


# Search and Rescue Operation Report

F/V L'Acadien II – Case H2008-00319  
March 28<sup>th</sup>/29<sup>th</sup>, 2008



Joint Rescue Coordination Centre Halifax

## Forward

The following is a report, from a JRCC Halifax perspective, of the search and rescue incident involving the Fishing Vessel L'Acadien II. It has been prepared, as specified in Chapter 9 of the National Search and Rescue Manual, to record the pertinent details of the case and make recommendations to improve the SAR system.

This report details the decision and actions of the SAR system prior to the towing operation involving the F/V L'Acadien II and the subsequent efforts to rescue survivors after the capsizing of the vessel. An additional report to address the towing operation and Coast Guard policy is being prepared by a team of experts appointed by the Commissioner of the Coast Guard. It is expected that this investigation will look into all aspects and factors surrounding the incident including the towing operation and produce a comprehensive report that will examine topics outside the scope of SAR.

## Part 1 Search Object Details

Vessel Name	L'Acadien II
Type	Fishing vessel
Official Number	811285
Construction	Aluminum
Gross Tonnage	34.36
Registered Length	12.56m
Home Port	Cap-aux-Meules, Iles de la Madeleine, PQ
Colour	Blue hull, white wheelhouse, white trim
Persons on board	6
Description	Single screw, aluminum hulled fishing vessel with the wheelhouse forward, stabilizers near midships and an A-frame on the stern.
Registered owner	Les Pecheries Bruno Bourque Inc.
Lifesaving equipment	1 Rigid Life raft - 4 persons (Ovatek) 1 approved boat - 4 persons 6 lifejackets 5 survival suits (Mustang) 2 lifebuoys 18 pyrotechnics 1 Class 1 EPIRB
Communications	VHF FM radio, cellular telephone
SAR Assistance Required	The fishing vessel's captain advised that they had suffered rudder damage in the ice and required assistance to a port in order to make repairs.

## Part 1 Search Object Details cont'd

Nature of distress	While under tow towards Sydney by CCGS Sir William Alexander, the vessel struck an ice floe and capsized. A following fishing vessel, Madelinot Warlord, rescued two of the crewmembers. Of the four remaining crewmembers, a SAR Tech dive team recovered three deceased but the fourth remains missing.
Crewmembers	Bruno Bourque - deceased Gilles Leblanc - deceased Marc-Andre Deraspe - deceased Claude Deraspe - rescued Bruno-Pierre Bourque - rescued Carl Aucoin - missing

## Part 2 Details of SAR Operation

### RCC Action/Search Operations/Rescue Operations

A timeline is attached at Annex A that details all RCC actions and Search and Rescue operations.

### Summary of Significant Decisions

The following is a summary of the significant decisions made by JRCC and the Commanding Officer Sir William Alexander during this incident:

28/1829z F/V L'Acadien II requested an ice escort. CCGS Des Groseilliers was alongside the vessel and sent engineers aboard but subsequently did not advise any Regional Operations Centre (ROC), Rescue Centre or Ice Office that the vessel was disabled. Because the vessel requested an ice escort and not a tow, JRCC passed the information to Ice Halifax for action as per standard operating procedures.

28/2024z JRCC tasks CCGS Des Groseilliers to assist F/V Ginny CR who reports taking on water off Cape North, Cape Breton. The vessel had significant water ingress but her pumps were managing. CCGS Des Groseilliers was tasked to assist the vessel to the ice edge where another fishing vessel would escort her to Cap-aux-Meules. This would allow Des Groseilliers to remain in the vicinity of the sealing fleet where JRCC anticipated an increased risk due to forecasted wind and ice conditions. When tasking Des Groseilliers, JRCC was not aware that L'Acadien II had not received an ice escort and was disabled in the ice due to rudder damage.

28/2148z JRCC tasks CCGS Sir William Alexander to assist the disabled F/V Madelinot War Lord and F/V L'Acadien II. As a result of the heavy ice reported in their area and forecasted northeast winds, there was some urgency to get these vessels out of the ice before the pressure increased and created more serious problems.

29/0413z CCGS Sir William Alexander (SWA) advises that F/V L'Acadien II struck a piece of ice and capsized. F/V Madelinot War Lord recovered 2 crewmembers but 4 are still missing and assumed trapped in the hull. CCGS Sir William Alexander is standing by the overturned hull and has launched their FRC to recover any other crewmembers that may surface. JRCC tasked the standby Hercules (R307) and Cormorant (R903) from Greenwood to deploy the SAR Techs for a rescue dive.

29/0503z JRCC and the Commanding Officer CCGS Sir William Alexander discussed the options for rescuing survivors who may be trapped in the hull. Factors considered were:

- Cold-water immersion – it was assumed that survivors were at least partly immersed in very cold water and had limited survival time.

- Dive rescue – it would take SAR Techs at least 3 hours to arrive on scene and begin a rescue dive.
- Dive feasibility – it was not certain that divers could safely drop their equipment and jump themselves into the ice covered waters and perform a rescue.
- Risk of losing the hull – it was understood that once the hull was cut there was a significant risk it would sink. There was also the possibility of the hull sinking before the dive team arrived whether it was cut or not.
- Risk to the crew of Sir William Alexander – crew from SWA would have to go on the hull to perform a rescue, which due to the risk of sinking involved significant risk for them.

It was agreed that given the cold water and length of time before a rescue dive, Sir William Alexander's crew would secure the hull to reduce the risk of sinking and attempt a rescue by cutting into it.

29/0548z JRCC Halifax requests MRSC Quebec to review the incident log and contact the Surete du Quebec to begin the next of kin notification process. JRCC subsequently requests that one person, preferably a clergy member or indirect family member, be appointed as a liaison between the families and JRCC. This was done for several reasons:

- A single point of contact would reduce the number of calls to the JRCC during a very busy period.
- All of the families would get a consistent message, as opposed to each family calling at a different time and getting information based on the facts available at that time.
- During similar situations in the past, conflicts have arisen among the families involved with accusations made of information being withheld. A single person, preferably not close to any one family, has proved to be the best way of averting this problem.

29/0644z Commanding Officer Sir William Alexander decided to cease the cutting operation. Due to the construction of the fishing vessel and limitations of the tools available, it was deemed impossible to rescue anyone by this method. Additionally the hull was sinking lower in the water and becoming unstable, so it was mutually agreed that the hull would be secured until the dive team arrived on scene. The possibility of righting or towing the vessel into shallow water was also discussed but it was agreed that it was too risky to attempt either of these actions at this time.

29/1050z SAR Tech team leader made a decision to end dive operations. Following four dives, the SAR Tech team consulted with the Commanding Officer SWA and decided to terminate the dive operation, as there was no hope of finding survivors inside the vessel. The vessel was deemed to be 90% searched with only 10% remaining. The SAR techs were all suffering some symptoms of cold injury such as frozen extremities, hypothermia and muscle cramps.

29/1150z JRCC decided to search the area surrounding the capsized hull and the track made during the tow and drift of Sir William Alexander and L'Acadien II. Although it was highly unlikely, this search was initiated to ensure that the missing person had not surfaced at some point without being spotted by Sir William Alexander, Madelinot War Lord or any of the aircraft in the area.

29/2000z Search and rescue operations were reduced under the authority of the Search and Rescue Region Commander. This was based on two criteria:

- There was no longer a reasonable chance of finding a survivor who by this time would have spent fifteen hours in the cold water.
- It was improbable that a survivor could escape from the capsized vessel and not be seen by the crews of Sir William Alexander or Madelinot Warlord. But, In order to eliminate this possibility all reasonable effort was expended and no survivor or evidence to suggest someone had escaped from the hull was found.

29/2002z CCGS Sir William Alexander was released from the search and rescue incident and departed for Sydney. The decision to proceed to Sydney was based on several factors:

- The accident occurred in the Nova Scotia RCMP and Medical Examiner's jurisdiction. Sydney was the nearest port to facilitate a transfer of the deceased to their custody.
- The Sydport facility could be secured, allowing the transfer of the deceased with some privacy and dignity and provide the crew of Sir William Alexander an opportunity to deal with the aftermath of the incident.
- Sydney was the most practical port for the agencies that required access to the ship and crew, including the Transportation Safety Board, a critical incident stress team and Coast Guard officials.

## Search and Rescue Units Tasked

<b>SAR Unit</b>	<b>Tasked</b>	<b>Departure</b>	<b>Response Time</b>
CCGS Sir William Alexander	28/2159z <sup>1</sup>	28/2221z	22 minutes
Cormorant R 903	29/0423z	29/0635z	2 hours 12 min <sup>2</sup>
Hercules R 307	29/0437z	29/0600z	1 hour 23 min
Cormorant R 910	29/1219z	29/1321z	1 hour 2 min

## Search and Rescue Unit hours

<b>SAR Unit</b>	<b>Transit Hours</b>	<b>SAR Hours</b>	<b>Total Hours</b>
CCGS Sir William Alexander	5.0	18.6	23.6
Cormorant R903	4.6	0.3	4.9
Cormorant R910	2.3	2.2	4.5
Hercules R307	2.6	4.4	7.0
F/V Madelinot Warlord	0.0	16.0	16.0

<sup>1</sup> This is the time that the tasking call ended

<sup>2</sup> Delay is a result of the crew changing aircraft due to a technical problem



## Part 3 Search Cessation

29/2000z Search and rescue operations were reduced under the authority of Rear Admiral McFadden, Halifax Search and Rescue Region Commander.

This decision was based on the following criteria:

- There was no longer a reasonable chance of finding a survivor who had spent fifteen hours in the cold water.
- The area had been searched and all reasonable effort expended but no survivor or anything to suggest someone had escaped from the hull undetected was found.

The case was handed over to the RCMP as a missing persons case.

Number of people on board	6
Survivors	2
Fatalities	3
Missing	1

## Part 4 Conclusions/Recommendations

### Search Mission Coordinator Recommendations

#### **SAR and Ice Operations Cooperation**

SAR and Ice Operations are Coast Guard programs that have many common goals and shared resources. As a result, it is in the best interests of the Coast Guard and its clients that there is a high level of cooperation at both the planning and operational levels. In this case it became apparent that SAR and Ice Ops were working independently. For example, on the day before this incident it was not clear to JRCC, that Ice Operations Halifax had made a decision not to task an icebreaker to escort any sealing vessels for this particular fishery. Additionally, there is often a grey area when it is not clear if a vessel requires icebreaker or search and rescue assistance. Further guidance would assist JRCC staff in deciding on the most suitable service.

