OFFSHORE HELICOPTER SAFETY INQUIRY
January 19, 2010
Tara Place, Suite 213, 31 Peet Street
St. John's, NL

January 19, 2010

PRESENT:

John F. Roil, Q.C./ Anne FaganInquiry Counsel
John Andrews/ Amy Crosbie Canada-Newfoundland and Labrador Offshore
Cecily Strickland/Ian Wallace
D. Blair PritchettSuncor (Petro-Canada)
Alexander C. MacDonald, Q.CHusky Oil Operations Ltd.
Nick SchultzCanadian Association of Petroleum Producers (CAPP)
Laura Brown LaengleGovernment of Newfoundland and Labrador
Norman J. Whalen, Q.CCougar Helicopters Inc.
Jamie MartinFamilies of Deceased Passengers
Don Anthony
V. Randell J. Earle, Q.CCommunications, Energy and Paperworkers Union Local 2121
Robert Escott (without counsel)

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1 January 19, 2010		1 EARI	LE, Q.C.:
2 COMMISSIONER:		2 Q.	I do have a number of questions for you, and I
3 Q. Good morning, ladies and gentlemen. Mr. l	Roil,	3	apologize in advance if some of them seem to
4 there's nothing further you wish to ask at		4	be going over some territory that we went over
5 this time, is there?		5	with the joint panel, Mr. Sacuta, in
6 ROIL, Q.C.:		6	particular to you. Obviously, Mr. Fraser
7 Q. No, Commissioner, nothing further in term	s of	7	wasn't here last time, but we do now have some
8 the direct examination.	:	8	documents that we didn't have before and it
9 COMMISSIONER:		9	brings these to mind. I want to start with
10 Q. And I presume counsel for HMDC will ask -	if 10	0	the concept of an incident. You mentioned
11 you wish to ask questions, it'll be at the	1	1	this by way of three levels of hazard, near
12 end.	12	2	miss, incident, Mr. Sacuta. Can you go
13 MR. WALLACE:	1.	3	through what you consider to be an incident
14 Q. Right.	14	4	again?
15 COMMISSIONER:	1:		SACUTA:
16 Q. Counsel for C-NLOPB.	10	6 A.	Actually, a near miss is one of our kinds of
17 MS. CROSBIE:	1'	7	incidents. I was trying to distinguish the
18 Q. No questions at this time, Commissioner.	13	8	difference between trying to identify what
19 COMMISSIONER:	19	9	would be considered a near miss. So a near
20 Q. No questions, Ms. Crosbie, thank you	. 20	0	miss is one of our kinds of incidents in the
21 Transport Canada is not present. At least, l	[2	1	system we use. Although we distinguish
don't think they are. Counsel for CAPP?	22	2	between the two, a near miss is just one of
23 MR. SCHULTZ:	2:	3	the categories of one of our incidents.
24 Q. No, thank you, sir.	24	4	Another incident, for example, could be an
25 COMMISSIONER:	2:	5	injury which occurs on the facility. That
	Page 2		Page 4
1 Q. No questions. Counsel for Cougar, Mr. Whalen?		1	would be considered an incident, depending on
2 WHALEN, Q.C.:		2	the nature. It could be a first aid, or it
3 Q. No questions at this time.		3	could be more significant than that. We have
4 COMMISSIONER:		4	process incidents where we may have a release
5 Q. Okay, thank you. Sikorsky is not here. Helly		5	on the facility, which would also be
6 Hansen here? No. Counsel for Memorial		6	considered or classified as an incident.
7 University, the Marine Institute?	,	7 EARI	LE, Q.C.:
8 MR. ESCOTT:	;	8 Q.	And I take it that we're all on the same
9 Q. No questions.		9	page, work for the employees on the HMDC
10 COMMISSIONER:	10	0	offshore facility starts when they report and
11 Q. For the Government of Newfoundland.	1	1	check in at the heliport, and it ends when
12 MS. BROWN LAENGLE:	12	2	they leave the heliport to go home?
13 Q. No questions.	13	3 MR. S	SACUTA:
14 COMMISSIONER:	14	4 A.	I would agree that from the time they check in
15 Q. Okay, thank you. Mr. Harris is not here. All	1:		until the time they get their bags to leave
right, we next come then to counsel for CEP,	10	6	the facility that would be considered work.
17 Mr. Earle.	1'	7 EARI	LE, Q.C.:
18 MR. PAUL SACUTA, MR. JOHN FRASER - EXAMINATION BY RAND			So then an incident which occurs during
19 EARLE, Q.C.:	19		helicopter transportation, a near miss which
20 EARLE, Q.C.:	20	0	occurs during helicopter transportation or a
21 Q. Good morning, gentlemen.	2		hazard which exists during helicopter
22 MR. SACUTA:	22		transportation, these are all hazards, near
23 A. Good morning.	2:		misses, incidents, in the workplace?
24 MR. FRASER:			SACUTA:
25 A. Morning.	2:		I would say that, yes, that would be correct.

Page 5	Page 7
1 EARLE, Q.C.:	departing from the Terra Nova facility, which
2 Q. When I know when Mr. Fraser discussed the	2 landed on the Hibernia Platform, was pulled
3 monthly meeting of onshore and the weekly	into the parking area, and was repaired on the
4 meeting offshore, he referred to review of any	4 Hibernia Platform. I'm not aware of the
5 incidents, and so the question that I want	5 situation that you speak of.
6 clarification on is if there is an incident or	6 EARLE, Q.C.:
7 near miss associated with helicopter	7 Q. Okay, well, let's deal with the one that you
8 transportation, does it flow into that system?	8 are aware of because that combines a couple of
9 MR. SACUTA:	9 elements nicely. Clearly the helicopter was
10 A. I think what we've done recently is we've	performing a task for another operator
tried to improve that communication between	initially, but it did involve HMDC because it
12 Cougar and ourselves when it comes to	was, I guess, the alternate landing site, and
incidents or near misses that Cougar would	at least by my way of thinking a fairly
investigate versus what we would do, and I'll	significant thing in terms of helicopter
give you an example. When an individual is at	transportation safety, the loss of an engine,
the heliport and dons his flight suit and	and whether it happened in respect of a
accidentally strikes his eye while donning the	passenger group from one of the other
flight suit, we would track that incident	installations would seem to me to be somewhat
19 through our incident process. If it was a	irrelevant because after all, it may be your
20 flight related incident that Cougar had the	20 people that are getting on that particular
responsibility for, Cougar would complete that	unit the next flight. So would that have made
report and what we've tried to do is make sure	it into your system as an incident?
that the results of those incidents and that	23 MR. SACUTA:
investigation with Cougar gets relayed through	24 A. Certainly there is whenever there's that
our logistic superintendent to our workforce.	25 type of aviation event, Transport Canada has
Page 6	Page 8
1 EARLE, Q.C.:	Page 8 1 some very specific requirements for the
1 EARLE, Q.C.: 2 Q. So I take it that you feel that that hasn't	Page 8 1 some very specific requirements for the 2 aviation operator to complete an
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22 MR. SACUTA:

24 EARLE, Q.C.:

23

25

A. I can't recall whether it was.

Q. Okay, well, let me ask you this and see where

A. I'm not aware of that circumstance. I am

aware of a situation where we had a helicopter

that had a failed engine on a flight that was

22 MR. SACUTA:

23

24

25

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1 we're going with these things.	discussed with Cougar. We found out about it
Notwithstanding the Transport Canada	when people reported it on the Platform, and
3 requirements, in terms of your leadership	it was discussed with Cougar, and they talked
4 meetings that review incidents, would you now	4 to the pilots involved and gave us some
5 expect that an instance such as that would	5 information on what had happened, and I don't
6 make its way through your incident reporting	6 believe that we considered that an incident,
7 and review system?	that Cougar and I don't have I can't
8 MR. SACUTA:	8 remember all the details on it, but Cougar
9 A. I would expect, based on the fact that we've	9 went through, told us what happened, what the
looked at improvement opportunities for the	pilots did in that instance and it like Mr.
communications between Cougar and ourselves,	_
and between Cougar, ourselves, and our	letter the e-mail back from Cougar in our
workforce, that, yes, that message would get	binder at heli-admin, but I don't believe that
relayed through our leadership and to the	that was considered an incident.
workforce. I would expect that, yes.	15 EARLE, Q.C.:
	16 Q. So it didn't make it into your incident review
16 EARLE, Q.C.:	
17 Q. And I take it that you have communicated that	
18 expectation to Cougar?	18 senior leadership at a monthly meeting?
19 MR. SACUTA:	19 MR. SACUTA:
20 A. Yes.	20 A. I was certainly informed of the situation.
21 EARLE, Q.C.:	21 EARLE, Q.C.:
Q. Now the other event that I talked to you about	22 Q. I heard that, Mr. Sacuta, but
the other day, the imbalance on landing which	23 MR. SACUTA:
you indicated was a Hibernia event, would	24 A. Yes.
not would, did that event make its way into	25 EARLE, Q.C.:
Page 1	Page 12
the incident reporting and review system of	1 Q. I'm interested in where these things go. I
2 HMDC?	2 mean and we'll ask some questions about who
3 MR. SACUTA:	3 was informed and at what level, but my
4 A. My understanding is, and Mr. Fraser may be	4 question for now if I could have it clarified
5 able to further clarify, is that we did	5 is whether this type of event, this particular
6 receive something from Cougar on that event.	6 event it's a particular event, but I'm
7 The details of that were placed in the binder	7 asking these questions for illustrative
8 that we have in the heli-admin area for all	8 purposes, made it into that process?
9 personnel to review, if required. So we did	9 MR. SACUTA:
get some information from Cougar on that	10 A. Based on the feedback we received from Cougar,
11 event.	it was not identified as an incident, so it
12 MR. FRASER:	did not go through our incident investigation
13 A. That's correct.	13 process.
14 EARLE, Q.C.:	14 EARLE, Q.C.:
15 Q. That's good, but, of course, that's not	15 Q. You would not consider that an incident.
exactly the question that I asked. I wanted	Would you consider it a near miss?
to know if it made it through your system as	17 MR. SACUTA:
an incident which should be brought to the	18 A. Would I consider it a near miss? No.
attention, like other incidents, to the senior	19 EARLE, Q.C.:
leadership, both at this monthly meeting and	20 Q. Okay. So when you tell us, Mr. Fraser, that
21 at the weekly meetings for reporting and	21 "they talked to us about it", who would have
review, and perhaps, Mr. Fraser, you can help	been the channel?
us on that part of it?	23 MR. FRASER:
24 MR. FRASER:	24 A. Services Supervisor talked to the coordinator
	±
25 A. Yeah, my recollection is that that was	25 at Cougar about that, and they talked to I

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1 believe he talked to their chief pilot and to	1 MR. SACUTA:	
2 their safety officer. I can't remember what	2 A. I mean, passengers are instructed as part of	
3 his title is. I believe they had a discussion	3 the pre-safety briefing that if they notice	
4 around what happened and talked to the pilots	4 anything out of the ordinary, that they have	
5 involved and came back with a determination	the ability to undo their seat belt and inform	
6 how to classify it.	6 the pilots. Also the pilots are responsible	
7 MR. SACUTA:	7 for the weight distribution and the safety of	
8 A. And our onshore logistics coordinator would	8 those on board the helicopter when landing,	so
9 have been involved in those discussions as	9 I would expect the same would apply to th	ie
10 well.	pilots, they have the ability to request	
11 EARLE, Q.C.:	passengers to undo their seat belts to move i	f
12 Q. So how would you have been informed of it, N		
Fraser, and I don't know were you the OIM	distribution on the helicopter during landing	, ,•
on board at the time of that incident?	14 EARLE, Q.C.:	
15 MR. FRASER:	15 Q. Yeah, but the normal procedure is that	
16 A. No, I don't believe I was the OIM at the time.	passengers will remain belted in their seats	
17 EARLE, Q.C.:	for the flight?	
18 Q. Do you know if it would have gone through th	18 MR. SACUTA:	
OIM as a conversation, or would it have turned	19 A. That's correct.	
20 up at the next daily meeting?	20 EARLE, Q.C.:	
21 MR. FRASER:	Q. So it is certainly a departure from the norm?	,
22 A. I can't remember how it was brought up, if it	22 MR. SACUTA:	
was brought up immediately by some of the	23 A. It was unusual.	
passengers or if it was brought up at a safety	24 EARLE, Q.C.:	
25 meeting. I'm not quite sure how it was	Q. Okay, now and I take it from the fact that	
	Page 14 Page 14	age 16
brought up, so I don't have the details or	it didn't go to your leadership meetings, it	uge 10
that. I know it was brought up, it was	2 likewise did not go to your Occupational	
discussed, and discussed with Cougar.	3 Health and Safety Committee meetings as	
4 MR. SACUTA:	4 incident for review, Mr. Fraser?	
5 A. It was my understanding that it was brough		
6 by the passengers on board the aircraft.	6 A. I don't believe it did.	
7 EARLE, Q.C.:	7 EARLE, Q.C.:	
8 Q. Brought up by the passengers on the	8 Q. As I understand it, you're a co-chair.	
9 MR. SACUTA:	9 MR. FRASER:	
10 A. Yes.	10 A. Yeah, I don't have I don't remember ever	ry
11 EARLE, Q.C.:	meeting that I attend every day, so I don't	
12 Q. So you will acknowledge then that it w		ee. I
certainly a matter of concern to the	probably would if it did come to the JOHS	
passengers on the aircraft?	14 Committee. I know it was discussed on th	
15 MR. SACUTA:	15 Platform. It was discussed. People knew	
16 A. I would acknowledge that it was somethin	_	
the passengers might not have been expose		
in the past, so certainly they'd want to kno		
why they had to get up and redistribute the		
weight at the time of the landing.	considered sufficient to go to the leadership,	,
21 EARLE, Q.C.:	it would not be brought from the leadership	
22 Q. And it is a departure from the normal	the Occupational Health and Safety Commit	
situation in the helicopter where passenge	-	
are supposed to remain belted in for the	Occupational Health and Safety Committee	is if
entire flight, right?	some of the worker reps brought it forward	l ,

