 MS. TADROS:	7 Q.	Okay, the CVR, the cockpit voice recorder is
8 A. Well, in terms ofif we just look at	8	considered personal information?
9 aircraft, it's recording of voice		TADROS:
communications originating from or receive		Yes, and -
or in the flight deck of an aircraft.		MARTIN:
12 MR. MARTIN:		. That's how it falls within the privilege? Is
13 Q. Okay, and are there any exceptions to the	13	that a fair comment?
14 statutory privilege?		TADROS:
15 MS. TADROS:		Yes, and I mean, the cockpit is a pilot's
A. Yes. A lot of these provisions, I think you	16	place of work, and so we have to be very
17 can appreciate that in a democratic society,	17	careful when you're routinely recording
there are lots and lots of interests and so	18	somebody's place of work that that be
19 when these provisions are crafted, they're	19	respected.
20 rather like those Russian dolls where there's		MARTIN: Okay Those are my questions Mg. Tedros
a provision and then there's another one in the middle and another one and another on		. Okay. Those are my questions, Ms. Tadros.
22 the middle and another one and another on and if you look down there are provision		Thank you very much.
23 and if you look down, there are provisions		TADROS:
24 where Courts canif you can just scroll dow		. Okay.
a little bit, you'll find that.	25 COM	IMISSIONER:

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1 Q. Okay, thank you, Mr. Martin. Counsel for the	1	to that recommendation. Then we rate that
2 estates of the pilots, Mr. O'Brien?	2	response and we post the rating on our website
3 O'BRIEN, Q.C.:	3	and we follow up on a periodic basis and
4 Q. I don't have any questions, Commissioner.	4	basically, the role in that respect is one of
5 COMMISSIONER:	5	persuasion and we believe if you have strong
6 Q. No questions, okay, thank you. Anything from	6	science and you have a logical argument that
7 Inquiry counsel to close out the matter then?	7	you put forth that the changes that we
8 MS. WENDY TADROS, RE-EXAMINATION BY MS. ANNE FA	GAN 8	recommend should be made.
9 MS. FAGAN:	9 MS. F.	
10 Q. I just have one area which I'd like Mrs.	10 Q.	So as this Inquiry is looking at the safety of
11 Tadros to just clarify, and that is the issue	11	workers, we would appreciate and take you up
12 between the TSB's role and the regulator's	12	on your offer to provide the recommendations
13 role, just to ensure that it's clear as to	13	that whatever they are there, whatever
14sort of the enforcement powers or the ability	14	recommendations that the TSB has made in the
15 of the TSB to regulate these activities or the	15	area of helicopter transportation, for
16 lack of the power to act as the regulator. If	16	consideration. Because some of these
17 you could just cover that one point, please?	17	recommendations may be in the regulations, but
18 MS. TADROS:	18	some of them may not be for the regulator, may
19 A. Well, the TSB is not a regulator. We're	19	not be in the regulator's exact area, or they
20 absolutely not a regulator and that was done	20	may not actually be regulations yet. So as
21 purposefully in Canada because in the older	21	you've said initially, this Inquiry can make
22 days, more than 20 years ago, accident	22	recommendations to the C-NLOPB through a
23 investigation was done by the regulators and	23	contract or through the authorization process,
24 that was seen as a conflict of interest, so a	24	we would like to consider those
25 decision was made, a conscious decision, to	25	recommendations. So I'd ask that you follow
	age 110	Page 112
1 separate out the accident investigation	1	up and provide those recommendations to us for
2 capability from the regulator's tasks and the	2	consideration.
3 regulator in Canada is Transport Canada. In	3 MS. T	
4 the United States, is it the FAA.		Okay. I'd be pleased to do that. We can
5 MS. FAGAN:	5	certainly talk about the scope of what you
6 Q. So since the TSB cannot attribute blame, the	6	would like to receive, because there are
7 TSB's mechanism, once it conducts its	7	recommendations that were made in the context
8 investigation, what is the TSB's mechanism to	8	of helicopter investigations. There are
9 see that their recommendations are adopted or	9	recommendations that were made in other
10 carried out?	10	contexts that may be transferable. So we'd be
11 MS. TADROS:	11	pleased to provide you with whatever you need.
12 A. Well, we have several ways that we communica		
13 safety deficiencies and recommendations are at		Okay, thank you, appreciate your evidence.
14 the higher end or they are the most serious	14 MS. T	
15 issues. We may communicate through a safety		Thank you.
16 advisory, safety information letter, and we do		MISSIONER:
17 these things all along the way. So the		Okay then, thank you. Well then, in closing,
18 regulator is aware of what the issues are as	18	Mrs. Tadros, is there any sort of general
19 the investigation is proceeding, and best case	19	comment you might wish to make or further
20 scenario is that action is taken before we get	20 21 MS T	comment?
21 to the stage of making a recommendation. But if we do make a recommendation then if it	21 MS. T	
22 if we do make a recommendation, then if it	22 A. 23	I would just follow up on the last comment that I made that ifas your Inquiry moves
23 goes to a minister in the government, they 24 have 90 days in which to tall us and tall the		forward, if there's any further information
24 have 90 days in which to tell us and tell the	24	•
25 public what they are going to do in response	25	that comes to your attention and you need more

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1 information from the TSB that w	-	
2 to provide you with whatever w	we can, and I	
3 wish you well.		
4 COMMISSIONER:		
5 Q. Okay, thank you very much. All	-	
6 there's nothing further then, we	'll adjourn.	
7 ROIL, Q.C.:		
8 Q. Until Monday. 9 COMMISSIONER:		
10 Q. Oh yes. We had set aside two d	ave Obviously	
11 it's not been used, so we'll me		
12 9:30 on Monday morning comi	-	
13 you.		
ADJOURNED TO NOVEMBER 2, 20	009 AT 9:30 A.M.	
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1 CERTIFICATE	C	
2 We, the undersigned, do hereby cer	rtify that	
3 the foregoing is a true and correct trans	cript of a	
4 hearing heard on the 28th day of Octob		
5 Tara Place, 31 Peet Street, Suite 213, S		
6 Newfoundland and Labrador and was t	-	
7 to the best of our ability by means of	a sound	
8 apparatus.		
<ul><li>9 Dated at St. John's, NL this</li><li>10 28th day of October, 2009</li></ul>		
11 Cindy Sooley		
12 Discoveries Unlimited Inc.		
13 Judy Moss		
14 Discoveries Unlimited Inc.		
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