#### Recommendation

1. SAR representatives attend all planning conferences for Arctic and Gulf Ice seasons to discuss any change in policies and procedures that may affect either program.
2. SAR representatives are invited to join weekly Ice Operations conference calls when there is potential for increased SAR involvement due to ice, weather, vessel activities or policy changes.
3. A more comprehensive set of guidelines should be developed to help operational staff define which program is responsible to provide assistance and when responsibility for an operation should be passed from one program to another. This information should be included in the National SAR Manual, Ice Operations SOPs and MCTS Operations Manuals.

#### **Coast Guard Vessel Availability for SAR**

At the time of the incident CCGS Sir William Alexander was effectively tasked to deliver three separate programs:

- Thirty minute SAR standby
- Assist the RCMP with law enforcement (Farley Mowat)
- Provide icebreaker assistance in the Sydney area if required.

SAR Coordinators were given instruction not to task the vessel for a non-distress case without consulting with the ROC.

This is not an isolated occurrence and they seem to be increasing in frequency. The SAR Needs Analysis 1993 specifies that as a result of the exposed waters, two offshore patrol vessels are required, one in the east and one in the west zone, off Nova Scotia at all times. The ROC attempts to accommodate this but with limited resources, multiple high profile program demands and unscheduled maintenance issues it is apparently becoming more difficult.

#### Recommendation

CCG Maritimes Region should review this issue with respect to resource levels, multi-tasking procedures and program priorities. It is imperative that the requirements of the SAR Needs Analysis are met. Otherwise, at some point a major SAR will occur off the Coast of Nova Scotia with no capable Coast Guard vessel available to respond in a timely and safe manner.

#### **JRCC Operations Room/Staff Interaction**

During the review of this incident it became apparent that information flow between workstations in the operations room was not optimal. Information was received but not always disseminated throughout the room. Although no critical information was missed and there was no negative bearing on the outcome, this issue should be addressed to ensure the operations team is working as effectively as possible.

#### Recommendations

1. The operations room should be renovated with the assistance of an ergonomics expert familiar with the requirements of this type of facility.
2. All operational staff should receive training similar to bridge resource or cockpit resource management. This training should be specific to the JRCC and based on the prosecution of SAR incidents.

#### **SAR Aircraft Reliability**

The Cormorant helicopter was slightly delayed getting to the scene due to the crew having to change aircraft as the result of a problem with communications equipment.

#### Recommendation

CF should review this issue with respect to resource levels, program demands, availability, reliability and maintenance in order to determine if there is a systemic problem.

#### **Capsized Vessel Rescues**

Coast Guard lacks formal training, detailed procedures and the proper equipment to guide and assist crews when dealing with this type of scenario.

#### Recommendation

Coast Guard implements training and develops procedures for ships' crews and SAR staff when dealing with this type of incident. The investigation, evaluation and purchase of suitable equipment to assist crews with a capsized rescue operation should also be initiated.

#### **SAR Tech OTV Kit**

The OTV (Over Turned Vessel) kit is presently configured for helicopter deployment. During the mission, the kit was delivered from the Hercules by parachute only due to the extraordinary resourcefulness displayed by the SAR Techs on duty that night, when they stripped down the kit and jury rigged it for parachute deployment. The SAR Techs

reported numerous equipment issues with the equipment during the dive operation in the icy waters.

#### Recommendations

1. The SAR Tech community should evaluate the dive equipment to be used during dive operations in icy waters.
2. The OTV kit should be configured to permit both parachute deployment or helicopter deployment.

#### **Communications Problems**

JRCC had difficulty faxing messages to both CCGS Des Groseilliers and CCGS Sir William Alexander during this incident.

#### Recommendation

Coast Guard Technical Services review the problems experienced during these incidents and implement measures to improve communications reliability between JRCC and CG vessels.

SAR aircraft primarily use HF radio to communicate with JRCC. This has been recognized as unreliable and inefficient during SAR incidents. Secondary SAR resources such as other CF aircraft, Transport Canada's pollution patrol and Provincial Airlines/DFO aircraft use satellite communications that are very reliable and allow the quick, efficient transfer of information. Reliable and efficient communications onboard primary SAR aircraft would allow more efficient tasking of resources and improve the SAR response.

#### Recommendation

The CF should install satellite communications as soon as possible onboard all SAR aircraft. This equipment should provide voice, data and fax service.

#### **Coast Guard Vessel/CF SAR Aircraft Tracking**

A number of Newfoundland Region's large vessels have tracking equipment onboard that give operations centres an accurate, timely picture of Coast Guard resource positions. This type of information allows JRCC, Ice Ops and other operational centres to utilize resources more efficiently, particularly during periods of high activity. Additionally it can serve as a safety system for the small vessel fleet as the operational centre can automatically be notified if a vessel misses a scheduled report.

#### Recommendation

All Coast Guard vessels and CF SAR aircraft have this functionality installed.

#### **JRCC Technical Issues**

During this incident there were three separate issues with equipment in the JRCC. The Inmarsat B terminal was out of service, the maritime coordinator's computer workstation was unreliable and the Comlog phone recording system was not functioning properly. None of these issues had a direct impact on the outcome of the incident but cumulatively

they have a detrimental effect on the operations in the JRCC. Given the variety of technical systems at JRCC Halifax, the operational staff often adapts to working around problems as solutions or fixes may not be immediately available.

#### Recommendation


In the last ten years the JRCC has gone from paper log keeping and charts to almost total electronic case prosecution. As a result, many new technologies and systems have been introduced to the centre but no comprehensive management plan, budget or staffing has been put in place to maintain and manage these systems. It is recommended that a technology review and audit be conducted with the goal of a comprehensive maintenance, tech training and financial plan implemented nationally and at the JRCC.

#### Next of Kin Notification

During this incident there was a communication breakdown between the NOK representative, Sûreté du Québec (SQ) and the families of the crewmembers. At 28/1527z JRCC advised the SQ that the search would be reduced at 2000z. The SQ agreed to advise all of the families but unfortunately this did not happen which resulted in unnecessary anguish for the family of Mr. Aucoin, in particular. JRCC recognizes and deeply regrets that this occurred and will take steps to reduce the possibility of this happening in the future.

#### Recommendation

The National SAR Manual and JRCC/MRSC Standard Operating Procedures should specify that in addition to an early notification of a pending search reduction, the SM/SMC will confirm at the actual time of search reduction that all NOK have been advised.



P. Rudden  
Maritime Coordinator  
JRCC Halifax

## JRCC Remarks/Recommendations

### RSMS Recommendations

#### **SAR and Ice Operations Cooperation**

The JRCC Halifax RSMS did attend the Arctic Planning workshop in May 2008 and it is intended that the participation of a SAR representative will be included in all future Gulf and Arctic planning meetings and conferences calls.

Ice breaking operations in the Gulf of St. Lawrence spans three Coast Guard and four DFO Fisheries Regions. There is a need for clear and concise national reporting procedures between the Regional Ice, ROC, JRCC, MRSC and C&P offices when dealing with disabled fishing vessels in ice. There was a breakdown of communication between the centres for this seal fishery resulting in a loss of information and situational awareness about the movements of the sealing fleet and the CCGS Des Groseilliers by JRCC Halifax and Ice Maritimes. Loss of information related to the breakdown of the L'Acadien II earlier in the day and the policy of ice escort for fishing vessels not being relayed to JRCC Halifax. Clear guidelines, detailing when a vessel in ice transitions from an Ice Assistance case to SAR case, need to be developed by Coast Guard Headquarters in Ottawa and relayed to all Regional Offices.

There is a need for a national Coast Guard case operational computer program, similar to the SARMaster program utilized in Canada's Rescue Centres, that would enable all Regional ROCs, Ice Offices, JRCC/MRSCs and Headquarters to manage interregional incidents and share information more easily. Coast Guard Headquarters should investigate the use of a current program such as INNAV, SARMaster or CANSARP or develop a new National Program to manage Coast Guard operational incidents.

#### **Coast Guard Availability for SAR**

Serviceability and multi-tasking of vessels assigned to maintain primary search and coverage regularly affects the quality of that coverage. Near daily discussions and negotiations between the RSMS at JRCC Halifax and the ROC are required to risk manage losses in SAR coverage. The restrictions placed on the CCGS Sir William Alexander leading up to this case are indicative of a systemic problem with Offshore SAR Coverage that regularly result in the loss of 30 minute standby, use of less capable vessels for Primary SAR Coverage or restrictions placed on vessels due the requirements of other programs. For example, in the weeks surrounding this incident Offshore SAR coverage was maintained by the CCGS Teleost while engaged in science operations and outside of the required zone. Often a single vessel secured in Dartmouth is used to covers both SAR zones in effect providing poor coverage to all offshore areas.

More accurate reporting of the quality of Offshore SAR coverage is required to determine the extent of the loss of Offshore SAR Coverage, to ensure Maritimes Region is meeting the requirements as stated in the SAR Needs Analysis and to reflect the realistic quality of Offshore SAR coverage provided in the Maritimes Region.

**JRCC Operations Room/Staff Interaction**

With an expanded workforce since the 1998 JRCC Halifax Workload Review, it has been determined that the JRCC operations room is too small with ergonomic restrictions which affect current operations. The OIC and RSMS are currently working on a three-year infrastructure project with DND that includes the redesign and possible expansion of the operations room to address these problems with 2008/2009 identified for the development of a design plan and 2009/2010 for renovations.

The new Continued Proficiency Training for SAR Coordinators provided by the Canadian Coast Guard College includes a module on Bridge Resource Management (BRM). This course is still in the development phase with two pilot courses complete and will be reviewed to determine if it is meeting the BRM needs of JRCC Halifax.

**Capsized Vessel Rescues**

The knowledge of vessel stability, ship construction and marine engineering required to make an informed decision on dealing with capsized vessels highlights the need for Maritime SAR Coordinators to possess a Deck Officers Certificate of Competency.

There are currently no national Coast Guard guidelines or procedures for rescuing survivors from capsized vessels. It is recommended Coast Guard Headquarters investigate, evaluation and purchase suitable equipment to assist crews with a capsized rescue operation and develop operational guidelines for these situations.

**Communications Problems**

Effective and reliable communications are the key to any successful search and rescue mission. JRCC Halifax will implement a more rigorous communication check with all Coast Guard vessels operating in the Halifax SRR to identify any potential technical problems and ensure those problems are addressed.