Page 19 leadership would not bring it to the meeting? 2 MR. SACUTA: 3 A. I believe there are a number of issues that come up during our day to day operations that don't go to the JOHS Committee because they're handled without needing to go to the JOHS Committee, and I think this is an example of the passengers on the aircraft, we immediately discussed the issue with Cougar, I was made aware of it, and we leadership being made aware of it, and we leadership being made aware of it, and we response, and posted that in the binder. 17 most user would have been highlighted as an issue, we response, and posted that in the binder. 18 most user would have been highlighted as an issue, we responded to the issue and let the workforce 19 know by posting the comments back from Cougar in the binder, which all personnel have access to the HoHS Committee because it to in heli-admin. 22 EARLE, QC: 23 Q. Well, I'm going to delve quite a bit into how 24 the HoHS Committee works, so I'll come back to that because I, quite frankly, detect 25 would have been informed of the evidence of the that there are significant differences in the way the JOHS 25 committee work, and I had that "JOHS', it is significant differences in the way the JOHS 25 committee work, and I had that "JOHS', it is sounds like it's a joke. Why you fellow don't use Occupational Health and Safety Board people here, and they indicated a very high level of reporting required by aircraft operators and the informed of the evidence of the Tansportation Safety Board people here, and they indicated a very high level of reporting required by aircraft operators and helicopters. Have you people ever done an analysis to see how your requirement to report compares with the TSB requirement to report? 17 MR. SACUTA: 18 A. Tho of aware of that analysis being completed, no. 19 CALLE, QC: 19 CALLE, QC	January 19,	2010 Multi	-Page	Offshore Helicopter Safety Inquiry
2 Q. And this is an ExxonMobil system, I take it? 3 A. I believe there are a number of issues that 4 come up during our day to day operations that 5 don't go to the JOHS Committee because they re 6 handled without needing to go to the JOHS 7 Committee, and I think this is an example of 8 that. An issue was raised by some or one of 9 the passengers on the aircraft, we immediately 10 discussed the issue with Cougar, I was made 11 aware of it immediately upon the offshore 12 leadership being made aware of it, and we 13 addressed the issue through Cougar, got a 14 response, and posted that in the binder. 15 That's a situation that I'm not sure would 16 have to go to the JOHS Committee because it 17 would have been highlighted as an issue, we 18 responded to the issue and let the workforce 18 know by posting the comments back from Cougar 20 to in heli-admin. 22 EARLE, Q.C.: 23 Q. Well, I'm going to delve quite a bit into how 24 the JOHS Committee works, as of I'll come back to 25 that because I, quite frankly, detect 1 significant differences in the way the JOHS 2 committee work, and I had that "JOHS"; it 3 sounds like it's a joke. Why you follows 4 don't use Occupational Health and Safety like 5 expected to comply with the Operations would 6 Safety and Health, but, anyway, I do detect 7 that there are significant differences in the 8 way different operators move, but on this 9 reporting system you. I'm sure, would have 10 been informed of the evidence of the 11 Transportation Safety Board people here, and 12 they indicated a very high level of reporting 13 required by aircraft operators and 14 helicopters. Have you people ever done an 15 analysis to see how your requirement to report? 17 MR, SACUTA: 18 A. I'm not aware of that analysis being 19 completed, no. 20 EARLE, Q.C.: 20, How are they selected, the external group? 21 The Responded to the standard analysis being 22 C. If we could turn to the Operational Integrity 23 MR, SACUTA: 24 MR, SACUTA: 25 A. I don't think I said there was a dedicated support group. Wha		Page 17		Page 19
3 A. I believe there are a number of issues that come up during our day to day operations that don't go to the JOHS Committee because they're handled without needing to go to the JOHS Committee, and I think this is an example of that. An issue was raised by some or one of that. An issue was raised by some or one of the passengers on the aircraft, we immediately discussed the issue with Cougar, I was made aware of it, and we lack assess the insue through Cougar, got a response, and posted that in the binder. 15 That's a situation that I'm not sure would have to go to the JOHS Committee because it would have been highlighted as an issue, we responded to the issue and let the workforce know by posting the comments back from Cougar in the binder, which all personnel have access 12 to in heli-admin. 2 EARLE, QC: 2 Q. Well, I'm going to delve quite a bit into how that because I, quite frankly, detect 2 EARLE, QC: 3 Q. Well, I'm going to delve quite a bit into how don't use Occupational Health and Safety like everybody else does instead of Occupational Safety and Health, but, anyway, I do detect that there are significant differences in the way different operators move, but on this reporting system you, I'm sure, would have been informed of the evidence of the Thanks and there was practice that all of ExxonMobil's worldwide operations would be expected to comply with the Operations and helicopters. Have you people ever done an analysis to see how your requirement to report completed, no. 20 EARLE, QC: 3 Q. If we could turn to the Operational Integrity Management System is an ExxonMobil's yater, hat's correct. 4 A. Rison acquired Mobil: in 1998. 16 EARLE, QC: 3 Q. Well, I'm going to delve quite a bit into how that because I, quite frankly, detect 4 the Johs Committee works, so I'll come back to that because I, quite frankly, detect 5 committee work, and I had that "JOHS", it would have the possible of the evidence of the that there are significant differences in the way different operators move, but on this	1 leade	ership would not bring it to the meeting?	1 EARL	E, Q.C.:
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helicopters. Have you people ever done an analysis to see how your requirement to report compares with the TSB requirement to report? MR. SACUTA: A. It's not the same team all the time. Basically, what they do is select members from various affiliates so that you get a wide ranging view, people that are familiar with OIMs from the various affiliates around the various affiliates around the world, and that can change. We can have an assessment done this year, and three years OIMs from now would be a totally different team that would come in. A. It's not the same team all the time. Basically, what they do is select members from various affiliates so that you get a wide OIMs from the various affiliates around the world, and that can change. We can have an assessment done this year, and three years It from now would be a totally different team that would come in. A. It's not the same team all the time. Basically, what they do is select members from various affiliates around the oIMs from the various affiliates around the assessment done this year, and three years that would come in. A. It's not the same team all the time. Basically, what they do is select members from various affiliates so that you get a wide 15 Basically, what they do is select members from various affiliates around the assessment done this year, and three years are years of the various affiliates around the assessment done this year, and three years are years of the various affiliates around the assessment done this year, and three years of the various affiliates around the are years are years. A. It's not the same team all the time. Basically, what they do is select members from the various affiliates around the are years. A. It's not the same team all the time.	12 they	indicated a very high level of reporting	12 Q.	How are they selected, the external group?
helicopters. Have you people ever done an analysis to see how your requirement to report compares with the TSB requirement to report? MR. SACUTA: A. It's not the same team all the time. Basically, what they do is select members from various affiliates so that you get a wide ranging view, people that are familiar with OIMs from the various affiliates around the various affiliates around the world, and that can change. We can have an assessment done this year, and three years OIMs from now would be a totally different team that would come in. A. It's not the same team all the time. Basically, what they do is select members from various affiliates so that you get a wide OIMs from the various affiliates around the world, and that can change. We can have an assessment done this year, and three years OIMs from now would be a totally different team that would come in. A. It's not the same team all the time. Basically, what they do is select members from various affiliates around the oIMs from the various affiliates around the world, and that can change. We can have an assessment done this year, and three years that would come in. A. It's not the same team all the time. Basically, what they do is select members from various affiliates so that you get a wide To make the provided that are familiar with oIMs from the various affiliates around the world, and that can change. We can have an assessment done this year, and three years of the various affiliates around the world, and that can change. Same that would come in the various affiliates around the oIMs from the various affiliates around the various affiliates around the various affiliates around the oIMs from the various affiliates around the various affiliates around the oIMs from the various affiliates around the various affiliates around the oIMs from the various affiliates around the various affiliates around the oIMs from the various affiliates around the various affiliates around the oIMs from the various affiliates around the various affiliates	13 requi	ired by aircraft operators and	13 MR. S	SACUTA:
16 compares with the TSB requirement to report? 17 MR. SACUTA: 18 A. I'm not aware of that analysis being 19 completed, no. 19 World, and that can change. We can have an 20 EARLE, Q.C.: 20 assessment done this year, and three years 21 Q. If we could turn to the Operational Integrity 22 Management System. Is that the full name of it? 23 it? 24 MR. SACUTA: 26 Various affiliates so that you get a wide 27 ranging view, people that are familiar with 28 OIMs from the various affiliates around the world, and that can change. We can have an 20 assessment done this year, and three years 21 from now would be a totally different team 22 that would come in. 28 EARLE, Q.C.: 29 Q. Uh-hm. So there is are you saying then			14 A.	It's not the same team all the time.
17 MR. SACUTA: 18 A. I'm not aware of that analysis being 19 completed, no. 19 EARLE, Q.C.: 20 If we could turn to the Operational Integrity 22 Management System. Is that the full name of 23 it? 24 MR. SACUTA: 27 ranging view, people that are familiar with 28 OIMs from the various affiliates around the 29 world, and that can change. We can have an 20 assessment done this year, and three years 21 from now would be a totally different team 22 that would come in. 23 EARLE, Q.C.: 24 Q. Uh-hm. So there is are you saying then	15 analy	ysis to see how your requirement to report	15	Basically, what they do is select members from
18 A. I'm not aware of that analysis being 19 completed, no. 20 EARLE, Q.C.: 21 Q. If we could turn to the Operational Integrity 22 Management System. Is that the full name of 23 it? 24 MR. SACUTA: 28 OIMs from the various affiliates around the 19 world, and that can change. We can have an 20 assessment done this year, and three years 21 from now would be a totally different team 22 that would come in. 23 EARLE, Q.C.: 24 Q. Uh-hm. So there is are you saying then	16 comp	pares with the TSB requirement to report?	16	various affiliates so that you get a wide
19 completed, no. 19 world, and that can change. We can have an 20 EARLE, Q.C.: 21 Q. If we could turn to the Operational Integrity 22 Management System. Is that the full name of 23 it? 24 MR. SACUTA: 25 world, and that can change. We can have an 26 assessment done this year, and three years 27 from now would be a totally different team 28 that would come in. 29 EARLE, Q.C.: 20 20 EARLE, Q.C.: 21 Q. Uh-hm. So there is are you saying then	17 MR. SACUT	A:	17	ranging view, people that are familiar with
20 EARLE, Q.C.: 21 Q. If we could turn to the Operational Integrity 22 Management System. Is that the full name of 23 it? 24 MR. SACUTA: 20 assessment done this year, and three years 21 from now would be a totally different team 22 that would come in. 23 EARLE, Q.C.: 24 Q. Uh-hm. So there is are you saying then	18 A. I'm	not aware of that analysis being	18	OIMs from the various affiliates around the
20 EARLE, Q.C.: 21 Q. If we could turn to the Operational Integrity 22 Management System. Is that the full name of 23 it? 24 MR. SACUTA: 20 assessment done this year, and three years 21 from now would be a totally different team 22 that would come in. 23 EARLE, Q.C.: 24 Q. Uh-hm. So there is are you saying then	1		19	world, and that can change. We can have an
22 Management System. Is that the full name of 23 it? 24 MR. SACUTA: 25 that would come in. 26 EARLE, Q.C.: 27 Q. Uh-hm. So there is are you saying then	20 EARLE, Q.C	::	20	assessment done this year, and three years
23 it? 24 MR. SACUTA: 23 EARLE, Q.C.: 24 Q. Uh-hm. So there is are you saying then	21 Q. If we	e could turn to the Operational Integrity	21	from now would be a totally different team
24 MR. SACUTA: 24 Q. Uh-hm. So there is are you saying then	22 Mana	agement System. Is that the full name of	22	that would come in.
	23 it?		23 EARL	.E, Q.C.:
25 A. Operational Integrity Management System, yes. 25 there is not a group within the ExxonMobil	24 MR. SACUT	A:	24 Q.	Uh-hm. So there is are you saying then
	25 A. Oper	rational Integrity Management System, yes.	25	there is not a group within the ExxonMobil

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1 hierarchy who have responsibility for seeing	1 compliance.	Ç
2 that the system is maintained throughout the	2 EARLE, Q.C.:	
affiliates or subsidiaries? You can't go into	3 Q. Uh-hm.	
4 your computer and somewhere in the operations	4 MR. SACUTA:	
5 find people with responsibility for that	5 A. So in some areas they may	y have less regulatory
6 system?	6 compliance requirements	
7 MR. SACUTA:	7 as regulated. In our situa	<u>-</u>
8 A. The Operations Integrity Management System	8 measured as part of those	
9 would be under the direction of the central	9 the fact that we have to n	
SH&E organization in Houston, but that doesn't	0 compliance as one of the	
necessarily mean like any organization	under OIMS.	management systems
people move in and people move out, but the	2 EARLE, Q.C.:	
overall responsibility for OIMS is underneath	Q. Do you find that it poses	any difficulty for
1	•	
-	, , ,	
15 EARLE, Q.C.:	1 0 0	
16 Q. And that's Safety Health and Environment?	6 know, systems are dictate	
17 MR. SACUTA:	7 thinking of the Occupation	
18 A. Safety Health and Environment and Security.	8 System as being one exam	
19 We just call it SH&E, but it's SHE&S.	9 dictated by the regulate	•
20 EARLE, Q.C.:	0 functions for which OIMS	already prescribes a
21 Q. How big a group would the central SH&E group	1 framework?	
22 be?	2 MR. SACUTA:	
23 MR. SACUTA:	A. No problem at all. The ex	
24 A. I don't know.	4 we meet the highest of	-
25 EARLE, Q.C.:	5 between the regulator and	our own management system.
Page 22		Page 24
1 Q. How big is the group that comes in to do the	1 EARLE, Q.C.:	
2 triennial review?	Q. Uh-hm. You mention	oned the 2006 OIMS risk
3 MR. SACUTA:	3 assessment, helicopt	er transportation, and
4 A. It's usually a team of between 10 and 12	4 that you described the	e team as having two user
5 individuals.	5 participants and both	those individuals were
6 EARLE, Q.C.:	6 management. Do you	u see any need to be seen as
7 Q. So that's a pretty substantial group compared,	7 involving people at	broader levels of the
8 for instance, to the three safety officers and	8 organization in such	
9 one senior safety officer, C-NLOPB.	9 MR. SACUTA:	
10 MR. SACUTA:	0 A. I think in those situat	ions, in those reviews,
11 A. It sounds like a bigger number, yes.		xtremely important in
12 EARLE, Q.C.:	2 that process, and the	-
13 Q. And I take it that the root of this system is	_	is to communicate the
not one of regulatory compliance because this	• •	ssments to the broader
is a system that has to operate in places	5 workforce itself.	The state of the s
where there's probably a very thin layer of	6 EARLE, Q.C.:	
regulation. You, Mr. Sacuta, described this	7 Q. As you know, I wor	k principally in Jahour
18 area as being one the most regulated, and that	-	e a phrase "perception is
this is, as the name suggests, about	9 reality in labour relat	
20 maintaining the integrity of operations and		t only that particular
21 that includes everything under that SH&E	•	ance, the fact that you,
22 acronym, right?		•
1		
23 MR. SACUTA:		cupational Health and
A. One of the management systems under Operations	•	nd various structures you
25 Integrity Management System is regulatory	5 have. Do you not re	ecognize that for some

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	Page 25
1	people there is a difficulty in speaking up to
2	the boss?
3	MR. SACUTA:
4	A. I think we talked of this yesterday. In my
5	experience working in the Hibernia
6	organization, both offshore and onshore, I
7	have not experienced a reluctance from
8	individuals to speak. There are a number of
9	methods by which they can bring up their

13 brought up at a JOHS Committee meeting. There are ways that you can raise issues by filling 14 15 out cards and not necessarily putting your

issues. If they're concerned specifically

with talking to the "boss", they can talk to

their safety rep so that the issue can be

16 name on them. So there are many ways, but my experience has been, and especially since I've 17

returned in 2007, people offshore are not 18 reluctant to talk to me about any issue. 19

20 EARLE, Q.C.:

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Q. You don't see any difficulty with your own 22 observations being coloured by the fact that it's not the people you talk to that you got 23 to worry about, it's the people that you don't talk to? 25

Page 26 1

1 MR. SACUTA:

A. And as I mentioned yesterday, that's one of 2 the reasons I go offshore as frequently as I 3 do, to try to touch base with everybody on the 4 5 Platform and show them that I am approachable and that you can bring up issues to me, and 6 7 how does that message get across; by having discussions with individuals, responding to 8 those discussions. Sometimes they don't like 9 the answers. That's the reality of it, but by 10 11 doing that as frequently as I can, and the 12 same with John in his role as offshore 13 installation manager, the message gets out that we're approachable, that we can be talked 14 15 to, and having had almost a ten year experience level with the Hibernia Platform, I 16 17 know that message is out there. I recognize there may be some new people that haven't had 18 19 the time to see that, but that's one of the reasons that we spend the time that we do 20

22 EARLE, Q.C.:

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Q. Uh-hm. Mr. Fraser, I'd like to hear your 23 answer to the same question because I think 24 25 you bring probably a unique experience to this picture, and my understanding is your history is that you've literally moved step by step up through the ranks in the offshore over your career, and there's not many levels in the organization that you haven't had experience at.

7 MR. FRASER:

A. Yeah, I guess I started at the bottom and worked my way up. I guess you could say that. I think, you know, Mr. Sacuta, gave an accurate picture of what goes on on the Platform. I eat with the same people, I sit in the waiting room waiting for the helicopter to come, so, you know -- I'm there for three weeks at a time with these people, watch hockey with them, you know, have discussions around the issues, watch the news, all that stuff. There's lots of opportunities for people to come and bring any issues up. There's people in and out of my office every day. The door most of the time is open. I'm there until 9 o'clock at night most nights. So there's ample opportunity for people to come and talk to myself, and our supervisors have -- most of them have been there since the

start up, most of them were technicians before they became supervisors, so they have the same level of exposure to the workforce on a day to day basis, and my supervisors certainly aren't shy about coming forward with any issues, and the workforce will talk to them. You know. these guys all on their days off, you know, ski-doo together and motor cycle together and all that kind of stuff. There's lots of communication. There may be somebody that's reluctant to bring something up, but it's not from want of us trying to encourage people to bring things up. We want to make sure that any safety issues get dealt with.

15 EARLE, Q.C.:

Q. Actually, you've just phrased the issue extremely well, Mr. Fraser. You said there may be some people who are reluctant, but it's not for want of opportunity, and I'm not suggesting to you for a moment that there is a want of opportunity. It is, in fact, a relatively small organization and when you think that you all, you know, live together for 21 days at a time, albeit with change outs, there should be opportunity, but I take

talking to our workforce.

Page 29 Page 31 behaviour, have a discussion with the it that you recognize that, perhaps wrongly, 1 1 2 one of the issues that you have to deal with 2 individual and let everybody learn from it is that some people may perceive it as being because we do review the STOP cards to see 3 3 not a smart thing to do to bring issues what the trends are. 4 4 5 forward? 5 EARLE, O.C. 6 MR. SACUTA: Q. So I take it you've recognized the perceptual 6 problem and you've tried to address it? A. I would say I wouldn't understand that because 7 7 there's no evidence that by bringing an issue 8 8 MR. SACUTA: forward there is any recrimination, any -- we A. And we worked very hard to make sure people 9 10 want our workforce to speak, we want our 10 understand that's not the intent of the STOP workforce to speak to all levels in our observation program. 11 11 organization. Overtime that improves within 12 12 EARLE, Q.C. the organization, and so -- can there be Q. Just take you back, recognizing that people 13 13 somebody? As I said, one of the reasons that sometimes have those kinds of perceptions, are 14 14 you totally confident that you don't have to we continue to work on communications, it's a 15 15 16 24 hour a day, seven day a week thing that we work against the perception that raising 16 need to work on, is establishing good issues could be a career limiting activity 17 17 communications with everybody on the Platform. that is not -- you know, people may feel that 18 18 it's not a good idea to be seen as someone 19 EARLE, O.C.: 19 who's bringing up issues all the time? Q. Let me bring it to the other side of the coin, 20 20 and this is the card system. Do you see any 21 21 MR. SACUTA: problems in getting people to buy into that 22 22 A. All I can speak from is 12 years of operations because of what some might call "the snitch on the Hibernia Platform. I'm not aware where 23 23 factor", that people don't -- you know, a anyone who's raised an issue in any way has 24 24 close community, the guy you might have supper had it impact on his future, has been 25 25 Page 30 Page 32 with, you don't necessarily want to point the disciplined. Would I say that we don't need 1 1 2 finger at that individual, and while your card 2 to worry about that? No. That's why we 3 system doesn't require you to name names, you continue to inform our workforce every day of 3 know, particularly in some factual situations the value of our safety programs. 4 4 5 it's not going to take a genius to figure out 5 EARLE, Q.C. who has responsibility? Do you see any issues Q. Now let's turn to the JOHS Committee. I need 6 6 7 with again that kind of human perception? 7 to get an understanding from you of what goes to the JOHS Committee. Perhaps, Mr. Fraser, 8 MR. SACUTA: 8 A. I think early on when we introduced the STOP given that you're a co-chair. 9 9 Program, there were some concerns raised by 10 MR. FRASER: 10 11 the workforce about it being a ticket, a STOP 11 A. What goes to the -- you need to tell me ticket, but we've worked very hard to make 12 12 EARLE, O.C. 13 sure the workforce understand that this is an 13 Q. What issues go to the JOHS Committee? Is it only those issues that are brought forward by observation tool to improve our overall safety 14 14 15 performance, this is not a finger pointing the members? Is it only issues that 15 management feels a need to communicate and tool, and we continue to relay that message 16 16 bring forward and discuss using the -- if you today. So, yes, I believe at the start of 17 17 this program there were some people that -- as you described yesterday, the JOHS 18 18 19 thought, you know, this is just an opportunity Committee as one of your means of 19 for management to point the finger at someone, communicating to your employees about safety, 20 20 but we have worked very hard to dispel that or is there a regular review of incidents? Is 21 21 22 myth, that this is an opportunity for us to 22 there a mechanism by which all incidents, all watch each other, to recognize safe whether there's still something outstanding 23 23

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from them or whether they've been dealt with,

go to the JOHS Committee? What goes to the

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behaviours when they occur, and during

situations where there may be an unsafe

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	Page 33 Page 35
1 JOHS Committee?	1 EARLE, Q.C.
2 MR. FRASER:	2 Q. So this is what I want to get clarified. So I
3 A. So there's incidents go to the JOHS	3 hear you saying actually that there is not a
4 Committee. So we review the incidents f	rom 4 listing of incidents that go to the JOHS
5 the last meeting that we attend. So you	5 Committee members, that there's a binder or
6 understand there's three weeks that the gro	up 6 maybe they could be accessed on your computer
7 that are at my JOHS meeting aren't there for	
8 three weeks. So we look at all the incident	
9 that happened while we're off, up until th	
time we have that meeting. So incidents a	_
discussed at the JOHS meeting. Any issue	
that the workforce brings to their	able to discuss if they wish. That doesn't
representatives are brought to the meeting	The state of the s
any issues that the, I guess the management	
side wants to discuss or bring forward for	
information are brought to the meeting.	
it's a broad range of issues and there's a	the meeting. If we have a physical piece of
basically anybody can have anything brought	
the JOHS committee meeting, if they think	
20 needs to be brought there.	we do. I think we talk through them.
21 EARLE, Q.C.	21 MR. SACUTA:
	22 A. If I could add, I mean, I've done that role in
brought to the JOHS Committee?	23 the past. At the JOHS minutes, we have a
24 MR. FRASER: 25 A. I believe we discuss the SH&E lead takes	standing agenda. One of the things that they
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	Page 34 Page 36
listing of the last, whatever it was, so many	
2 incidents. We don't discuss you know,	_
3 would take forever to discuss, you know, e	7
4 past incident, but we look at the incidents	•
5 over a time period that have happened and	
6 a brief discussion on them. Sometimes	· · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·
7 discuss them in detail. Sometimes it's just	
8 brief discussion.	that you're attending. Do they actually hand
9 EARLE, Q.C.	out the reports? No. But the workforce does
10 Q. But they are available? There is a listing of	know that copies of the reports are in the
some sort of report that a member of the JC	oHS 11 coffee rooms, if they have any questions, even
12 Committee can, you know, look down an	d say 12 after the JOHS meeting. They talk about the
"hey, this happened. We need to talk abo	ut incidents that have occurred. If they'd like
14 this"?	more detail, it's provided in the coffee
15 MR. FRASER:	15 rooms.
16 A. Yeah. I think I talked about that yesterday	, 16 EARLE, Q.C.
that the incident reports go that we have	Q. Okay. So just to be clear, there is the
on Hibernia, go to the we put them in a	
binder and put them in the coffee shop. S	
anybody on the Platform can look at the	
They're also at the morning meeting th	_
they have that we have in my office, eve	
incident is discussed. If it happened like	23 MR. FRASER:
the day before, it's discussed that day and	
25 there's a JOHS worker rep at those meeting	