**Coast Guard Vessel Tracking**

There is an immediate need for real time tracking of all Coast Guard resources in the Maritimes region. This is already accomplished for Newfoundland Region vessels through the VMS system and Quebec Region vessels through the INNAV system and should be implemented nationally.

**JRCC Technical Issues**

JRCC Halifax is a highly technical centre with many independent networks, systems and equipment including, but not limited to, SAR Mission Management System (DND Managed), CANSARP (CG Managed), telephones and recording equipment (DND Managed), satellite equipment (CG Managed). Long term management of these systems is handled at a national level but day to day support is provide onsite by DND technicians and one Coast Guard employee, the SAR Systems Support Officer.


The job description of the SAR Systems Support Officer is currently under classification review. There is need for this review to be completed as soon as possible so that any

staffing and qualification deficiencies may be identified. Administrative staffing issues leading up to this incident prevented the SAR Systems Support Officer from focusing on the JRCC Technical issues. This situation has been rectified with the return of all indeterminate Coast Guard Administrative staff to JRCC Halifax.

**Next of Kin Notification**

The OIC and RSMS are currently reviewing Next-of-Kin notification protocol to ensure this important aspect of any SAR case is handled in the most respectful and effective manner.

The Search Mission Coordinator Course at the Canadian Coast Guard College should be reviewed to ensure the Next-of-Kin notification process instruction is provided in the classroom and practiced in simulation.

A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to be 'P. Stow', written in a cursive style.

P. Stow  
Regional Supervisor Maritime SAR  
Canadian Coast Guard  
JRCC Halifax



**OIC Remarks**

I agree with the observations and recommendations of the author. His work has served to compile the details of the SAR case and has resulted in valuable recommendations to improve the overall SAR system. I also support the recommendations of the RSMS and will work with him to address the issues noted above. I will add amplifying comment to a couple of areas.

**JRCC Operations Room/Staff Interaction**

The points related to potential internal JRCC improvements are very well taken. The issue of internal communications during case prosecution is particularly pertinent. The layout of the JRCC Operations Room is not optimized for the information sharing that is critical to efficient case prosecution. An ergonomic study was undertaken to assess the space requirements for the JRCC and determine the best layout to optimize information flow. That study was the impetus for initiating a project to renovate the JRCC. Funding sources are being actively pursued to ensure the renovation can be done as quickly as possible, in sequence with other, interdependent projects. Support from senior leadership in both the CF and CCG have been engaged for their support of these important initiatives.

The recommendation by the author to enhance operational communications and team development training for JRCC CF and CCG staff is supported. This may take the form of CCG Bridge Resource Management (BRM) training or something similar with the goal of formalizing the sharing of operational information and providing feedback within the operational setting of a JRCC Operations Room. JRCC Halifax staff will explore options for this training through liaison with CF/CCG Trainers.

Additionally, options will be explored to enhance Risk Assessment Training for JRCC staff. This could provide additional "tools" for SAR Coordinators when faced with decisions regarding deployment of SAR Tech teams for operational jumps and dives as well as decisions regarding rescues from capsized vessels.

I am very pleased with the SAR coordination aspects of this case. It is clear to me that the staff at JRCC Halifax and at MRSC Quebec worked through the challenges described above and put forward the total effort I expect for any distress case. Their willingness to explore every option to locate and save the crew of this vessel was of the highest standard. Well done to them.

**SAR Aircraft Reliability/Availability**

Aircraft reliability and availability is a challenge that is well known to the Air Force. A number of studies have been conducted to investigate potential solutions to Cormorant and Hercules SAR aircraft availability challenges and those efforts continue. Most recently, a Cormorant Campaign Plan has been initiated which will gradually improve Cormorant availability to almost double the current rate in the next two years.

While not a reliability issue, the subject of SAR standby response posture (RP) for CF air assets remains an outstanding issue. Air resources were on the normal 2 hr RP when this incident occurred. A detailed study on SAR RP was recently conducted by the Chief of the Air Staff. Decisions regarding the recommendations in that study have not yet been promulgated but should be made and communicated as soon as possible as confirmation of the optimum SAR RP for CF assets.

### **SAR Aircraft Tracking**

The author's comments regarding SAR resource tracking are noted. It is recognized that this was not a negative factor in this SAR case; however, it would have assisted SAR Coordinators in achieving greater Situation Awareness (SA). I take it as a given that increased SA greatly aids in SAR coordination and results in more efficient and effective utilization of resources. I support his comment on this issue.

### **Communications**

SATCOM capability has been identified as a long-standing deficiency in FW and RW SAR aircraft. This capability gap results in less efficient employment of aircraft. Real-time communications with SAR aircraft will result in more efficient taskings and allow stand-down of resources at the earliest opportunity, saving scarce aircraft hours. Currently, there is an ongoing SATCOM trial for the Cormorant which is expected to result in the acquisition and fleet fitment of this capability. A similar trial on the Hercules has been initiated but is currently prioritized too low to allow testing and evaluation (T&E). 1 Cdn Air Div has been requested to initiate a review of the prioritization level with a view to encouraging T&E.


### **JRCC Technical Issues**

As pointed out by the Coordinator, there were three separate equipment issues that came up during this SAR case. The Inmarsat B terminal was out of service, the Maritime Coordinator's computer workstation was unreliable and the Comlog phone recording system was not functioning properly. Each of these issues is being addressed and in fact, were being addressed at the time of the incident. Troubleshooting of the Inmarsat B terminal was being done at the time. Since the case, the problem was identified and rectified. The JRCC computer workstations had also been scheduled for lifecycling. The new equipment has arrived in the JRCC and building of the new workstations has commenced. Lastly, the cable problems with the one channel of the Comlog phone recording system has been rectified and it is fully operational. Due to the highly technical nature of the JRCC equipment, periodic glitches will occur. It is recognized that these technical issues can detract from the efficient coordination of a SAR case so whenever a problem is reported, it is investigated and addressed as quickly as possible.

**Conclusion**

It is known that this report is not the only documentation being prepared in the aftermath of this event. It is hoped that the details contained here will assist the agencies conducting investigations to compile all of the facts.

Lastly, I wish to acknowledge the tragic circumstances surrounding the loss of life in this case. Our sincere condolences go out to the families of those who died in this tragic case.



J.P. Van Oosten  
Major  
Officer in Charge  
JRCC Halifax


## SRR Commander Remarks

I agree with the observations and recommendations contained in this report. They serve the intended purpose of recording the relevant details surrounding the L'Acadien II SAR case, and of applying them as appropriate to inform recommendations for improving the SAR system.

There can be no doubt that this case involved terrible tragedy. The fact that the L'Acadien II capsized while being assisted out of the ice highlights the inherent dangers associated with operating vessels at sea, especially in and around ice, and particularly during the seal harvest. My most sincere condolences go out to the families and crew-mates of the men who were lost as a result of this accident.

I wish to echo the comments of the Officer in Charge of the JRCC regarding SAR coordination of this event. The SAR coordination aspects of this case were handled very professionally and proactively. It is unfortunate that the excellent performance of this important SAR unit was marred by loss of life at the scene of action. Well done to the Coordinators.

I will ensure that progress is made as rapidly as practicable towards implementing the many recommendations submitted in this report. Indeed, I am confident that most of them will be addressed as a result of parallel investigations already underway.



P.A. Maddison  
Rear-Admiral  
Commander Halifax Search and Rescue Region

Attachments - Weather reports

**Environment Canada Marine Forecast valid March 28<sup>th</sup> 2219z**

**Cabot Strait**

Forecast:

Freezing spray warning continued.

Winds light becoming northeast 10 to 15 knots this evening then increasing to northeast 15 to 20 overnight. Winds increasing to northwest 25 to 30 Saturday afternoon.

Occasional snow beginning This afternoon tapering to occasional flurries Saturday morning.

Visibility fair to poor in precipitation. Freezing spray over open water beginning Saturday afternoon. Temperatures minus 2 to zero lowering to near minus 5 Saturday morning.

Outlook for Sunday...Strong to gale force northwesterlies.

**Environment Canada Weather Report 2200z, Sydney, NS**

Wind NE @ 10kts, temperature -3C, barometer 1007, snow and fog.

**Sir William Alexander Sitrep 0300z – F/V L'Acadien II under tow**

Wind NNW @ 5/10kts, temperature -2C, barometer 1012, cloudy and clear.

**Sir William Alexander Sitrep 1100z – Dive Operations ended**

Wind NNW @ 5/10kts, temperature -2C, barometer 1010, cloudy and clear.


**Sir William Alexander Sitrep 1500z – Cormorant search ends**

Wind NxW @ 10/15kts, temperature +1C, Barometer 1012, cloudy and clear, sea temperature +0.75C.


**Sir William Alexander Sitrep 2035z – Search reduced**

Wind NNW @ 10/15kts, temperature -4C, barometer 1013, cloudy and clear.

### Attachment - Charts Overview



### Vessels and Magdalen Islands



F/V L'Acadien II - SAR Case H2008-00319  
JRCC Halifax Timeline

The following timeline is a compilation from JRCC logs and phone recordings during the F/V L'Acadien II and other concurrent SAR incidents. Where there is a difference between the log time and the phone recording time the recording time has been used, as this is generally the most accurate.

Time	Friday March 28th
1829z	Sydney MCTS (VCO) advises that the F/V L'Acadien II is requesting an ice escort. CCGS Des Groseillers (Des Gros) is alongside the vessel and has an engineer onboard. JRCC passes this information to Ice Operations Halifax (Ice Ops) for action.
1904z	VCO advises F/V Ginny CR is taking on some water through a broken rudder box but not in immediate danger. He is requesting an escort to the ice edge where he will proceed to the Magdalen I on his own. JRCC advises VCO to pass the request to Ice Ops for action. VCO questioned this as he was taking on water but JRCC confirms the vessel is only asking for an escort and can make his own way to Magdalen Islands once clear of the ice.
1917z	Sydney MCTS advises further information on the Ginny CR and advises that Ice Ops will not task a CG vessel for an ice escort. JRCC advises if Ginny CR becomes a SAR case he will be taken to the nearest port or a helicopter will take the crew off.
1921z	JRCC calls Ice Ops and requests clarification on their policy for assisting sealers requesting icebreaker assistance. Ice Ops advises that there will be no ice taskings for sealers, only SAR taskings. Ice Ops also advises Des Gros is available for SAR if required and Sir William Alexander is in Sydney to support law enforcement (Farley Mowat), SAR and to provide icebreaker assistance to commercial traffic.
1923z	Sydney MCTS advises F/V Ginny CR's situation has deteriorated and she is at risk of sinking. JRCC will contact the vessel directly on cellular phone to clarify the situation and discuss the vessels' options. The maritime coordinator is dealing with this while trying to clarify the Ice Ops position. Note this call is recorded at end of the 1921z call to Ice Ops.
1930z	JRCC calls F/V Ginny CR on cel phone. The skipper confirms that he can still steer but when moving in ice the rudder box leaks and his vessel is in danger of sinking. They are taking on a lot of water but the pumps are keeping up for now but if the rudder lets go the vessel will sink. JRCC advises that the vessel will be escorted or towed towards the nearest safe port which could be Neil's Harbour or Sydney but the skipper requests assistance towards the ice edge in the direction of the Magdalen Islands. The Maritime Coordinator explains that if his situation worsens while under escort, the icebreaker may have to take him all the way to the Magdalen Islands resulting in one less CG resource in the

	vicinity of the rest of the sealing fleet. JRCC will look at the situation and advise the skipper what assistance will be provided.
2007z	Sydney MCTS advises F/V Madelinot Warlord is requesting an ice escort. The vessel is taking on some water through his stuffing box but is in no immediate danger.
2009z	JRCC advises CG Regional Operations Centre (ROC) that due to an increase in requests for assistance the CCGS Sir William Alexander will probably be tasked by JRCC for sealers in the Northern Cape Breton area. ROC advises that CCGS George R Pearkes may be passing through the area and could assist too if required.
2024z	JRCC tasks CCGS Des Groseilliers to proceed and assist F/V Ginny CR.
2026z	JRCC Advises Ginny CR that Des Gros has been tasked and will assist her to the ice edge. Ginny CR advises that F/V Rough Rider is nearby and will escort him from the ice edge to Cap-aux-Meules, Magdalen Islands. JRCC requests Ginny CR to pass sitreps every 2 hours until secured at Cap-aux-Meules.
2034z	JRCC speaks with Des Gros and confirms the tasking for Ginny CR.
2037z	VCO advises JRCC that L'Acadien II is not happy because Des Gros left him to help someone else. JRCC requests VCO contact Des Gros and get her position earlier in the day
2047z	VCO advises Des Gros position earlier was 46 54N 59 58W.
2113z	JRCC requests VCO get the cel phone number of Madelinot Warlord. JRCC needs to make sure that he is willing to be towed or escorted to Sydney before tasking CCGS Sir William Alexander.
2118z	JRCC advises Madelinot Warlord that CCGS Sir William Alexander will be tasked to escort his vessel towards Sydney. Madelinot Warlord advises that L'Acadien II is nearby and needs assistance. JRCC will check on his status and get more information.
2124z	JRCC advises Ice Ops of potential problems with Madelinot Warlord and other vessels in Sydney Bight due to ice conditions and wind forecasted to come northeast. Ice Ops is not aware that Des Groseilliers is east of Cape North, Cape Breton assisting the sealing fleet.
2129z	JRCC advises VCO that SWA will be tasked to assist Madelinot Warlord and requests VCO get further details on L'Acadien II. VCO advises that L'Acadien II has been in contact with Ice Quebec for a couple of days and they are responsible for him. JRCC will follow up with Ice Quebec. As a result, JRCC will not task SWA to assist L'Acadien II until they have talked to Ice Quebec and gathered more information on the situation and have a complete picture of the vessel's status.
2133z	Ice Quebec advises they have no information on F/V L'Acadien II and did not task the Des Gros to assist her. He was talking to the Commanding Officer of Des Gros earlier in the day about another issue and was advised that the skipper of L'Acadien II is furious that he is being left while someone else (Ginny CR) is being assisted.
2139z	JRCC calls Des Gros, who confirms that they could not fix the problem onboard L'Acadien and departed the scene when tasked to assist the Ginny CR. Ice in the area was 9/10's coverage of fairly heavy ice with no pressure. Des



	Gros confirms L'Acadien II cannot steer so is unable to make her own way through the ice. JRCC asks why they left L'Acadien II without telling JRCC? Des Gros advises they had no orders to assist her and she was in no immediate danger at the time. She was in approximate position 46 52N 060 02'W.
2148z	JRCC calls SWA's officer of the watch and tasks SWA to assist F/V Madelinot Warlord. SWA is also tasked to assist F/V L'Acadien II. JRCC advises she is having steering problems and can't make way in the ice so SWA may have to tow the vessel or take the crew off. More details will follow.
2241z	VCO advises F/V Wendy and Cora, in the vicinity of the F/V Madelinot Warlord and F/V L'Acadien II, is requesting an escort. The vessel has no mechanical problems but the ice pressure is increasing and the skipper requests SWA assist his vessel while in the area. JRCC requests VCO establish communications with F/V L'Acadien II to get more details on the vessel and her situation. JRCC also requests confirmation that she still requires a tow and is willing to come south towards Sydney with SWA. VCO advises they have not worked the L'Acadien II and believe all communications have been done through Ice Quebec. VCO is presently working six vessels in the area at this time. JRCC requests VCO ascertain the number of boats in the Madelinot Warlord's area as the situation could become serious based on the ice and wind forecast.
2247z	JRCC calls Ice Ops, but the Ice officer is off duty and as per normal operating procedure the ROC staff would relay all information to the duty ice officer. JRCC passed the request from F/V Wendy and Cora for an escort due to increasing ice pressure. ROC reconfirms that there will be no ice escorts, only SAR taskings but they will pass the request along.
2249z	Sydney MCTS has contacted L'Acadien II. She still has steering problems and requires CG assistance. The vessel's cel phone number is passed with the advice that the skipper only speaks French.
2253z	Note this is the only direct comms between F/V L'Acadien II and JRCC. JRCC calls L'Acadien II on cel phone and speaks to the captain in French. The captain confirms his position, a description of his vessel, six people onboard, that he has steering problems and requires a tow. CCGS Des Groseillers advised him earlier in the day to contact Sydney MCTS and make a formal request for an escort to the Magdalen I. JRCC advises that SWA has been tasked and should be on scene in approximately 3 hours 30 minutes. It is planned to tow L'Acadien II to the nearest safe haven, which is Sydney, but the captain is concerned that there may be no facility to take his boat out of the water and make repairs. JRCC advises the captain to contact Sydney MCTS for assistance with contacting local boat repair facilities.
2309	SWA calls JRCC and advises they are outbound from Sydney Harbour. JRCC briefs the C/O on the latest details and it is agreed that the vessels will be brought south towards Sydney/North Sydney.
2315	JRCC expresses concern to the ROC about the forecasted ice and weather conditions and the fact that a Provincial Airlines surveillance flight indicates at least 20 sealing vessels in the area, Des Gros and SWA are both on SAR

	tasking so another vessel may be required. ROC responds that CCGS George R Pearkes is heading into the Gulf of St Lawrence/Magdalen Islands area for Sunday and this may be the most suitable resource for JRCC to use. She is doing a harbour breakout and some Marine Navigation Services work before proceeding into the Gulf of St Lawrence. Louis S St Laurent is off Chaleur, Quebec escorting shipping and Edward Cornwallis is north of Anticosti Island standing by for shipping. There are ice and security issues in the Sydney area and the RCMP ERT may be put onboard SWA on Sunday.
2335	JRCC contacts CCG Auxiliary Everett Andrews for information on shipyards in the North Sydney area. He suggests a local boat hauling company. The CGA member expresses concern because Sydney Harbour is filling with heavy drift ice.
2339	Des Gros advise they are enroute to assist the Ginny CR and will advise when they commence the escort towards the Magdalen Islands.
2339	JRCC calls the local boat hauler to check on the availability of the equipment to assist L'Acadien II but left a message on the answering machine.
2341	JRCC calls ROC to discuss difficulties connecting to the SWA Fax machine and sending a hardcopy-tasking message.
2346	JRCC requests VCO pass the boat hauler info to L'Acadien II.

Saturday March 29th	
0018	Des Gros commences escort of F/V Ginny CR towards the ice edge and the Magdalen Islands.
0109	SWA advises on scene at L'Acadien II and Madelinot Warlord and is aware of the Wendy and Cora stuck in the ice ten miles to the north. C/O of SWA thinks she should be escorted due to heavy ice and forecast winds. JRCC explained the earlier phone call with CG ROC/Ice Ops but agreed to establish a conference call between JRCC, SWA and Ice Halifax. During this call it was agreed that SWA would assist Wendy and Cora. SWA advises they will probably pick up Wendy and Cora first and then come back and pick up L'Acadien II then Madelinot Warlord and take them to North Sydney. SWA expressed concern about how the L'Acadien II will tow with a rudder problem and plans on having a short towline, perhaps close enough for L'Acadien II to contact SWA's stern.
0314z	CCGS Sir William Alexander calls JRCC to request a SAR tasking number. A discussion took place about problems faxing the tasking form and SWA officer of the watch advises they will attempt to transfer the fax machine back up to the bridge to fix the problem.
0327z	0300z sitrep from SWA advises they have commenced the tow of L'Acadien II in position 46 52.0N 060 10.2W and now enroute to assist Madelinot Warlord. Winds NNW @ 5/10kts, temperature -2c, overcast sky with clear visibility.
0413z	CCGS Sir William Alexander advises that L'Acadien II struck a piece of ice and capsized. F/V Madelinot Warlord rescued two crewmembers but the other four are still missing. SWA and Madelinot Warlord are standing by the capsized vessel, there is banging coming from inside the overturned hull and SWA is getting ready to launch the fast rescue craft to rescue anyone who comes to the surface. Total ice coverage is 6/10s but they are sitting in a pool of open water now. JRCC will task a Cormorant helicopter and have Sydney MCTS issue a mayday relay. .
0415z	JRCC calls SWA and requests an updated position of the incident for the mayday relay - 46 49.18N 060 03.9W. The hull is still afloat and they can hear knocking from inside.
0415z	Request Mayday relay broadcast from Sydney MCTS.
0417z	Standby Hercules and Cormorant aircraft from 413 Squadron, Greenwood are paged after a discussion and agreement that 4 rescue divers would be required on the scene.
0419z	Ice Ops Halifax advised.
0420z	Cormorant crew briefed and tasked.
0424z	JRCC advises SWA of attempts to contact divers in Sydney but it is improbable that a dive rescue team can be found who can assist in these conditions. Hercules R307 will have divers on board but their eta is 3 hours from now and it is uncertain if they can para drop their equipment then jump themselves into the ice floes. SWA confirms that the hull is still floating and it was agreed that they should attempt to secure it alongside and consider cutting into the hull due to limited cold water survival time.