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Page 37	Page 39
1 Q. So it would be possible, for instance, if this	safety reps that these safety reps were all
2 Inquiry comes to the conclusion that there	2 members of the JOHS Committee.
3 should be an interface whereby helicopter	3 MR. FRASER:
4 incidents go to the JOHS Committee, that there	4 A. Yeah, I think we're using, I think, the same
5 is that system available?	5 term, right. Maybe a JOHS rep is a I'm
6 MR. SACUTA:	6 using that for the worker reps that are
7 A. In the existing system, one of the agenda	7 elected to be on the Occupational Health and
8 items is to review incidents. That's correct.	8 Safety Committee. So I'm calling them safety
9 EARLE, Q.C.	9 reps.
10 Q. They could be funnelled through the SH&E	10 MR. SACUTA:
person?	11 A. It's the same thing.
12 MR. SACUTA:	12 MR. FRASER:
13 A. Correct.	13 A. It's the same thing. There's no it's -
14 EARLE, Q.C.	14 MR. SACUTA:
15 Q. Okay. Now I was a bit puzzled by the notion	15 A. They're not two different things.
that there are 13 safety reps, and I got the	16 MR. FRASER:
impression that these 13 safety reps were all	17 A. It's not two different things. Sorry if the
members of the JOHS Committee. Is that	18 confused you, but that's -
19 correct, Mr. Fraser?	19 EARLE, Q.C.
20 MR. FRASER:	20 Q. So you have 13?
21 A. Yeah. I believe I read through that we've got	21 MR. FRASER:
have one person and some have three, so the	
safety reps are on the safety committee. Is	24 MR. SACUTA:
25 that your question? Are the safety reps on	25 A. There's 26 total.
Page 38	Page 40
the safety committee?	1 MR. FRASER:
2 EARLE, Q.C.	2 A 26 total, yeah.
2 EARLE, Q.C. 3 Q. Well, it seems to me that you have almost two	2 A 26 total, yeah. 3 EARLE, Q.C.
2 EARLE, Q.C. 3 Q. Well, it seems to me that you have almost two 4 partially integrated and partially parallel	 2 A 26 total, yeah. 3 EARLE, Q.C. 4 Q. 26 total. You know that's at odds with the
2 EARLE, Q.C. 3 Q. Well, it seems to me that you have almost two 4 partially integrated and partially parallel 5 systems operating. You have these weekly	 2 A 26 total, yeah. 3 EARLE, Q.C. 4 Q. 26 total. You know that's at odds with the 5 Act that says the Committee should be no more
2 EARLE, Q.C. 3 Q. Well, it seems to me that you have almost two 4 partially integrated and partially parallel 5 systems operating. You have these weekly 6 safety representative meetings, right?	 2 A 26 total, yeah. 3 EARLE, Q.C. 4 Q. 26 total. You know that's at odds with the 5 Act that says the Committee should be no more 6 than 12 the JOHS Committee should be no
2 EARLE, Q.C. 3 Q. Well, it seems to me that you have almost two 4 partially integrated and partially parallel 5 systems operating. You have these weekly 6 safety representative meetings, right? 7 MR. FRASER:	 2 A 26 total, yeah. 3 EARLE, Q.C. 4 Q. 26 total. You know that's at odds with the 5 Act that says the Committee should be no more 6 than 12 the JOHS Committee should be no 7 more than 12 people.
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1	facility, but seven may be working days and	1	practically renders the JOHS committee
2	six may be working nights, and if you have a	2	redundant?
3	JOHS meeting, there would only be seven	3 MR.	SACUTA:
4	available to attend because there would be six	4 A.	Absolutely not. I see it as an opportunity to
5	that would be off shift and in bed.	5	continue to engage the workforce. One of the
6 EA	RLE, Q.C.	6	reasons we have the JOHS member come to the
7	Q. I recognize that, and I've seen some	7	morning meeting is to be sure that we've got a
8	indication that there are times when people	8	worker rep there to understand what's happened
9	can't get to meetings because of work	9	in the previous day. He can take that message
10	requirements. Is that the case?	10	back to the other safety reps, if he so
11 MF	R. FRASER:	11	wishes. Engaging a JOHS member in the weekly
12	A. We go out of our way to make sure that the	12	safety inspection further enhances that
13	worker reps get to the meetings. So I've had	13	expectation that we place on all of our
14	meetings where a worker rep hasn't shown up	14	workers. I'm not sure I understand why you
15	and we've gone and had him paged and get him	15	would think that would undermine or I'm not
16	to come down because he's forgotten or got	16	sure of the exact term you used on the JOHS.
17	doing something and got busy at it, but we go	17	It's to further engage the workforce in our
18	out of our way to make sure that everybody	18	day-to-day responsibilities and focus on
19	that's on shift, that's not in bed, can attend	19	safety.
20	the meetings.	20 EAR	LE, Q.C.
21 EA	RLE, Q.C.	21 Q.	. Well, Mr. Sacuta, I put this to you. As I
22	Q. Okay. But I sense from that that you	22	understand it, the philosophy of JOHS
23	acknowledge that it's not always the case?	23	Committees or Occupational Health and Safety
24	When you say "we go out of our way" -	24	Committees is that you put an equal group of
25 MF	R. FRASER:	25	workers and managers together and assign them
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1	A. So what I mean is if somebody doesn't show up,	1	the task of working together on safety issues.
2	we will go find them.	2	Things like walkabouts are actually mandated
3 MR	. SACUTA:	3	in legislation. And it seems to me that what
4	A. I think the key component is whenever we have	4	you folks have got, and maybe it's a better
5	a JOHS committee meeting, that there has to be	5	system, but what you folks have got is a
6	equal representation from the workers and	6	system which works on a more frequent basis
7	management. Management does not have 13 reps.	7	but by this one individual from the group
8	So there are times where we may have more than	8	coming forward thing, so that you have one

- So there are times where we may have more than 9 equal representation because of the shift 10 structure, and if there is a situation where 11 we have less safety reps than management, we 12 either make sure we go out and get another 13 safety rep to even it up or we ask one of the 14 management reps to step down so that we
- 15 maintain that equal representation. 16 EARLE, O.C. 17 Q. The system of having a weekly meeting of the 18 safety reps or the worker representatives on 19 the JOHS Committee and one of their number 20 meeting with the OIM in the OIM meeting each 21 day and then another of their number 22 participating in the weekly walkabout, do you 23 see that as essentially taking away from the 24 role of the JOHS committee? That it's almost 25 like there's an alternate system which
- coming forward thing, so that you have one 8 worker representative at the OIM meeting, at 9 10 which there are a number of other managers, 11 right? 12 MR. FRASER:
- A. Yes. 13
- 14 EARLE, Q.C.
- 15 Q. Or one worker representative on the walkabout, 16 that rather than the equality notion of the
- 17 occupational health and safety committee being
- 18 reenforced, it's being diluted. The price for
- 19 dilution clearly is frequency.
- 20 MR. SACUTA:
- 21 A. I wouldn't agree with your comments because 22 the JOHS isn't the only mechanism by which we have communication between our workforce and 23 our management. There are many ways. Every 24 25 single day, we expect our workforce to

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1 communicate with their supervisor if the	ere's 1	sick and tired, no doubt, of hearing me go on
2 issues that come up. If it doesn't need to	go 2	about this but I've got to say it really
3 to a safety rep, it should be able to be	3	troubles us that the fact that this thing did
4 handled between the individual employe	ee and 4	not fit slipped through the cracks, and we're
5 the supervisor. The morning, in the mor	rning 5	interested in that because if it can slip
6 meeting when we have the JOHS rep ther	re, one 6	through the cracks, something else can slip
7 of the reasons he's there is so that the OI	М 7	through the cracks. Mr. Fraser, you indicated
8 can ask the JOHS rep "are there any issu	ies 8	that what you had heard about the suit were
9 that the workforce have that you're awar	e of?" 9	issues of comfort, correct?
10 It's one of the specific questions that Joh	nn 10 MR	. FRASER:
or his back-to-back would ask as part of	that 11 A	A. That's correct.
morning meeting. "Are there any wo	orker 12 EAI	RLE, Q.C.
issues?" It's not just for him to listen.	13 (Q. Would you agree that there's a general view in
14 It's for him to participate.	14	respect of safety gear that comfort is in
15 EARLE, Q.C.	15	itself important from a safety perspective
16 Q. He's required to play a solo.	16	because history in the workplace has shown
17 MR. SACUTA:	17	that if gear is not comfortable, people find
18 A. We've asked for one individual and the	JOHS 18	ways to make them comfortable which can defeat
committee has been very willing to pro		the purpose of the gear? Would you agree that
20 that individual to come and partake in the	hat 20	that's an accepted proposition in terms of
21 morning meeting at 20 to 8.	21	safety management?
22 EARLE, Q.C.	22 MR	. FRASER:
23 Q. You don't see the issue there, do you?	23	A. I think what I'd say is that the suits, all
24 MR. SACUTA:	24	suits that I've worn all through my career, in
25 A. I don't. I don't agree with what you'r	re 25	general, tend to be somewhat uncomfortable.
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saying is what I'm saying. It's not that	I 1	They're made to keep you warm in the cold
don't see the issue. I don't see it as an	2	water and when you're in a warm helicopter,
3 issue. I think it's just another step in the	3	for instance, you get warm. So in general, in
4 process that allows us to continue to	4	my career, immersion suits, survival suits,
5 communicate with our workforce.	5	tend to be uncomfortable.
6 EARLE, Q.C.	6 EAI	RLE, Q.C.
7 Q. And you have, as you've indicated, n	nany 7 (Q. Mr. Fraser, that's not the question I asked
8 processes.	8	you. The question I asked you, and now you're
9 MR. SACUTA:	9	co-chair of an occupational health and safety
10 A. Many processes, and it's expected every	day.	committee. You're the offshore installation
11 EARLE, Q.C.	11	manager. You've said "the safety of these
12 Q. And I don't think because I sense	a 12	workers out there stops with me." That's
defensiveness on your part, Mr. Sacuta.	Let 13	where the buck stops. Now do you accept the
me make something clear for CEP 2121. W	Ve know 14	proposition that comfort of safety gear is a
that HMDC's safety record is truly impres		safety issue because of the tendency of
16 MR. SACUTA:	16	persons who are uncomfortable to try and make
17 A. As a result of the hard work of all ou	r 17	them comfortable and hence defeat the purpose
18 employees.	18	of the gear?
19 EARLE, Q.C.	19 MR	. FRASER:
20 Q. We're looking at certain mechanisms, bu	it we're 20	A. So when we recognized that there were specific
21 not unmindful of the result that has be		comfort issues with these suits, and I think
achieved to date. The members obvio	ously 22	Mr. Sacuta talked about it in the joint panel,
appreciate working for an employer with	•	that we looked at ways to improve those
24 kind of safety record.	24	comforts. We talked about lubricating the
Now the 452 suit, people are going to b	e 25	zipper and talking to Helly Hansen about