	Commanding Officer of SWA advises that the fishing vessel hit a piece of ice and capsized despite SWA engines being put astern and cutting the tow line as quickly as possible.
0429z	First call received from Canadian Press requesting information about the seal fishery in general but not the L'Acadien II. They will call back in an hour.
0430z	VCO calls JRCC with responses to the mayday relay. The bulk carrier Magdeleine and the Marine Atlantic Ferry Lief Erickson responded but they are not tasked as there is no additional assistance they can provide with respect to rescuing the four trapped crewmembers. There has been no response to the broadcast from commercial divers.
0430z	JRCC briefs RJOc Atlantic and requests information on any military assets in the area. RJOc advises there are none.
0431z	Message left with DND Public Affairs for briefing in anticipation of press inquiries.
0434z	JRCC Officer in Charge (OIC) briefed.
0434z	JRCC CG Regional Supervisor Marine SAR (RSMS) briefed.
0435z	Hercules aircraft commander (A/C) is briefed and advises they plan to proceed directly to the scene and deploy the SAR Techs/divers by parachute, if possible. Their eta on scene is two hours and thirty minutes from now. The SAR Techs will have to wait until they get on scene before making a decision to jump and dive.
0440z	JRCC calls SCUBA TECH, a commercial dive company based in Sydney. They are presently in Halifax but advise Cape Breton Regional Police (CBRP), Glace Bay Fire Department and North Sydney Fire Department have dive teams.
0443z	VCO calls with another response to Mayday Relay. M/V Federal Venture is a bulk carrier, 5 hours away but has no divers so she is not tasked.
0444z	JRCC calls CBRP dispatch and requests the dive team. The dispatcher advises it will take a long time to get on scene, probably several hours, but they will call out the sergeant to discuss the situation.
0445z	Called CCG Auxiliary member in Neil's Harbour in an attempt to contact any local divers and left message to call JRCC.
0448z	CBRP dive team leader briefed. Their dive team would have to be called out plus two hours and thirty minutes to get to Neil's Harbour. They will muster the team, determine a time line and call back with details.
0455z	RJOc is requested to have the Fleet Diving Unit Duty Officer call JRCC.
0458z	VCO advises JRCC that when they spoke to L'Acadien II earlier in the day they were told there were four persons onboard (this was confirmed to be incorrect). They also passed the name of a local diver who may be able to assist.
0459z	JRCC contacts a CCG Auxiliary member in Dingwall. His wife advises he is seal hunting but she will have him call JRCC.
0501z	CBRP dive team advises JRCC they do not have the equipment to do this work and cannot assist.
0501z	VCO passes contact numbers for North Sydney Fire Department.
0503z	JRCC calls SWA and provides an update on the latest efforts to locate divers. Commanding officer advises they have secured the after part of the hull but the ice conditions are preventing the placing of another strap around the forward part and stabilizing it for a rescue attempt. A discussion took place about the available

	options – wait for divers or cut into the hull. It was agreed that given the cold water, time for divers to arrive on-scene and risk that the hull could sink in the meantime, it was best to attempt a rescue by cutting into the hull.
0504z	Fleet Dive Unit Atlantic advises JRCC they have no resources in the area and it would take too long to get a Halifax based team to the scene.
0506z	JRCC contacts North Sydney Fire Department, they do not have a dive team but Sydney Mines Fire Department does.
0507z	VCO advises JRCC the F/V Sanbrendora and another 6 fishing vessels are proceeding to the area to provide assistance. They are cautioned by JRCC to proceed only if they can assist in the recovery of the boat and missing crew. They could put themselves in danger and complicate the situation by proceeding under the present conditions.
0518z	Hercules aircraft commander discusses with JRCC whether the best option is to jump and dive as soon as they arrive on scene or to wait for the Cormorant and go as a four-person dive team. It was decided that given the time restraints it was best to jump and dive as soon as possible.
0526z	SWA calls JRCC and advises that they are preparing equipment to cut into aluminum hull. There is no one on the hull yet as they are still having problems securing it alongside. There was a discussion and agreement that the L'Acadien II crew is probably trapped in the forward part of the vessel and that is where the cutting should begin. There is still banging from the hull at this point.
0529z	CG ROC requests JRCC take the lead for media requests with respect to the SAR operation and the ROC will handle all other media requests. ROC is also briefed on the latest information from the scene.
0530z	CG Regional Supervisor Maritime SAR arrives in the JRCC.
0531z	Canadian Mission Control Centre advises that the COSPAS/SARSAT monitoring system appears to be malfunctioning so distress alerts may not show up on the JRCC system. The system will be restarted and JRCC requests that USMCC be contacted to maintain a guard for alerts in the Canadian area during this period.
0532z	JRCC contacts Cape Breton Regional dispatch for info on the Sydney Mines dive team.
0535z	JRCC calls the F/V Madelinot Warlord and confirms the two survivors onboard his boat are in good shape. The survivors are Bruno Pierre, son of the skipper and deckhand Claude Deraspe. It is also confirmed that the four remaining persons onboard L'Acadien II were asleep in their bunks in the forward part of the vessel when she capsized and are definitely trapped inside. Missing is skipper Bruno Bourque, Carl Aucoin, Gilles Leblanc and Marc-Andre Deraspe, all from the Magdalen Islands. No one has spoken to the families so JRCC will have the Magdalen Islands Surete du Quebec (SQ) begin a next of kin (NOK) notification process. JRCC advises that SWA is planning to cut into the hull but the skipper of Madelinot Warlord has concerns that she will sink if they do that but notes that the hull appears to have a lot of air trapped inside as she is floating fairly high in the water.
0536z	JRCC briefs the Sydney Mines Dive Team. They will proceed to Neil's Harbour with a five-person team to provide assistance as required and will call back with an ETA.

0539z	SWA calls JRCC to advise there are reservations about cutting into the hull as Madelinot Warlord has advised the hull is open from one end to the other and it will probably sink once it is opened. It is agreed to delay cutting until the hull can be better stabilized with the assistance of Madelinot Warlord.
0548z	JRCC briefs MRSC Quebec and requests they contact the SQ to begin NOK notification on the Magdalen Islands.
0557	JRCC is advised that due to problems with the communications equipment on the Cormorant helicopter, they will be delayed approximately fifteen minutes.
0559z	Ice Ops calls to confirm L'Acadien II is the vessel Des Gros was assisting earlier in the day.
0600z	Sydney Mines Fire Department dive team is underway for Neil's Harbour but due to bad roads their eta is at least one hour thirty minutes. Communications will be via Trunked Mobile Radio and cell phone.
0602z	Greenwood Wing Ops advises the standby Cormorant is unserviceable so they are switching to Cormorant Rescue 903, estimated time of departure is thirty minutes.
0607z	CCGS Sir William Alexander advises the hull is secured fore and aft and a crewman is cutting into it now. Madelinot Warlord is secured alongside the hull and will rescue the SWA crewman if the hull sinks. It is not clear at this point if banging inside the hull can still be heard. SWA is briefed on the status of the Sydney Mines dive team bound for Neil's Harbour and discussed the possibility of a fishing vessel picking them up but it is deemed impossible due to ice conditions. JRCC also advises that the Hercules with two divers will be on scene in fifty minutes.
0609z	Canadian Press calling for an update and is referred to DND Public Affairs.
0611z	RSMS updates CG Director of Operations (at ROC) and confirms DND Public Affairs will handle all SAR related inquiries while CG Public Affairs will deal with all other inquiries.
0613z	MRSC Quebec advises that the SQ have been briefed on the situation and will begin the NOK notification. JRCC requests that one person, preferably clergy or an indirect family member, is appointed to liaise with JRCC.
0615z	RSMS confirms with CG Director of Operations (C/O Sir William Alexander's direct supervisor) that L'Acadien II was involved with Des Gros earlier in the day. Director advises that they are in the process of sending a briefing note to CG HQ Ottawa.
0620z	JRCC calls SWA to arrange a recovery plan for the divers and their gear once they jump from the Hercules. SWA's FRC cannot be launched because the capsized hull is secured alongside now but Madelinot Warlord will standby to recover the divers and gear. It is still unknown if the divers can jump into the ice covered water. The cutting operation is going very slowly because of the tight spacing of the frames but the hull remains stable and upright.
0628z	CCGS Sir William Alexander advises they cannot cut through the hull as the frames are tightly spaced. They have not stopped cutting yet, but are quickly running out of ideas. A cutting torch cannot be used, as it would cause the aluminum vessel to burn. It was agreed to wait for the divers assessment and if they cannot attempt a rescue then attempt to tow or right the vessel would be considered. SWA advises they can no longer hear noises from inside the hull.