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1 making sure that people could get the zipper	1 A. Yes, mine did.
2 up and that type of issue. So we did address	2 MR. FRASER:
3 those comfort issues.	3 A. Yeah.
4 MR. SACUTA:	4 EARLE, Q.C.
5 A. And I would add to that that there is a	5 Q. So you weren't neither of you were amongst
6 personal accountability when it comes to the	6 that nine percent?
7 individual's own safety. I believe that I	7 MR. SACUTA:
8 think our workforce has higher integrity than	8 A. That's correct.
9 that. I think they recognize that the suits	9 MR. FRASER:
are there for a reason and that they need to	10 A. Correct.
make sure that the suit can be fully donned.	11 EARLE, Q.C.
That's why the issues were brought up, is that	12 Q. There was a C-NLOPB audit. There was an audit
they had problems donning the hood because of	by your certifying organization during the
the stiffness of the zipper. Some people	time period. There was at least one, right?
could have just said "oh, I don't care" but	15 MR. SACUTA:
our workforce understand the importance of	16 A. During which time period?
that flight suit and that's why the issue of	17 EARLE, Q.C.
comfort was brought up during the initial roll	18 Q. The time period from the introduction of the
out of the E452 suits.	19 suit to the crash.
	20 MR. SACUTA:
20 EARLE, Q.C.	
Q. Mr. Sacuta, what I'm trying to drill down to,	
22 if you will, is how it was that with	22 completed during that time frame.
considerable feedback coming on these suits on	23 EARLE, Q.C.
comfort and I will tell you in other instances	Q. By both organizations?MR. SACUTA:
	175 MR SACTITA:
25 more explicitly on fit, how it was that it	
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Page 50 didn't get picked up that the suits weren't	Page 52 1 A. Both the certifying authority and the Board.
Page 50 didn't get picked up that the suits weren't fitting?	Page 52 1 A. Both the certifying authority and the Board. 2 EARLE, Q.C.
Page 50 didn't get picked up that the suits weren't fitting? MR. SACUTA:	Page 52 1 A. Both the certifying authority and the Board. 2 EARLE, Q.C. 3 Q. Do you have any thoughts on how it was that
Page 50 didn't get picked up that the suits weren't fitting? MR. SACUTA: A. The feedback we were receiving, and I'll	Page 52 1 A. Both the certifying authority and the Board. 2 EARLE, Q.C. 3 Q. Do you have any thoughts on how it was that 4 the audit did not pick up the fact that no one
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	Page 53 Page 5
1 my trust account is run properly. But I'n	1 (BREAK)
2 also interested in it being done right. So I	2 COMMISSIONER:
would think that HMDC would have an inte	rest 3 Q. Okay, Mr. Earle.
4 in it being done right. So it's that context	4 EARLE, Q.C.
5 in which I ask you the question. Does HM	
6 have any sense or feeling about, you know	
7 that wouldn't have been picked up?	7 auditors in looking at issues like the
8 MR. SACUTA:	8 helicopter transportation system, would they
9 A. As I've mentioned, we bought a certified s	
We had no indications as part of the	the HUEBA process?
implementation plan, aside from comfo	<u> </u>
issues. So you're asking me do I have ar	
idea why the Board or the certifying author	·
didn't pick up something. I don't know ho	
can answer that question. I can't answer th	
16 question.	16 A. Sorry, are you asking -
17 EARLE, Q.C.	17 EARLE, Q.C.
1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1	
Q. Well, you might have, if you'd gone back the issue, developed some thoughts on it.	_
_	
take it then that you have not gone back to that issue.	1
	21 they do in the area. We've got a lot of
22 MR. SACUTA:	questions for them in that area, as you can
23 A. I'm not sure what you mean by gone back	
24 issue.	they have, in their audits, gone to the
25 EARLE, Q.C.	25 process and said, you know, "we see some
	Page 54 Page 5
1 Q. Gone back to the issue and said, you kno	w, 1 indication here that you're looking at an
2 "gee, we found out nine percent of the suit	s underwater breathing device. What is your
3 didn't fit. We had an audit done" in	3 process?" and have checked that process for
4 particular by your certifying organization	4 validity or are they only concerned with
5 you know, "how come they didn't pick it u	p?" 5 systems once they're put in place?
6 MR. SACUTA:	6 MR. SACUTA:
7 A. There were some lessons learned that came	out 7 A. I'm not aware that they would be involved in
8 of this process, and we have instituted who	t looking at HUEBA prior to implementation. I'm
9 the Transportation Safety Board has consid	ered 9 not aware that they would look at that as part
as a best practice for these suits looking	of their audit cycle.
forward, to the point where they have writt	en 11 EARLE, Q.C.
a letter to Transport Canada highlighting th	e 12 Q. Lloyd's is contracted by HMDC?
steps that we have implemented. I didn't s	ay 13 MR. SACUTA:
we didn't learn any lessons, Mr. Earle. I	14 A. That's correct.
said that it's hard for me to answer the	15 EARLE, Q.C.
question why didn't the certifying authorit	
or the Board pick it up. We did our own	·
review of the lessons learned and have con	
19 with this new process which has been	<u> </u>
_	
recognized as a best practice.	scope of work which it would include
	1
21 EARLE, Q.C.	21 maintaining our certificate of fitness, that
21 EARLE, Q.C. 22 Q. I've been instructed by Commission couns	maintaining our certificate of fitness, that they would be the certifying authority to
21 EARLE, Q.C. 22 Q. I've been instructed by Commission couns 23 keep my eye on the clock, so that -	maintaining our certificate of fitness, that they would be the certifying authority to maintain a certificate of fitness which is
21 EARLE, Q.C. 22 Q. I've been instructed by Commission couns	maintaining our certificate of fitness, that they would be the certifying authority to

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1	Q. Yeah. I understand though that they have a	- I	identify it in the report.
2	even broader mandate than that because th		MMISSIONER:
3	speak to your co-venturers in terms of the	·	2. I see. All right then, think about that and
4	operation, you know, in terms of the assuran		talk to your counsel.
5	they give. They speak, most importantly		. SACUTA:
6	suspect from their point of view, to your		A. We will.
7	insurers, in terms of the assurance they give		MMISSIONER:
8	So it's not just your certifications that they		2. And Mr. Roil, perhaps you could discuss -
9	report to, is it?		L, Q.C.:
1	IR. SACUTA:		2. Yes, indeed.
11	A. I'm not aware of the relationship they would		MMISSIONER:
12	have with our insurers or the co-venturers. I) with Ms. Strickland or Mr. Wallace that
13	am aware of the requirements for them to		issue.
14	maintain our certificate of fitness, as part		RLE, Q.C.
15	of their job, work scope.		2. Fine, thank you. If we could refer to slide
1	ARLE, Q.C.	16	39 in Exhibit 130?
17	Q. Mr. Commissioner, I think it would be used	ful 17 ROI	L, Q.C.:
18	in this process for you to be apprised of the). 130.
19	terms of engagement of Lloyd's as an audit		GISTRAR:
20	of the system, because it seems to me that). 130.
21	they are a crucial backup to the security of		L, Q.C.:
22	whatever systems are put in place to ensure). Slide 39.
23	safety, including helicopter safety. So I		RLE, Q.C.
24	would ask, and I don't think it is something		2. It's up on the screen. Under your key
25	that I would necessarily want to ask any mo	-	preventative safeguards and equipment, you
	p	Page 58	Page 60
1	questions on, so nobody needs to worry abo	- I	indicate alternative offshore landing sites.
2	me coming back, but it does seem to me th		Would you agree with me that in the last metre
3	this is an important part of the system which		of your sea state restriction, alternative
4	should be made available to you.	4	landing sites disappear? Because the other
	COMMISSIONER:	5	two installations and it seems to me likely
6	Q. On that point then, Mr. Earle, what I would		that the tankers, because they suffer the same
7	suggest to you, Mr. Sacuta, is you might lik		issues as the other two installations, in a
8	to think about that and talk to your counsel		they have a limitation, either stated or, as
9	about it and certainly, if I would have no	9	Mr. Vokey told us last week, practically, of
10	objection to receiving it. It may be useful.	10	six metres. So that in your last metre sea
11	It is another audit. When you are reviewed		state in allowing seven metres, you lose the
12	where does it fit in with the other audits? I	12	alternative offshore landing sites?
13	mean, is it a very stringent audit?		. SACUTA:
	IR. SACUTA:		A. I mean, certainly in a situation where there
15	A. It's the certifying authority will come out		was a potential emergency, it would be up to
16	with a specific set of issues that they want	16	the pilot to determine the best location,
17	to look at. They have a quarterly inspection	n 17	should they have to land. There may be some
18	and then an annual audit, and they will give		restrictions on the other facilities that are
19	us the specifics of what they're coming out		out there, but I think an emergency situation
20	audit at that time and there is a full report	20	would be handled in a one-of scenario by the
21	that's issued as a result of that. The annual	21	pilot making sure that everybody understood
22	audit would also be used to validate that we		that there was an emergency situation for a
23	have a valid certificate of fitness, or if	23	landing.
24	there were any conditions that we had to		RLE, Q.C.
25	correct as part of that audit, they would		2. I'm not suggesting, Mr. Sacuta, that someone's
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going to be standing on the helideck saying		_
2 "don't come down."	-	o you have a page that you'd like us to look
3 MR. SACUTA:	3 at	
4 A. Right.	4 EARLE, 0	Q.C.
5 EARLE, Q.C.	5 Q. Tł	ne very first page.
6 Q. "Don't come down here. You're beyond the		
7 metres." But I think what we have heard		eah, it was issued on January 1st '09.
8 that on these other installations, once you	8 EARLE, 0	Q.C.
get over six-metre seas, it's not safe to	9 Q. Ye	ou see that January 1st can we just scroll
10 land.	10 do	own just a fraction? Okay, there we go. See
11 MR. SACUTA:	11 th	at January 1st '09, issued for
12 A. But I think the pilot would have to make a	an 12 im	plementation and signed off by yourself, Mr.
assessment of the risk, whether it was safe	r 13 Sa	icuta.
to attempt a landing on a floating	14 MR. SAC	UTA:
installation or having to ditch in the ocean.	15 A. Tł	nat's correct.
16 EARLE, Q.C.	16 EARLE, 0	Q.C.
17 Q. But if you had a six-metre limit like	17 Q. Sc	I take it that there was a revision or
everybody else, then they wouldn't have	to 18 re	view?
make that decision, would they?	19 MR. SAC	UTA:
20 MR. SACUTA:	20 A. Tł	nere would have been a review, that's
21 A. I think that the six-metre limit, there are	21 co	orrect.
times when, depending on the pitch and rol	of 22 Earle, 0	Q.C.
the vessel even six metres, there are time	es 23 Q. Yo	eah, and I believe it's on page 24 under
when the pitch and roll of the vessel may	7 24 we	eather limitations, where it's there under
dictate even at a six-metre sea that the	25 Se	ection 3.12.2, end of the first paragraph
	Page 62	Page 64
landing conditions are outside of what the	-	ere.
2 requirements are for those floating	2 MR. SAC	UTA:
3 installations.	3 A. U	m-hm.
4 EARLE, Q.C.	4 EARLE, 0	Q.C.
5 Q. Um-hm. How long have you had the seven-me	tre 5 Q. Th	nat it's stated that -
6 restriction stated in your helicopter	6 (0	OFF RECORD - AUDIO PROBLEMS)
7 operations?	7 EARLE, 0	Q.C.
8 MR. SACUTA:	8 Q. Be	efore we had our technical interruption, I
9 A. The seven metres is stated in the aviation	9 wa	as referring you to Section 3.12.2, weather
10 operations guide.	10 lir	mitations of Exhibit C-00133, and if we
11 EARLE, Q.C.	11 co	ould go to the end of the first paragraph
12 Q. Seven years?	12 th	ere, you'll see that the statement is made -
13 MR. SACUTA:	13 - r	no, no.
14 A. No, I didn't say that. I said that the seven-	14 REGISTR	AR:
metre restriction is identified in our	15 Q. W	'hat number, sir?
aviation operations guide.	16 EARLE, 0	Q.C.
17 EARLE, Q.C.	17 Q. 3.	12.2, leave it there. Okay. The statement
18 Q. Yes, and I asked you because I notice that		made "however, although it is possible for
there was a reissue January 1st '09 which on		helicopter to take off under these
20 the document on the first page of Exhibit		onditions, for the safety of passengers and
21 00133.		e helideck crew, all helicopter operations
22 REGISTRAR:		e normally suspended if the steady wind
Q. I'm sorry, the number? 133?		eed across the helideck exceeds 59 knots or
24 ROIL, Q.C.:	24 wl	here the maximum gusts exceeds 70 knots or if
25 Q. That's correct.	25 th	e significant wave height of the sea states
	'	

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1 exceeds seven metres" and the question I h	ad	1 Q	Now we understand that the rationale for the
2 for you is how long has that seven-metre	,	2	auto hover on the first response helicopter is
3 restriction been in place?		3	that it removes the necessity for the pilot to
4 MR. SACUTA:		4	maintain the aircraft at a certain distance
5 A. I don't know. I know that this document w	as	5	over sea level. That this is done
6 updated on January 1st of '09. We could a	go	6	automatically, because and this is of value
7 back and look at the document from 2006	and	7	because it is extremely difficult to do that
8 see if it stated this. It's impossible for me		8	in the dark without visual reference.
9 to tell, looking at this document, what		9 MR.	SACUTA:
changes were made between 2006 and 2009).	10 A	. Correct.
11 EARLE, Q.C.		11 EAR	RLE, Q.C.
12 Q. Can you tell us this, was it being enforced,		12 Ç	. Have you considered the fact that those same
that limitation being enforced prior to the		13	issues of absence of visual reference arise if
March crash of the S-92?		14	an aircraft is helicopter, aircraft is
15 MR. SACUTA:		15	required to ditch at night in that the
16 A. It's my understanding it was being enforce	d,	16	helicopter pilot will have a great deal of
17 yes.		17	difficulty judging where the water surface is
18 EARLE, Q.C.		18	and in terms of ditching and apparently there
19 Q. Has there been any change in respect of nig	ht	19	are things that he should do as he gets close
20 flying?		20	to the water, in terms of adjusting the
21 MR. SACUTA:		21	attitude of the aircraft?
22 A. With HMDC?		22 MR.	SACUTA:
23 EARLE, Q.C.		23 A	a. I mean, I think certainly that's a good
24 Q. With HMDC, since the crash.		24	question for Cougar to answer, based on them
25 MR. SACUTA:		25	having the knowledge to answer that question.
I	Page 66		Page 68
1 A. Yes, there has been. HMDC has put a protoc	_	1	I do know that Cougar, as part of their annual
2 in place under which there would be an	I	2	simulator training, do ditch the aircraft in a
approval process to fly at night. We have		3	number of scenarios. But I think Cougar would
4 made a decision that until the Cougar first	I	4	be best suited to answer that question.
5 response search and rescue helicopter is		5 EAR	RLE, Q.C.
6 equipped with auto hover that we will not f	lv		e. Well, I find that an interesting response, Mr.
7 at night, unless it's a medical emergency th	- 1	7	Sacuta, because you have a document here which
8 cannot be handled by the offshore medical		8	sets up criteria, weather limitations where
9 resources.		9	you say we're not flying. Why wouldn't you
10 EARLE, Q.C.		10	similarly set up the limitations for night
Q. Is that consistent with a OIMS document? I	_{Mv}	11	flying?
understanding is that somewhere out ther	- 1		SACUTA:
there is an OIMS document that says that			a. I mean, we have set up limitations for night
should be the case anyway.		14	flying. Prior to the accident, we did fly at
15 MR. SACUTA:		15	night. Based on some of the concerns that
16 A. In the aviation operations guide, it talks		16	came out of the accident, we've made a
about what would be required to fly at nigh	t.	17	conscious decision not to fly at night until
18 EARLE, Q.C.	.	18	we have the capability to recover personnel in
19 Q. Um-hm, and is that consistent with -		19	the water using our first response search and
20 MR. SACUTA:		20	rescue helicopter.
21 A. It's consistent that the expectations to fly			RLE, Q.C.
22 at night is that you have access to search an			2. But what consideration have you given to the
22 rescale helicenters that can retrieve personn	I	22	other issue?

other issue?