0630z	Hercules R307 eta on scene 0655z, delayed due to turbulence.
0638z	Cormorant R903 airborne at 0635z
0639z	Surete du Quebec seal hunt command post on the Magdalen Islands calls MRSC Quebec for details of the incident. MRSC provides a briefing and refers further inquiries to JRCC.
0644z	SWA advises JRCC that they have been unsuccessful cutting into the hull and will have to wait for divers. The Commanding Officer advises that towing or righting the vessel will result in her sinking so they will not be attempted. JRCC will check with the Sydney Fire Department for specialized cutting and rescue equipment that can be brought to the scene by helicopter. The hull is sinking lower in the water and SWA crew is working to secure it with additional lines. It is confirmed that there is no noise coming from the hull now.
0646	Cormorant Rescue 903 eta on scene 0830z
0645z	SQ Magdalen Islands requests a briefing from JRCC on the latest details. There are two constables informing the next of kin at this time and they are in the process of finding a representative to liaise directly with JRCC.
0647z	VCO advises JRCC that the son of the Captain of the L'Acadien II, onboard Madelinot Warlord, would like to advise the families himself. JRCC subsequently provides the SQ with a contact number for the Madelinot Warlord and requests they contact the son directly and agree on a notification procedure.
0655z	Hercules R307 on scene.
0657z	JRCC updates the ROC on the diver situation. The ROC advises they have been in contact with the SWA and the ship now has a list of 2 ½ degrees as a result of L'Acadien II taking on water, so they may have to release the hull for safety reasons.
0701z	JRCC calls SWA and suggests using the ship's helo rescue gear to spread the frames in the hull
0702z	JRCC arranges for Sydney Fire Department to have cutting equipment on standby for helicopter transport to SWA.
0704z	SWA calls JRCC to advise that the helo rescue gear is not suitable for spreading the frames. Madelinot Warlord just sealed the hole in the hull with expandable foam and damage control plugs.
0707z	Call to JRCC from R307 concerning situation on scene. Communications are very poor.
0708z	JRCC requests VCO to advise Cormorant R 903 that they may have to stop in Sydney and pick up the fire rescue equipment. This is subsequently cancelled as a decision is made to send the Cormorant direct to the scene and begin dive operations with 4 divers as soon as possible.
0717z	JRCC requests VCO establish a VHF radiotelephone call with R307 due to communications difficulties with HF. VCO is also updated with latest details.
0719z	ROC calls JRCC to advise that the list on SWA has been stabilized and the hull will remain secured to her for now. SWA has advised that there is a three hundred foot wide pool of open water where the SAR Techs from R307 can land when they jump.
0720z	R307 (call through VCO) advises the dive equipment ready to go and the SAR Techs are getting dressed for their jump. The intent is to drop the equipment first

	and if it is recovered then the divers will jump. The operation should begin in approximately thirty minutes. R307 also requests more dive tanks and were advised of the dive team at Neil's Harbour where the Cormorant can get tanks if required. Permission for the SAR Techs to jump is granted by JRCC.
0725z	Sydney Mines Fire Department advises JRCC that the dive team is forty-five minutes from Neil's Harbour and confirms they have extra tanks and divers.
0730z	ROC calls JRCC to discuss moving CCGS George R Pearkes from Placentia, Nfld towards the sealing area as SWA will not be able to assist if other sealers get into trouble.
0742z	JRCC calls JRCC Victoria to get advice after dealing with the capsizing of the Cap Rouge II. Patched through to the dive team at Sea Island who recommend the following: No more cutting to maintain the hull's buoyancy The diver should go in closest to the place where noises were last heard Only secure debris – do not cut it free. Watch for contaminants such as fuel or oil. Extra air tanks will be required. Clear as much debris out of the interior as possible, blankets charts etc.
0748z	SWA advises that Hercules R307 has done their first equipment drop, which was recovered by Madelinot Warlord. On the next pass they will drop a second bundle of equipment then the SAR Techs.
0758z	Cormorant R903 is twenty minutes from the scene. If they dive, the SAR Techs will be unable to continue on SAR standby for subsequent taskings so JRCC will have to arrange a back up team.
0801z	JRCC calls SWA to confirm they received a photo of L'Acadien II so the SAR Techs can assess the danger areas on the vessel. JRCC advises that, if requested, they can be patched to Sea Island dive rescue team for a consultation before starting their dive.
0802z	JRCC calls Canadian Mission Control Centre (CMCC) to get an update on their status but left a message.
0805z	CMCC advises JRCC that the SRSAT system appears to be fully operational now
0812z	Greenwood Wing Operations is advised by JRCC that a back up SAR Tech team will be required. Operations has already advised the back up team.
0818z	Provincial Air Lines is advised by JRCC of the SAR operation to ensure there is no conflict with the Fisheries patrol flights in the area.
0820z	Cormorant R903 on scene.
0828z	JRCC updates the ROC and advises there may be a requirement for a CG helo to assist with transferring equipment to SWA.
0832z	JRCC requests CG ROC to put a CG helicopter on standby to support the SAR operation. ROC also advises that CCGS George R Pearkes is departing Placentia and will be assuming the SAR standby role for any other vessels that require assistance
0838z	SQ advises JRCC that one family still has not been advised. A crisis centre has been set up near the hospital to deal with the NOK and a person has been designated to represent the families and act as a liaison with JRCC.
0840z	R903 has hoisted the two SAR Techs onboard SWA and are now enroute to



	Sydney for fuel.
0846z	CCGS Sir William Alexander confirms that the two SAR Techs from Cormorant R903 are onboard and the two SAR Techs who parajumped from R307 will soon be onboard. A SAR Tech on SWA advises they decided on a four-member team as they can better manage the cold-water risk. They have checked the picture of the boat and are ready to dive. R903 has departed for Sydney and can get more dive tanks if required.
0902z	JRCC is advised by the ROC they were just speaking to the SWA and the situation is stable with the hull alongside.
0906z	R903 on the ground in Sydney and will standby there until needed.
0908z	VCO advises that R307 has SAR Techs in the water (this is duplicate and aged information). Their bingo time is 1200z.
0915z	Press call.
0917z	Press call.
0918z	Sydney Mines FD are at Neil's Harbour and ready to assist as required.
0927z	Press call.
0930z	Air/Ground/Air communications request a contact number for R307 as want to pass weather but cannot get them on HF radio.
0930Z	(From SAR Tech debrief) SAR Techs prepare for the dive operation from the hull of the overturned vessel. Last minute coordination and planning took place to mitigate the problems associated with a dive operation such as this e.g. lack of radio communications, cold water, dark and dangerous environment.
0931z	SQ and the NOK representative call JRCC for a briefing. All of the families have been advised.
0942z	Sydney Fire Department is updated and advised that JRCC will call if the equipment is required.
0950Z	The SAR Techs commence the dive operation. Over the next sixty minutes, SAR Techs commence a series of four separate dives following a rotation in which each SAR Tech takes a turn as diver, tether man, back up safety diver and warm up. The water temperature was near zero so a diver could only remain in the water for fifteen to twenty minutes at a time. The first diver entered the water from the stern, and upon entering the vessel immediately found and recovered two deceased. The next diver in the rotation continued searching and securing floating debris until all feeling was lost in his hands. The third diver entered the same area to continue the search and located and recovered the third deceased. The fourth diver took his turn but as he tried to enter the same area he found a large metal freezer had shifted and blocked the door. As a result, he used the last few minutes of his dive to search the rigging and deck area for last crewmember.
0953z	Press call.
0955z	NOK representative calls to find out when the survivors will be flown to the Magdalen Islands and requests JRCC to advise her as soon as there is any news.
0959z	R307 through VCO advise they have one hour left on scene and will return to Greenwood.

1011z	JRCC calls SWA and requests an update. SWA advises that the divers have been in the water and confirms that there is no longer any requirement for cutting equipment from Sydney FD. He is not comfortable passing any more details over a cellular phone and will attempt to call using a more secure means.
1014z	Sydney Fire stood down.
1021z	Cape Breton Regional dispatch advised to stand down all agencies associated with this incident.
1024z	CG Director of Operations advises he has just spoken with SWA's Commanding Officer and confirms that 2 bodies have been recovered and the SAR Techs are continuing with dive operations. They plan to have SWA proceed to Sydney and secure at Sydport wharf where access to SWA can be restricted. It was agreed that JRCC would advise the Medical Examiner of the plan to have SWA secure at Sydport. The ROC is also sending a CG helo to SWA to take the two survivors to the Magdalen Islands. ROC is in the process of contacting the Transportation Safety Board and Transport Canada to see if they need the hull salvaged for investigative purposes.
1027z	JRCC advises the ROC that if all four missing are not accounted for, a search of the area would have to be done.
1028z	R903 is the only serviceable Cormorant. There will be no back up helicopter in Greenwood until sometime later today.
1029z	NOK representative calls JRCC for an update and is given the following: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- two deceased crewmembers have been recovered but not identified yet.</li> <li>- dive operations are continuing but it is a slow process</li> <li>- the two survivors will be transported to the Magdalen Islands by CG helo.</li> </ul> The representative requests updates as quickly as possible and JRCC agrees to pass information as soon as it is received.
1048z	JRCC calls SWA on Inmarsat B and gets confirmation that the two deceased are onboard now and the divers are still in the water but the two remaining crewmembers are still unaccounted for. C/O is aware of helicopter CG 361 heading towards the SWA for transfer of survivors. JRCC requests that SWA advise as soon as there is any new info from the divers.
1050z	The fourth and last SAR Tech to dive completes his turn and exits the frigid waters. After the SAR Techs climb back aboard the GGS SWA from the hull of the capsized vessel, the SAR Tech team consulted with the Commanding Officer SWA. The vessel was deemed to be 90% searched. With no hope of survival for anyone remaining inside the vessel, the SAR Tech Team Leaders made the decision to terminate the dive operation. The SAR techs were all suffering some symptoms of cold injury such as frozen extremities, hypothermia and muscle cramps.
1050z	The International Fund for Animal Welfare offers two A-Star helicopters and a Navajo fixed wing aircraft to assist with the search. JRCC advises that there is no requirement for more aircraft at this time.
1102z	Press call.
1113z	NOK rep calls for any new information and is advised that there is nothing new at this time; the divers are still in the water. (JRCC has not been advised that dive ops

	had ended and a third deceased recovered at this point)
1120z	Herc R307 Off scene
1121z	Hercules R307 advises three deceased have now been recovered with one person still missing. They are now proceeding to Sydney. (3 tries were needed to get this message from aircraft due to bad communications.)
1129z	NOK representative is updated on recovery of third deceased and also advised that dive operations will end in approx. 10 minutes.
1131z	<p>JRCC updates the CG Director of Operations on the recovery of the third deceased and advises that the dive operation is almost complete. There is some discussion of bringing in more divers to complete a search of the boat. Note: this was later cancelled based on the SAR Tech's assessment that further dive operations were too dangerous.</p> <p>JRCC also advises that if the fourth person is not located in the hull, then there will be a search of the surrounding area to confirm that he did not drift away from the hull undetected.</p> <p>There was a discussion about what to do with the hull once dive operations are completed. Dir Ops advises that neither Transportation Safety Board nor Transport Canada have requested CG tow the hull to port but SWA still plans to tow it to Sydney once all recovery operations are completed.</p> <p>JRCC advised that there would also be some discussion in the near future about search reduction at some point today.</p>
1139z	RCMP Seal Hunt Operations Centre at H Division Halifax calls offering their assistance. JRCC briefs that the deceased will probably be transported to Sydney and agree that CB Regional Police should be advised and they will contact the Medical Examiner.
1149z	CG and DND Public Affairs are fully briefed on the situation during a ten-minute conference call.
1152z	R903 on the ground at Sydney is briefed on the plan to search the area for the missing person. R903 advises the SAR Techs onboard SWA have to be recovered and flown back to Greenwood, so they will call JRCC back to discuss the plan after the SAR Tech discussion.
1157z	<p>SWA Commanding Officer advises all of the SAR Techs and the three deceased are onboard SWA. The hull has been released and is three quarters submerged with just the stern out of the water.</p> <p>They just received another distress call from a vessel thirty miles north of them and details of the Annie Marie are passed to JRCC.</p> <p>The SAR Techs are debriefed and advise that the vessel was well searched but due to the amount of debris inside the hull they cannot confirm 100% that the fourth missing person is not inside.</p>
1157z	VCO advises JRCC that F/V Anne Marie is stuck in ice under pressure and taking on water north of L'Acadien II. His pump is keeping up for now but the situation may deteriorate. VCO has done a mayday relay and is receiving responses now.
1158z	CG Director of Operations advises he just spoke with SWA. The hull is settling lower in the water and the Commanding Officer has decided to release it from the ship's crane. TSB and Transport Canada have approved the release of the hull and SWA no longer plans to tow the hull to Sydney.

	<p>JRCC advises that the Cormorant will complete a final search of the area for the missing person. JRCC also advises of a group of seven sealers who have decided to return to the Magdalen Islands and may request icebreaker assistance. A member of this group who is a Coast Guard Auxiliary member and community leader has requested that, out of consideration for the families, we consider sending the deceased to the Magdalen Islands but it was agreed that decision would have to be made by the Medical Examiner and police.</p>
1202z	<p>Hercules R307 in Sydney for fuel. At this point they cannot drop any equipment to Annie Marie or provide a decent search for the fourth survivor without SAR Techs, so they will investigate the quickest way to get a fresh SAR Tech crew and advise JRCC.</p>
1203z	<p>JRCC calls the SAR Techs on SWA and discusses the possibility of them rejoining the aircraft and participating in the search for the fourth survivor. The SAR Tech advises that is not possible within their operational rules and the back up crew at Greenwood would have to do this. The SAR Tech confirms that the hull search was probably 95% completed but there is still the possibility that the fourth person is inside or somehow was freed from the capsized vessel.</p>
1210z	<p>R 903 advises they are available to take a pump from Hercules R307 and drop it to Annie Marie, then proceed to SWA to pick up the four SAR Techs and return to Greenwood. JRCC tasks R903 to do this and advises that Cormorant R910 from Gander will be tasked to continue the search for the missing person.</p>
1210z	<p>VCO advises that Annie Marie is still keeping up with the ingress of water and the ice pressure has released slightly. JRCC advises that Cormorant R 903 will drop a pump but cannot assist in any other way so JRCC needs to know if the crew can safely abandon onto the ice until another rescue resource can get to the scene. Motor Tanker Ottawa Express has responded to the mayday relay but is not tasked at this time.</p>
1212z	<p>CG RSMS briefs the Officer in Charge JRCC that there will be a final search for the missing person using the Gander based Cormorant. The Search and Rescue Region Commander has been briefed and has approved a search reduction later in the day if there is no further possibility of locating a survivor.</p>
1213z	<p>CFB Gander's 103 Squadron Cormorant R910 is tasked to search for the missing crewman.</p>
1222z	<p>VCO advises helicopter CG 354 was on patrol for the seal hunt and responded to the mayday relay for F/V Annie Marie. JRCC requests a vox call with the helicopter.</p>
1223z	<p>CG Director Operations advises they will issue a notice to shipping for the hull and requests an update on JRCC's plan for SWA. JRCC advises that SWA will remain in the area until the Cormorant completes their search and she may be tasked to assist Annie Marie. JRCC notes that the sooner George R Pearkes arrives in the area the easier it will be to release SWA.</p>
1225z	<p>CG 354 advises they are on scene and can land on the ice next to Annie Marie to check their status. JRCC tasks them to do this and advises them of R903's plan to drop a pump</p>
1227z	<p>RCMP H Division EOC advises the incident falls in their area of responsibility and provide the chief investigator's name and contact number. The RCMP will advise</p>

	the medical examiner and keep the CBR Police updated. JRCC provides an update on the details of the capsized vessel and SWA's status.
1232z	NOK representative is advised that dive operation has finished. The divers checked out the boat and are confident there is no one onboard. She requests that identification of the deceased be made as soon as possible so that the families can be advised. JRCC advises that the priority right now is the search for the missing person and assisting Annie Marie who is taking on water, but that identification will be made and she will be advised as soon as possible. The deceased will be transported to Sydney because it is the closest port and the investigation is the responsibility of the RCMP and the Nova Scotia Medical Examiner. The NOK rep had several more questions but the call had to be ended, as the JRCC ops room was extremely busy at this point.
1235z	VCO advises that CG 354 is on the ice next to Annie Marie and provides information on ice conditions at the scene. They are going to speak with the skipper of Annie Marie about his situation and intentions.
1238z	JRCC calls SWA and requests the identification of the three deceased as soon as possible. It is also advised that Cormorant R 910 has been tasked to search the area for the missing person and may call SWA for drift information and Annie Marie is being taken care of so SWA should not be tasked to assist her. SWA advises that Madelinot Warlord is still a SAR incident and the skipper has requested an escort to the east to join the other sealing vessels proceeding to Magdalen Islands. JRCC approves this.
1249z	JRCC calls SWA requesting her drift points to calculate a search area for R910. SWA advises all of the officers are busy with tasks at this time but they will call back in the next ten minutes with the information.
1250z	Corm R910 is tasked to proceed to current position of the capsized vessel and search along the track line that was made through the ice for approximately five miles, then return along the track again. If nothing is found during this search then complete a sector search with a two-mile radius around the capsized v/l. On completion they will be released.
1252z	Press call.
1254z	Transport Canada Quebec calls MRSC Quebec and requests a briefing on the incident. MRSC briefs the TC official using information in the JRCC log.
1256z	Press call.
1256z	Note to file (from JRCC Log): Search rationale for the missing person – R910 tasked to proceed to F/V position and from there to search along the track that was made through the ice during the tow. This would be the area to search because presuming the missing person was not still in the hull of the vessel, this would be the only open water, if at all, as the ice in the area is quite thick and heavy. After completing this track search, R910 tasked to do a sector search out to a 2 nautical mile radius around L'Acadien II's last known position.
1304z	SWA passes the names of the deceased and advises Carl Aucoin is the missing person. He was wearing a black sweater with grey sleeves, black jogging pants and has lots of black curly hair. SWA is still waiting to be officially stood down from the other case. The stern of the hull is still visible but she is down by the bow. JRCC requests SWA to deploy a self-locating datum marker buoy (SLDMB) on the

	ice to track the hull's drift.
1308z	R910 is given a final briefing before take off.
1311z	NOK representative calls to advise all of the families are upset and really need some information. She is advised that the Maritime Coordinator she has been dealing with will call back in five minutes.
1314z	JRCC calls the NOK representative number but the line is busy.
1316z	JRCC calls the NOK representative to pass the names of the deceased. The NOK representative passed the phone to a Surete de Quebec officer who took the names and is advised that Carl Aucoin is the remaining missing crewmember but the search for him continues. The boat has been searched but Mr Aucoin's body was not found. The CG Helo will be flying the 2 survivors back to the Magdalen Islands. JRCC will call with any new information and explains that any delay in passing information is a result of the level of activity in the JRCC and at the scene.
1316z	JRCC calls SWA to advise Cormorant R910 from Gander will be carrying out the search for the missing person, eta on scene is 1530z. JRCC requests SWA to remain on scene until the Cormorant has completed the search and pass drift information to R910 when they arrive on scene. SWA advises that L'Acadien II is still afloat with the stern sticking up about two feet and has been like that for the last couple of hours. They have been advised that there is an air pocket (bladder) in the stern so if there is no leak she could remain that way for some time.
1324z	413 Squadron Greenwood advise they now have two serviceable Cormorants and have a standby crew for the Cormorant in Greenwood.
1329z	JRCC calls RCMP officer in charge of the investigation and confirms he will accept the deceased crew members and notify the medical examiner. JRCC provides a briefing on the survivor transfer by helo to the Magdalen Islands and the plan to have SWA bring the deceased to Sydney. JRCC will give the RCMP officer's name and number to the SQ for co-ordination with the NOK.
1330z	Press call.
1332z	Press call.
1343z	RCMP H Division EOC advises that they are getting reports from their counterparts in Ottawa that the SWA is leaving the area and L'Acadien II has sunk. JRCC provides the correct information. RCMP has also received information that the Farley Mowat is heading into the area and have some concerns because SWA was their security platform for the Emergency Response Team. JRCC advises to contact the CG ROC concerning the Farley Mowat situation.
1348z	SWA calls JRCC and advises they have just deployed the SLDMB. The SWA has not been in comms with helicopter CG 361 yet. JRCC advises that the NOK would like to know the eta of the 2 survivors at the Magdalen Islands and requests SWA to advise when CG 361 departs the ship. Once SWA is stood down from the search, JRCC will put them in contact with the RCMP officer in charge to arrange the transfer of the deceased. The two survivors have been checked by the SAR Techs and appear to be in good shape.
1357z	413 Squadron advises Hercules R307 has landed at Greenwood.
1358z	VCO advises CG 354 has finished assisting the Annie Marie and is now bound for SWA. R903 also proceeding to SWA to pick up SAR Techs. No contact with CG 361 yet.