A. The other issue?

24 MR. SACUTA:

23

25

should they end up in the water.

rescue helicopters that can retrieve personnel

23

24

25 EARLE, Q.C.

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]	Page 69	Page 71
1 EARLE, Q.C.	1	fact there are a number of devices that the
2 Q. The other issue being the ability of a	2	standby vessel has in place that can aid in
3 helicopter to ditch at night.	3	recovery from sea. One of them is the fast
4 MR. SACUTA:	4	rescue craft.
5 A. I'm not technically qualified to answer tha	ıt 5 1	EARLE, Q.C.
6 question.	6	Q. How many how do you approach it if some of
7 EARLE, Q.C.	7	these mitigating factors go missing, as would
8 Q. I don't know that it requires technical	8	the fast rescue craft at seas about five
9 qualification. I mean, have well, let me	9	metres, as would the effectiveness of
ask you this. Has HMDC considered that iss	ue? 10	floatation currently at above three metres, it
11 MR. SACUTA:	11	would appear? What's your approach? You
12 A. Cougar has not identified any issues, that I	m 12	know, if mitigators start disappearing by
aware of, through HMDC with the ability for		change in circumstances, when do you say "we
the helicopter pilot to ditch at night. I'm	14	have insufficient mitigation"?
not aware of any issues that have been raise	ed 15 1	MR. SACUTA:
by Cougar in that regard.	16	A. As I mentioned, and I testified to this last
17 EARLE, Q.C.	17	week during the joint panel, the standby
18 Q. You're not aware of Cougar raising that iss	sue. 18	vessel has more than one rescue capability.
Are you aware of your employees raising t		It has fast rescue craft. It has the EMPRA
20 issue?	20	basket and it has the DACON scoop, and should
21 MR. SACUTA:	21	we be unable to launch the FRC because we're
22 A. With the ability to ditch at night?	22	above five metres, for example, the other two
23 EARLE, Q.C.	23	devices are available for possible rescue in a
24 Q. Yes.	24	helicopter ditching scenario in close
25 MR. SACUTA:	25	proximity to the Platform.
	Page 70	Page 72
1 A. It may have come up as part of the questio	_	EARLE, Q.C.
that were asked during the HOTF. I'm not		Q. I appreciate those facts. The question I was
familiar with all there were 350 question	s. 3	asking for you is when circumstances change to
4 It may have come up. But if it did, I'm sur		remove the benefit of a mitigating factor,
5 via anavianad it in the HOTE nament	_	
5 we answered it in the HOTF report.	5	when is it that you say there's insufficient
6 EARLE, Q.C.	5 6	when is it that you say there's insufficient mitigation? You know, if they all disappear?
_	6	· · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·
6 EARLE, Q.C.	6	mitigation? You know, if they all disappear?
6 EARLE, Q.C. 7 Q. If we could go back to the aviation operation	ons 6 7	mitigation? You know, if they all disappear? Obviously they can't all disappear. Some of
6 EARLE, Q.C. 7 Q. If we could go back to the aviation operation as a risk assessment?	ons 6 7 8	mitigation? You know, if they all disappear? Obviously they can't all disappear. Some of them are, if you will, set in stone, but for
6 EARLE, Q.C. 7 Q. If we could go back to the aviation operation 8 risk assessment? 9 REGISTRAR:	ons 6 7 8 9	mitigation? You know, if they all disappear? Obviously they can't all disappear. Some of them are, if you will, set in stone, but for instance, if you had the foam/water monitors
6 EARLE, Q.C. 7 Q. If we could go back to the aviation operation is assessment? 9 REGISTRAR: 10 Q. What page number?	ons 6 7 8 9 10	mitigation? You know, if they all disappear? Obviously they can't all disappear. Some of them are, if you will, set in stone, but for instance, if you had the foam/water monitors on the helideck out of commission, something
6 EARLE, Q.C. 7 Q. If we could go back to the aviation operation 8 risk assessment? 9 REGISTRAR: 10 Q. What page number? 11 EARLE, Q.C.	ons 6 7 8 9 10 11	mitigation? You know, if they all disappear? Obviously they can't all disappear. Some of them are, if you will, set in stone, but for instance, if you had the foam/water monitors on the helideck out of commission, something happened with them, would that be a sufficient
6 EARLE, Q.C. 7 Q. If we could go back to the aviation operation is assessment? 9 REGISTRAR: 10 Q. What page number? 11 EARLE, Q.C. 12 Q. Slide 40.	ons 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13	mitigation? You know, if they all disappear? Obviously they can't all disappear. Some of them are, if you will, set in stone, but for instance, if you had the foam/water monitors on the helideck out of commission, something happened with them, would that be a sufficient loss of mitigating factors that you would say
6 EARLE, Q.C. 7 Q. If we could go back to the aviation operation 8 risk assessment? 9 REGISTRAR: 10 Q. What page number? 11 EARLE, Q.C. 12 Q. Slide 40. 13 REGISTRAR:	ons 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13	mitigation? You know, if they all disappear? Obviously they can't all disappear. Some of them are, if you will, set in stone, but for instance, if you had the foam/water monitors on the helideck out of commission, something happened with them, would that be a sufficient loss of mitigating factors that you would say "we're not flying"?
6 EARLE, Q.C. 7 Q. If we could go back to the aviation operation is assessment? 9 REGISTRAR: 10 Q. What page number? 11 EARLE, Q.C. 12 Q. Slide 40. 13 REGISTRAR: 14 Q. Slide 40?	ons 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 1	mitigation? You know, if they all disappear? Obviously they can't all disappear. Some of them are, if you will, set in stone, but for instance, if you had the foam/water monitors on the helideck out of commission, something happened with them, would that be a sufficient loss of mitigating factors that you would say "we're not flying"? MR. SACUTA: A. If we did not have the foam/water monitors on the helideck, we would not fly. If there
6 EARLE, Q.C. 7 Q. If we could go back to the aviation operation is assessment? 9 REGISTRAR: 10 Q. What page number? 11 EARLE, Q.C. 12 Q. Slide 40. 13 REGISTRAR: 14 Q. Slide 40? 15 ROIL, Q.C.: 16 Q. In No. 130. 17 EARLE, Q.C.	ons 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17	mitigation? You know, if they all disappear? Obviously they can't all disappear. Some of them are, if you will, set in stone, but for instance, if you had the foam/water monitors on the helideck out of commission, something happened with them, would that be a sufficient loss of mitigating factors that you would say "we're not flying"? MR. SACUTA: A. If we did not have the foam/water monitors on the helideck, we would not fly. If there isn't firefighting capabilities on the
6 EARLE, Q.C. 7 Q. If we could go back to the aviation operation is assessment? 9 REGISTRAR: 10 Q. What page number? 11 EARLE, Q.C. 12 Q. Slide 40. 13 REGISTRAR: 14 Q. Slide 40? 15 ROIL, Q.C.: 16 Q. In No. 130. 17 EARLE, Q.C. 18 Q. The mitigating factors and emergency resp	ons 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 onse. 18	mitigation? You know, if they all disappear? Obviously they can't all disappear. Some of them are, if you will, set in stone, but for instance, if you had the foam/water monitors on the helideck out of commission, something happened with them, would that be a sufficient loss of mitigating factors that you would say "we're not flying"? MR. SACUTA: A. If we did not have the foam/water monitors on the helideck, we would not fly. If there isn't firefighting capabilities on the helideck, we would not be landing helicopters
6 EARLE, Q.C. 7 Q. If we could go back to the aviation operation is assessment? 9 REGISTRAR: 10 Q. What page number? 11 EARLE, Q.C. 12 Q. Slide 40. 13 REGISTRAR: 14 Q. Slide 40? 15 ROIL, Q.C.: 16 Q. In No. 130. 17 EARLE, Q.C. 18 Q. The mitigating factors and emergency respure in the standby	ons 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 17 18 19 19 19 19 19 19 19	mitigation? You know, if they all disappear? Obviously they can't all disappear. Some of them are, if you will, set in stone, but for instance, if you had the foam/water monitors on the helideck out of commission, something happened with them, would that be a sufficient loss of mitigating factors that you would say "we're not flying"? MR. SACUTA: A. If we did not have the foam/water monitors on the helideck, we would not fly. If there isn't firefighting capabilities on the helideck, we would not be landing helicopters on the helideck.
6 EARLE, Q.C. 7 Q. If we could go back to the aviation operation risk assessment? 9 REGISTRAR: 10 Q. What page number? 11 EARLE, Q.C. 12 Q. Slide 40. 13 REGISTRAR: 14 Q. Slide 40? 15 ROIL, Q.C.: 16 Q. In No. 130. 17 EARLE, Q.C. 18 Q. The mitigating factors and emergency responsory you just have a reference to the standby vessel at the Hibernia Platform. Where do	ons 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 19 19 19 19 19 19 19	mitigation? You know, if they all disappear? Obviously they can't all disappear. Some of them are, if you will, set in stone, but for instance, if you had the foam/water monitors on the helideck out of commission, something happened with them, would that be a sufficient loss of mitigating factors that you would say "we're not flying"? MR. SACUTA: A. If we did not have the foam/water monitors on the helideck, we would not fly. If there isn't firefighting capabilities on the helideck, we would not be landing helicopters on the helideck. EARLE, Q.C.
6 EARLE, Q.C. 7 Q. If we could go back to the aviation operation risk assessment? 9 REGISTRAR: 10 Q. What page number? 11 EARLE, Q.C. 12 Q. Slide 40. 13 REGISTRAR: 14 Q. Slide 40? 15 ROIL, Q.C.: 16 Q. In No. 130. 17 EARLE, Q.C. 18 Q. The mitigating factors and emergency respondant you just have a reference to the standby vessel at the Hibernia Platform. Where do the fast rescue craft, that, my understanding	ons 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 1 15 16 17 17 18 19 19 19 19 19 19 19	mitigation? You know, if they all disappear? Obviously they can't all disappear. Some of them are, if you will, set in stone, but for instance, if you had the foam/water monitors on the helideck out of commission, something happened with them, would that be a sufficient loss of mitigating factors that you would say "we're not flying"? MR. SACUTA: A. If we did not have the foam/water monitors on the helideck, we would not fly. If there isn't firefighting capabilities on the helideck, we would not be landing helicopters on the helideck. EARLE, Q.C. Q. So is there any rule of thumb that addresses
6 EARLE, Q.C. 7 Q. If we could go back to the aviation operation risk assessment? 9 REGISTRAR: 10 Q. What page number? 11 EARLE, Q.C. 12 Q. Slide 40. 13 REGISTRAR: 14 Q. Slide 40? 15 ROIL, Q.C.: 16 Q. In No. 130. 17 EARLE, Q.C. 18 Q. The mitigating factors and emergency resp 19 You just have a reference to the standby vessel at the Hibernia Platform. Where do the fast rescue craft, that, my understanding that vessel is supposed to be equipped with	ons 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 17 18 19 18 19 19 19 19 19	mitigation? You know, if they all disappear? Obviously they can't all disappear. Some of them are, if you will, set in stone, but for instance, if you had the foam/water monitors on the helideck out of commission, something happened with them, would that be a sufficient loss of mitigating factors that you would say "we're not flying"? MR. SACUTA: A. If we did not have the foam/water monitors on the helideck, we would not fly. If there isn't firefighting capabilities on the helideck, we would not be landing helicopters on the helideck. EARLE, Q.C. Q. So is there any rule of thumb that addresses the loss of any of these mitigating factors
6 EARLE, Q.C. 7 Q. If we could go back to the aviation operation risk assessment? 9 REGISTRAR: 10 Q. What page number? 11 EARLE, Q.C. 12 Q. Slide 40. 13 REGISTRAR: 14 Q. Slide 40? 15 ROIL, Q.C.: 16 Q. In No. 130. 17 EARLE, Q.C. 18 Q. The mitigating factors and emergency resperson you just have a reference to the standby vessel at the Hibernia Platform. Where does the fast rescue craft, that, my understanding that vessel is supposed to be equipped with come into play?	ons 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 19 19 19 19 19 19	mitigation? You know, if they all disappear? Obviously they can't all disappear. Some of them are, if you will, set in stone, but for instance, if you had the foam/water monitors on the helideck out of commission, something happened with them, would that be a sufficient loss of mitigating factors that you would say "we're not flying"? MR. SACUTA: A. If we did not have the foam/water monitors on the helideck, we would not fly. If there isn't firefighting capabilities on the helideck, we would not be landing helicopters on the helideck. EARLE, Q.C. Q. So is there any rule of thumb that addresses the loss of any of these mitigating factors that says, you know, "if two or more are
6 EARLE, Q.C. 7 Q. If we could go back to the aviation operation risk assessment? 9 REGISTRAR: 10 Q. What page number? 11 EARLE, Q.C. 12 Q. Slide 40. 13 REGISTRAR: 14 Q. Slide 40? 15 ROIL, Q.C.: 16 Q. In No. 130. 17 EARLE, Q.C. 18 Q. The mitigating factors and emergency resp 19 You just have a reference to the standby vessel at the Hibernia Platform. Where do the fast rescue craft, that, my understanding that vessel is supposed to be equipped with	ons 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 1 15 16 17 18 19 oes 20 19 oes 21 oh, 22 23 24 24 24 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 1	mitigation? You know, if they all disappear? Obviously they can't all disappear. Some of them are, if you will, set in stone, but for instance, if you had the foam/water monitors on the helideck out of commission, something happened with them, would that be a sufficient loss of mitigating factors that you would say "we're not flying"? MR. SACUTA: A. If we did not have the foam/water monitors on the helideck, we would not fly. If there isn't firefighting capabilities on the helideck, we would not be landing helicopters on the helideck. EARLE, Q.C. Q. So is there any rule of thumb that addresses the loss of any of these mitigating factors

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1 MR. SACUTA:		ere an assessment done of which of these
2 A. I mean, all of these mitigation safeguards	2 mi	tigators, if they're not available, is
reduce the consequence. If, for example, the		ucial to the ability to fly?
4 standby vessel was not able to use any of	4 MR. SAC	, ,
5 their means, whether it's the fast rescue		nean, I think if, for example, the flight
6 craft, the DACON scoop or the EMPRA basket,		llowing and tracking system was unavailable,
7 would not fly during those situations. We		e would certainly have a discussion with
8 can't take credit for those safeguards if		ougar Helicopters to determine whether or not
9 they're not available.		was safe to carry on helicopter operations.
10 EARLE, Q.C.		is there a specific list that identifies
11 Q. Yeah.		nat we do is if any of these mitigation
12 MR. SACUTA:		feguards are not in place, we will some
13 A. That doesn't mean that if one of the three is		it is mandated in our documentation, such
not available that we would not allow the		sea states above seven metres. If we
helicopter transportation. As an example, the		dn't have a standby vessel that had the
sea state limitation of seven metres is above		ility to recover personnel, we would not
when they would launch a fast rescue craft,		v. Is there a specific list for that? No,
but we have the other retrieval means on that	1	t we'd certainly have a discussion. If in
19 standby vessel.		e situation of flight tracking, now we would
20 EARLE, Q.C.		ve that discussion with Cougar.
21 Q. Do we know that the other retrieval means ca		G
be used in sea state of seven metres?		ne of the I'm just trying to check now
23 MR. SACUTA:		nether it's a I guess it's a mitigator,
24 A. We have had discussions with our standby		at is the yes, the standby helicopter
25 vessel captains and they have indicated that		sed in St. John's, and if we could refer to
* *		
	ge 74	Page 76
they would be comfortable using those mean		chibit C-00132, page 13? Sorry, I guess it's
2 during a rescue situation.		for the purposes of the exhibit. It's page
3 EARLE, Q.C.		of the technical specifications, 30 at the
4 Q. In a seven-metre sea?	_	o of the page. If you look at Section 11.1?
5 MR. SACUTA:		the contractor shall provide all personnel,
6 A. Yes, up to seven-metre seas, that's correct.	_	uipment, permits and/or authorizations
7 EARLE, Q.C.		quired to provide first response to owner-
8 Q. Up to seven metres. So is it because	_	ecific incidents on a 24-hour, 7-days-a-week
9 clearly, for instance, the availability of a		sis. During non-core hours, wheels up
properly fitting helicopter transportation		sponse time shall be at most one hour." I
suit was also a mitigator that when it was not		n't think it was clear from your answers to
available, you said "those people aren't	12 M 1	r. Roil what non-core hours are.
flying. They're going back and forth by	13 MR. SAC	
14 vessel"?	14 A. I 1	think core hours are identified in the
15 MR. SACUTA:	15 co.	ntract.
16 A. Correct.	16 EARLE, C	
17 EARLE, Q.C.	_	ooked for them and couldn't find them, but
18 Q. Right. So do we have available a ranking or		u fellows dropped a lot of material on me in
an indicator which of these going out shuts	19 the	e last couple of days of last week.
down flights? For instance, the flight	20 MR. SAC	
following tracking system, do we know if it's		my opinion, non-core hours are once we've
out of commission, which of course doesn't		ut down flying for the day, then those are
eliminate a whole lot of other public systems.	23 no	n-core hours.
if you will, do we know if that's out of	24 EARLE, C	
commission that there will be no flying? Is	25 Q. Yo	ou say once you shut down operations for -

Page 79 I MR. SACUTA: I A. Yeah, once we're no longer flying, once we've shut down flying for the day, that would be non-core hours. I A. Weah, once we're no longer flying, once we've shut down flying for the day, that would be non-core hours. I content of the day, that would be non-core hours. I content of the day that would be non-core hours. I content of the day, that would be non-core hours. I content of the day that would be non-core hours. I content of the day that would be non-core hours. I content of the day that would be non-core hours. I content of the day that would be non-core hours. I content of the day that would be non-core hours. I content of the day that would be non-core hours. I content of the day that would be non-core hours. I content of the day that would be non-core hours. I content of the day that would be non-core hours. I content of the day that would be non-core hours. I content of the day that would be non-core hours. I content of the day that would be non-core hours. I content of the day that would be non-core hours. I content of the day that would be non-core hours. I content of the day that would have taken place during the lights? I content of the day that would have taken place during the lights? I content of the day that strange, the work packs put together and you have to the lights? I content of the day that strange, the work packs put together and you have to the reduction of a time frame lights? I content of the day that strange, the work packs put together and you have to the work packs put together and you have to the work pack to green was pushful them, and that was completed in 2009. I recall that. Will dhere be an amendment to the weaks put together of the content. It's a practice, after the events of the weaks put together thanding deck to green was pushful and we went shead and engineering the heavy put the new the pack. I content of the pack put the fact that we had, in the pack put the new that the pack put the new that the pack put the n		Tage Onshore Hencopter Surety Inquiry
2 A. Yeah, once we're no longer flying, once we've shut down flying for the day, that would be non-core hours. 5 FARTE, Q.C. 6 Q. So the March crash would have taken place during core hours? 8 MR. SACUTA: 10 EAREL Q.C. 10 EAREL Q.C. 11 O. There is no stated expectation of a time frame during core hours. I find that strange, the lights of way you've done it. 12 during core hours. I find that strange, the lights of the during core hours. I find that strange, the lights of the lights of the past during core hours. I find that strange, the lights of the		Page 79
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	Page 81				Page 83
1	Q. You would not have considered it to have a	1	1	,	would be talking a stack of paper as high as
2	high priority?	2	2	1	my shoulder.
3	MR. SACUTA:	3	3 MF	R. SA	CUTA:
4	A. That's not what I said. I said it was a	4	1	Α.	I don't know if it would be as high as your
5	continuous improvement opportunity which we	5	5	:	shoulder, but there are a number of documents.
6	completed in 2009.	6	5 EA	RLE	, Q.C.
7	EARLE, Q.C.	7	7	Q.	A large number of documents.
8	Q. Should we be taking four years for continuous	8	3 MF	R. SA	CUTA:
9	improvements?	9	•	Α.	As you go through the various levels of OIMS,
10	MR. SACUTA:	10)	1	that would be correct, yes.
11	A. I think we certainly have to look at each	11	l EA	RLE	, Q.C.
12	improvement opportunity to look at the benefit	12	2	Q.	Yeah.
13	of that improvement opportunity. We did do	13			CUTA:
14	that in this case, and we went ahead and	14	1		But that would include all of our operations
15	implemented the new helicopter lights in 2009.	15	5		and maintenance procedures, for example.
16	EARLE, Q.C.	16			, Q.C.
17	Q. I think you would agree that if a higher	17	1		Do you see and this is your operations
18	priority had been put on it, it could have	18	3		integrity bible, if you will. Do you see any
19	been done in a considerably shorter period of	19)		issues with the volume and scope of this
20	time than four years, right?	20			material being so large that it is a challenge
21		21			to get people to follow it through?
22	A. I think there are a number of situations where				CUTA:
23	equipment changes can be done in a quicker	23			I don't see any challenges because, as Mr.
24	amount of time. In this case, we did it	24			Fraser mentioned yesterday, all of our
25	during that four-year period.	25	<u> </u>]	positions offshore have road maps and included
١.	Page 82				Page 84
1	EARLE, Q.C.	1			in those road maps would be the required
$\frac{1}{2}$	Q. I'm asking you do you agree that if a higher	$\frac{1}{2}$			documentation that those individuals would
3	priority had been put on this particular	3			have to be familiar with. We don't expect
4	change, it could have been done in less than	4			every person on that Platform to know every
5	four years? MR. SACUTA:	5			document, but we do expect them to know the
1		6			documents that are relevant to their job
7 8	A. If there had been there are opportunities to complete this work in less than four years,	8			function. So to answer your question, no, I
9	correct.				don't see a problem with that.
1	EARLE, Q.C.	10	9 EAF		
I	Q. The technical demands of the work did not	11			Gentlemen, those are my questions. Thank you very much.
11 12	create the four-year time frame. It was the		i 2 mr.		•
13	priority that was assigned to it that created	13			
14	the four-year time?				Thank you. SIONER:
1	MR. SACUTA:	15			Okay, thank you, Mr. Earle. Now, counsel for
16	A. The technical demands did not determine the	16			the families, Mr. Martin.
17	four years. That's correct.		7 mr.		
1	EARLE, Q.C.	18			Go ahead?
19	Q. Thank you. I think I'm through with my				SIONER:
20	questions, gentlemen. I just want to make a	20		Q.	
21	quick check of my notes. No, I'm not through	1			L SACUTA AND MR. JOHN FRASER, EXAMINATION BY MR.
	•	1			

22 JAMIE MARTIN

Q. Good morning, Mr. Sacuta. Good morning, Mr.

 $23\ \text{MR. MARTIN}$

24

25

my questions. The OIMS system, I'm told that

documents incorporated by reference, that we

if we were to print off all the various

documents, because there are a lot of

22

23

24

25

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F	e 85	Page 87
1 MR. FRASER:	1 statement.	
2 A. Good morning.	2 MR. SACUTA:	
3 MR. SACUTA:	3 A. That's correct. Of any of the place	s I've
4 A. Good morning.	4 worked, that's correct.	
5 MR. MARTIN	5 MR. MARTIN	
6 Q. My name is Jamie Martin. I represent the	6 Q. And you've worked in the North Se	a, you've
7 families of the deceased passengers, and I	7 worked in the Gulf of Mexico?	
8 know you've been on the stand now for a co	le 8 MR. SACUTA:	
9 of hours, so I don't expect to detain you for	9 A. I haven't worked in the North Sea.	
much longer. A lot of the questions I have	10 MR. MARTIN	
are just points of clarification and in	11 Q. You haven't?	
particular, I want to focus on your	12 MR. SACUTA:	
interaction with the Board as the regulator.	13 A. I've transitted on helicopters in the	North
So that's the focus where I'm going to be	14 Sea during visits. I've worked in Ind	lonesia,
directing my attention.	Qatar, West Africa, and Alberta.	
16 If the Registrar could turn up slide No.	16 MR. MARTIN:	
13 in the PowerPoint presentation, which is	17 Q. Okay. Now as the principal regulator	r, the C-
Exhibit 130? And my question is really a	NLOPB, other than Transport Canada	
point of clarification. I'm just trying to	issues, the principal regulator being (C-NLOPB,
better understand you've got several	20 I'm just inquiring a bit further about	t the
subcontractors working for you, and I thin	interaction the typical interaction b	etween
you've got most, if not all of them,	yourself and the Board in relation to	some of
identified on that slide. Who is actually	the issues that are before the Commis	ssioner as
24 responsible for safety for those	being considered important for this I	Inquiry,
subcontractors? The answer may be obvious	and Mr. Roil has questioned you at so	ome length
F	e 86	Page 88
but I'm a little bit confused as to -	on the characterization of incident, ha	•
2 MR. SACUTA:	and near misses, and incidents, and	I think
3 A. We are.	3 your evidence was that near misses	
4 MR. MARTIN	4 considered an incident, and I know	we're
5 Q. You are, and that's -	5 waiting on some information, I under	rstand from
6 MR. SACUTA:	6 Mr. Roil, that I think that informatio	n will
7 A. HMDC is ultimately responsible for the safety	7 be forthcoming, there were some	e 178
8 of everyone who works on our facilities.	8 observations that the Board referred	l to in
9 MR. MARTIN	9 their evidence last fall, we're awaitin	g that
10 Q. And that's pursuant to the operational	and I'm curious as to how much of	-
agreement? Is that correct? Or is there any	incidents, how much of them are near	ar misses,
other authority for that?	but I'm not going to ask you that b	ecause
13 MR. SACUTA:	that's information the Board will	l be
14 A. I mean, the commitment we make in our Ops pl	presenting, but I want to know from	m your
is that we are accountable and responsible for	perspective as one of the operators a	at what
the safety of personnel that work on our	stage does the information on a haza	ard, for
17 facilities.	instance, I'll use hazard as an example	le, what
18 MR. MARTIN	stage, if at all, does that get brought t	to the
19 Q. Okay. Yeah, I thought that was the but I	attention of the Offshore Petroleum E	Board? Do
just wanted to clarify that. Mr. Sacuta, in	you make them aware of that? You u	sed the box
21 particular, you stated last week and yesterday	21 analogy yesterday, there was an unm	arked box.
as well, that you consider the offshore regime	Is that something the Board would be	e familiar
in Newfoundland to be the most regulated of	with, would be made aware of?	
any offshore that you've worked in. I think	24 MR. SACUTA:	
25 that's a fair characterization of your	25 A. The Board during their visits would	be aware