1400z	JRCC calls ROC for an update on CG 361. The helicopter has departed Halifax ETA Port Hawkesbury 1429z for refueling them continuing to the SWA.
1401z	Press call.
1402z	JRCC attempts a phone patch with Cormorant R910 but the call is dropped.
1403z	JRCC attempts another phone patch but unable to connect so info is relayed by Air/Ground/Air. R910 One hour twenty minutes eta to the scene. JRCC provides a briefing on the latest information and advises that CG 361 will be on scene at the same time.
1414z	R307 in Greenwood advises they had attempted to call a number of times during the tasking but comms through AGA very poor. The Hercules is unserviceable at this time, it is a minor snag and it should be operational shortly.
1419z	CG 361 eta at SWA 1540z. JRCC requests an eta for Cap-aux-Meules to give the NOK as much notice as possible.
1421z	AGA advises that Cormorant R903 has just departed SWA enroute Greenwood.
1426z	Ice Ops Halifax advises that CCGS Edward Cornwallis, north of Anticosti Island, will deal with the seven boats that are trying to get to the Magdalen Islands. CCGS George R Pearkes is in the Burgeo area and Maritimes Region is trying to get her to move towards Sydney for SAR standby, security and ice breaking in the area. JRCC briefs on the SAR case Annie Marie and the latest info on the L'Acadien II.
1436z	JRCC provides an update to NOK via SQ officer who has assumed role of family liaison. SQ confirms that information has been passed to all six families. JRCC passes the transportation information on the two survivors and confirms that the deceased will be landed at Sydney. More details are requested on Carl Aucoin for identification and cold-water survival calculations. It is agreed that the SQ will liaise directly with the RCMP once the deceased and missing persons case are handed over to them.
1438z	JRCC calls SWA for an update on the CG helo status and requests a seawater temperature.
1447z	Press call.
1456z	SWA advises the sea temperature is +0.75 Celsius. JRCC advises that CG361 should be on SWA's deck in thirty five to forty five minutes. SWA to call JRCC as soon as the helo lands on SWA.
1457z	RSMS updated before his participation in a conference call concerning the George R Pearkes assisting with the seal hunt activity.
1506z	JRCC Officer in Charge intends to seek authorization for search reduction at 1700z when the Cormorant R910 has completed the search.
1523z	Briefing given to ROC concerning SAR activities.
1524z	JRCC calls SWA and confirms they have assumed the role of on scene coordinator and tasks to standby in the ice, monitor the location of the hull and provide datum and drift information to R910. SWA can still see the hull and advises that Madelinot Warlord had attempted to sink it and intends to shoot holes in the stern so that the air will escape. SWA advised him that he could not do this and CG would not approve sinking the hull.
1520z	Corm R910 on scene and commencing search.
1527z	SQ calls with information concerning the description of the missing person. JRCC provides a thorough brief on the search of the overturned boat and reaffirms

	<p>that the dive operations have ended. The search is now concentrating on the open water and ice floes in the area and this search would be reduced at 1700 local time if nothing else is found. JRCC also advises again that SWA will be taking the deceased to Sydney and provides the name and contact number of the RCMP officer responsible for receiving them.</p> <p>The SQ agrees to brief all the families with this information.</p>
1550z	SWA advises that CG 361 is on deck refueling then will proceed to Magdalen Islands with the two survivors.
1553z	JRCC notifies the SQ of CG 361's eta at Cap-aux-Meules and that there is no need for an ambulance. There is no new information on the search for Carl Aucoin. SQ will notify the families.
1602z	Press call.
1621z	<p>JRCC briefs the ROC on the planned search reduction at 2000z and advises that salvage of the submerged hull will be the next issue. ROC does not have any salvage plans at this time as CG has no mandate for salvage. ROC also advises that a Critical Incident Stress Team will be at Sydney when SWA arrives.</p> <p>ROC has a teleconference scheduled with Ottawa, Quebec, and Nfld. The intent is to send the Pearkes and Cornwallis to the Magdalen Islands and Des Gros will deal with the Farley Mowat issue.</p>
1625z	<p>Conference call between OIC, N3 and Search and Rescue Region Commander. The OIC provides a full briefing on the incident and the search plan. The SRR Commander authorizes search reduction for 2000z, unless new information becomes available.</p>
1629z	SWA advises CG 361 has just departed for the Magdalen Islands with the two survivors, eta 1415 local time. R910 should be finished searching in approximately one hour. Madelinot Warlord is heading to the east to standby with another vessel, he wants to head towards the ice edge and then to the Magdalen Islands. JRCC anticipates standing down the SWA at 2000z when the search is reduced.
1634z	SQ Magdalen Islands is advised of CG 361's eta at the Cap-aux-Meules airport.
1641z	ROC requests an update from JRCC. JRCC intends sending SWA towards Sydney after escorting Madelinot Warlord towards open water and confirms that SWA is released from SAR case Annie Marie.
1648z	Cormorant R910 advises they have approximately twenty-five minutes left on scene, then they will refuel at Sydney.
1653z	Cormorant R903 has landed at Greenwood. The aircraft commander advises that the SAR Techs think there is a possibility the body of the last crewmember is inside the hull. They searched as long as they could but they were not going to find him.
1654z	Cormorant R910 off scene.
1655z	CG RSMS briefed on search reduction at 2000z. The Maritime Coordinator advises that the George R Pearkes will be tasked to standby Annie Marie as the situation is still not under control and SWA should be released in order to get some crew rest. The Maritime Coordinator mentions that this will raise issues at the management level between the CG Regions but RSMS agrees with this decision.
1658z	JRCC advises ROC that JRCC will be tasking George R Pearkes to assist Annie Marie. ROC advises that this is a good decision that will simplify the conference



	call to discuss resource allocation with the other CG Regions.
1701z	JRCC updates RCMP H Division EOC and advises of the search reduction plan. RCMP request information on the two survivors for the purpose of their investigation.
1708z	JRCC tasks Pearkes to assist Annie Marie.
1730z	Cormorant R910 ends search and departs the scene.
1737z	ROC advises that all parties on the conference call, except Maritimes Region, would like to express their displeasure to JRCC for tasking George R Pearkes to assist F/V Ginny CR (who is taking on water).
1748z	Helo CG 361 has dropped the two survivors at Cap-aux-Meules and departed for Halifax.
1752z	VCO advises F/V Annie Marie is now abandoning ship. JRCC advises VCO to task R910 to proceed to the scene.
1753z	JRCC advises SWA that the Annie Marie is abandoning ship. SWA offers to proceed and assist but JRCC advises the ice is thick enough for the crew to abandon to it and R 910 will be tasked to rescue them. SWA advises R910 has proceeded to Sydney for fuel and CG354 has proceeded towards Des Gros.
1755z	R910 landed Sydney for fuel and food, tasked to proceed to assist the Annie Marie.
1801z	JRCC requests VCO get the location of CG 354 for a possible tasking to assist Annie Marie
1802z	JRCC advises MRSC Newfoundland that there is no Cormorant on standby at Gander as it has been tasked to L'Acadien II and Annie Marie
1804z	JRCC calls Regional Joint Operations Centre and requests information on surveillance flights in the Cape Breton area that can assist with SAR
1807z	CMCC advises Annie Marie just activated their EPIRB
1809z	RJOC advises there are two surveillance aircraft in the area now and a charter aircraft carrying press members
1820z	VCO advises that Annie Marie's crew are abandoning onto the ice now.
1827z	The spouse of a crewmember on Annie Marie calls JRCC for information on the vessel's status. JRCC provides a full briefing and gathers information on all of the crewmembers. The spouse agrees to act as the point of contact for the crewmembers' families.
1835z	VCO advises R 910 is enroute to Annie Marie and will transport the crew to Cap-aux-Meules
1948z	VCO advises that R 910 has all crew aboard and proceeding to Cap-aux-Meules
1950z	JRCC passes R910's eta at Cap-aux-Meules to Annie Marie families
1955z	JRCC releases George R Pearkes from Annie Marie case
1959z	RCMP North East Nova Major Crime Unit requesting information on L'Acadien II as they are having some difficulties getting information from SQ due to language problems. Information is provided as requested.
2001z	RCMP Division Emergency Response Centre (EOC?) looking for a contact at the ROC in order to get more information on SWA.
2002z	Des Gros provides an update on the escort of Ginny CR and Lady Maggie. Ginny CR is being towed by Rough Rider and Lady Maggie is towing Nadine D (MRSC Quebec SAR Incident)
2002z	JRCC releases SWA from L'Acadien II SAR incident. SWA advises that

	Madelinot Warlord has departed but SWA will confirm he needs no assistance before proceeding to Sydney.
2012z	SWA advises Madelinot Warlord is proceeding under her own power towards the Magdalen Islands with another vessel and does not require any further assistance. JRCC releases SWA from the Madelinot Warlord SAR incident and will have VCO set up a communications schedule to ensure she makes it safely to port.. SWA will get the latest position for the L'Acadien II hull then depart for Sydney. SWA advises the time of the capsizing was 0407z.
2013z	VCO advises F/V Sanbrendora is requesting information on transfer of the deceased to the Magdalen Islands. JRCC advises that the RCMP has jurisdiction and will receive the deceased at Sydney.
2017z	SWA advises they towed L'Acadien II for two hours and seventeen minutes for a distance of six nautical miles
2019z	JRCC verbally transfers the incident to the RCMP as a missing persons case and follows up with a faxed form. JRCC also advises that SWA is proceeding towards Sydney and requests RCMP to liaise directly with the ship. JRCC recommends the RCMP contact the SQ to deal with NOK and transport of the deceased. RCMP advises this connection has already been made and family members have already made inquiries.
2020z	ROC calls JRCC requesting information on the Pearkes, the RCMP is looking for her for the Farley Mowat security tasking.
2051z	RCMP confirms they have been in direct contact with SQ in Magdalen Islands concerning the deceased being transported to Sydney; JRCC requests confirmation that the SQ have advised the NOK of the status of the deceased? RCMP responds, yes they assume the SQ will be in touch with the next of kin.
2107z	JRCC receives a call from the RCMP at the Magdalen Islands (Seal Hunt File Coordinator for Quebec) he has been getting enquiries concerning the deceased persons. RCMP briefs on the plan for SWA to proceed to Sydney with the 3 deceased. RCMP advises that there is a language problem with the RCMP in Sydney, so JRCC provides contact info for the Sydney RCMP. RCMP states that the NOK representative has called him looking for information and the families are angry because they have not had any information for approx twenty hours. JRCC advises that is not correct, as SQ had been briefed regularly.
2356z	SWA secured Sydney and deceased released to RCMP and Medical Examiner

	<b>Sunday, March 30, 2008</b>
1133z	Call received from the mother of Carl Aucoin, the missing person. She has heard on the radio that the search for her son has been cancelled; she is looking for confirmation and further information. JRCC advises that the search is now a matter for the RCMP and passes their contact information.

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Marine Rescue Sub-Centre Quebec – RSMS	1
Marine Rescue Sub-Centre St. John’s – RSMS	1
CCGS Sir William Alexander - Commanding Officer	1
CCGS Des Groseilliers - Commanding Officer	1
103 Search and Rescue Squadron Gander – CO	1
413 Transport and Rescue Squadron Greenwood – CO	1
Canadian Coast Guard Headquarters – Manager SAR	1
Canadian Coast Guard Headquarters – Director Maritime Services	1
Canadian Coast Guard Maritimes Region – Assistant Commissioner	1
Canadian Coast Guard Maritimes Region – Director Operational Services	1
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