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1	that we have a hazard recognition program	-	1	I mean, you referenced a couple twice
2	cards, they know we have a STOP observa		2	annual meetings.
3	program, so they would be aware of that.	Any 3	3 MF	R. SACUTA:
4	time we have an incident on the facility, th	ie 4	4	A. That would be JOHS meetings. I have a
5	Board is made aware and they get a copy of			quarterly meeting that I have with the Board.
6	incident report. We do not, I'm aware,	, 6	6	It's actually scheduled for today. I've had
7	provide the Board every specific hazard th	nat 7	7	to delegate it because of the Inquiry, but we
8	comes up, details of that. That's handled b	by 8	8	have a quarterly meeting where we meet with
9	ourselves as the hazards are identified, that	t 9	9	the Board with the standard template of items
10	we track them to closure ourselves. We do	let 10	0	to discuss, which includes safety, production
11	the Board know that we have these program	ms in 11	1	performance. The Board will let us know if
12	place and that we monitor the statistics fro	m 12	2	there's any other specific that they want us
13	those programs as part of what we would	d do 13	3	to talk to at that meeting, and there's also
14	during a quarterly review with the Board.	We 14	4	impromptu meetings that we've had certainly
15	have a quarterly meeting with the Board.	15	5	after March 12th during our return to service
16	MR. MARTIN:	16	6	plan. We had frequent meetings with the Board
17	Q. So you monitor the statistics and provide to	hem 17	7	to let them know the status of the work that
18	directly to the Board?	18	8	was being done by the HOTF. We had a meeting
19	MR. SACUTA:	19	9	with them prior to us reestablishing
20	A. We let them know that we're monitoring	the 20	0	helicopter operations. So set-wise, quarterly
21	statistics, yes, and they are aware that we	21	1	meetings, but many other meetings depending on
22	use those monitoring programs to determ		2	the circumstances.
23	safety programs, for example, and they we			R. MARTIN:
24	see what our weekly safety focus is on o			Q. And who, generally speaking, sets the agenda
25	daily report because they get a copy of ou	ır 25	5	for those meetings? Is it something that's
		Page 90		Page 92
1	daily report as well.	1	1	generated between yourselves?
2	MR. MARTIN:	2	2 MF	R. SACUTA:
3	Q. So what about near misses? I know yo	ou 3	3	A. Between the two of us. If there's any item
4	characterize them as incidents, but they we	ould 4	4	that either one of us wants to talk about,
5	be made aware of near misses as well?	5	5	we'll just add it to the agenda.
6	MR. SACUTA:		6 MI	R. MARTIN:
7	A. Yes, because a near miss is an incident ar	I	7	Q. And the level of representation at these
8	the Board gets all the information on an	y 8	8	meetings, would it be considered high I
9	incident that we have on our facility.	9		know you're President of the organization.
10	MR. MARTIN:	1		R. SACUTA:
11	Q. Because I know in your evidence yesterd	·		A. And Max Ruelokke would be attending those
12	following the March 12th incident, you sa			quarterly meetings.
13	Husky was mandated by the Board to cond			R. MARTIN:
14	investigation. What was that happened?	14		Q. As Chair of the Board?
	MR. SACUTA:	I		R. SACUTA:
16	A. It was agreed with the Board that Husky w			A. Yeah.
17	take the lead on the investigation based o	I		R. MARTIN:
18	the fact that it was a Husky aircraft a	18		Q. Now those meetings, are they just specific to
19	Husky flight. That doesn't mean that we			safety or do they concern other issues such as
20	not participate. We were involved in the H			drilling and production?
21	Report. Mr. Fraser was our representative			R. SACUTA:
22	the HOTF team. We were involved very cle			A. It's a standard agenda or standard template.
23	with all the operators during this period.	23		The first item we always talk about is safety,
$ _{25}^{24}$	MR. MARTIN: O So how frequently do you meet with the R	024		but we do talk about production performance,

flare performance, drilling performance. It's

Q. So how frequently do you meet with the Board?

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a all encompassing quarterly review.		wondering, you know, as a general observation,
2 MR. MARTIN:	2	how much of that information gets actually
3 Q. And from your experience, even though s	I	channelled up to you, because you got a very
4 is the number one agenda on the docket,	· I	flat structure there and you've got a
5 much of the meetings are actually focused		considerable number of people reporting to you
6 safety, or percentage roughly?	6	on several issues; drilling, production,
7 MR. SACUTA:	7	engineering, geosciences, you know, there's a
8 A. Anywhere between a quarter and 50 per		considerable range of activities that are
9 depending on the circumstances at the tim		reporting directly to you. How much under
10 MR. MARTIN:	10	that structure, how much of the information on
11 Q. If I could ask the Registrar to turn up Tab		safety gets channelled up to you? I'm not
of the PowerPoint presentation, which		looking for a percentage, but it concerns me
believe is Exhibit 133.	1 12 13	that you've got such a flat structure, you've
14 ROIL, Q.C.:	14	got so many people reporting to you, but there
15 Q. I think it's 130.	15	doesn't seem to be anyone, in particular,
16 MR. MARTIN:	16	directly responsible for safety and health
17 Q. 130, sorry.	17	reporting directly to you.
18 MR. SACUTA:		MR. SACUTA:
19 A. Do you mean page 10, or slide 10?		
1	19	A. Yes, there is, there's a safety supervisor
20 MR. MARTIN:	20	that's part of the HMDC management team that
21 Q. Page 10, yes. It's actually	21	reports direct to me. The safety health and
22 REGISTRAR:	22	environment team reports to that supervisor.
23 Q. Slide 10?		MR. MARTIN:
24 MR. MARTIN:	24	Q. But you've got several other people reporting
25 Q. Slide 10, yes, and it's your structure, and	I 25	to you as well?
	Page 94	Page 96
think you referred to it as a flat structure,	1 1	MR. SACUTA:
which it appears from a visual observation	on, 2	A. Correct.
and you indicated yesterday I believe that	it 3 1	MR. MARTIN:
4 was probably flatter than some of the	e 4	Q. But my question to you is you made an
5 structure that you're previously familian	r 5	observation that it's a flat structure.
6 with, would that be a fair characterization	of 6 1	MR. SACUTA:
7 your evidence?	7	A. Yes.
8 MR. SACUTA:	8 1	MR. MARTIN:
9 A. That would be a fair characterization. When	en I 9	Q. And it's somewhat different, and we'll have
mentioned it as flat, it's certainly flatter	10	information on that later, somewhat different
than the other operators in the basin.	11	than the structures that the other two
12 MR. MARTIN:	12	operators you didn't name them, but I'm
13 Q. And we'll hear from them in the next litt	tle 13	assuming you're referring to the other two
while, Suncor and Husky, but my quest	tion, 14	operators. Do you see any problems with your
though, is and I paid close attention to		structure in that regard?
your evidence yesterday and today. You		MR. SACUTA:
daily meetings, you have weekly meetings		A. I don't, and I'll tell you the reason why.
allow input for workers through these ca		When I'm doing my normal responsibilities,
that you showed the Commissioner yeste		when I'm not negotiating a new collective
20 there's binders left in the lobby of the	20	agreement, or when I'm not participating in
structure itself, and I do appreciate your		the helicopter Inquiry, I attend the morning
evidence that there's considerable opportu		call every morning, and at that morning call
for input, but in terms of your own intern	-	is the opportunity for the offshore
structures, I see reference to Safety Healt		installation manager and his offshore
25 Environment and Security, but I'm ju		leadership team to tell me what's going on

Page 97 Page 99 A. They sanctioned and agreed that the process offshore. Any incidents I would be made aware 1 2 at that morning call. I have a monthly asset 2 that we followed had integrity. level leadership team meeting which occurs the 3 3 MR. MARTIN: second Tuesday of every month, which is Q. But were they not required to approve your 4 4 attended by the offshore leadership and my 5 5 decision? onshore leadership representatives from the 6 MR. SACUTA: 6 departments that are shown on this graph. One 7 A. I mean, we inform the Board any time we have a 7 8 of the -- the first agenda item is safety. We 8 contract come up for renewal as part of our do a thorough review of any of the safety requirement to let them know, but generally 9 9 10 incidents that have occurred during the 10 they don't do an investigation of whether or previous month. So I'm not concerned at all not there's integrity in the process unless 11 11 12 that there's safety issues that are being 12 for some reason they have a concern or a raised out there that I'm not aware of, unless concern is raised by one of the bidders. So 13 13 we do inform the Board when we go through 14 for some reason I'm on vacation, and when I 14 get back I'll have to familiarize myself, but major contracts, yes. 15 15 16 I have ample opportunity for my organization 16 MR. MARTIN: to let me know what's going on from a safety 17 17 Q. And in this particular instance, there was a concern raised by a local helicopter provider 18 perspective. 18 19 MR. MARTIN: 19 about your --Q. So you have a comfort level with your current 20 20 MR. SACUTA: organization structure? A. About the fact they didn't win the bid. 21 21 22 MR. SACUTA: 22 MR. MARTIN: A. I very much have a comfort level, yes. 23 Q. Okay, and it was only at that stage that the 23 Board intervenes, or can the Board -- you've 24 indicated that the Board -- what role does the 25 Q. Just a couple of more points that I want to 25 Page 98 Page 100 touch on. You spent some time yesterday going Board have in terms of that? 1 1 2 through the process in terms of selecting 2 MR. SACUTA: Cougar as the helicopter provider, and my 3 A. At any point in time the Board can ask us to 3 question is in on way intended to question demonstrate to them the process that we 4 4 5 that decision, we'll hear evidence from Cougar 5 followed. So they can do that at any point in on their qualifications and their experience time. Generally speaking, they don't because 6 6 and their abilities to do the job, so my 7 7 over the years they have realized that we have 8 question is not directed there. You did, 8 integrity in our bidding process, but at any 9 however, reference that the Board endorses point in time the Board can come and ask can 9 that decision, and "endorses" leaves certain you help us or step us through the process you 10 10 11 connotations in my mind --11 did for any major contract, for example. 12 MR. SACUTA: 12 MR. MARTIN: 13 A. I didn't say the Board endorsed. I said the 13 Q. And have they done that other than the Board evaluated our process, and that was a incident that you just described? 14 14 15 direct result of one of the unsuccessful 15 MR. SACUTA: bidders raising a concern with the process. A. They did it on the catering contract renewal 16 16 17 One of the unsuccessful bidders was a local 17 in the summer of 2008. 18 person and he raised some concerns at the 18 MR. MARTIN: 19 time. So the Board validated our process that Q. And again is that something you asked them to 19 do or did some third party as them to there was integrity in the process. That's 20 20 what that statement was supposed to imply. 21 21 intervene? 22 MR. MARTIN: 22 MR. SACUTA: Q. But you did use the word "endorse" I believe. A. No, they came and asked us to do it. 23 23 24 They sanctioned or --24 MR. MARTIN:

25

Q. My final question to you, last week the

25 MR. SACUTA:

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1	Commissioner heard a presentation from	1		running their business.
2		2	MR. M	
3	Democratic Party in the Province of	3	Q.	Your company operates in Norway, I presume,
4		4		they have
5		5	MR. SA	•
6	61	6	A.	Our company, HMDC, does not operate in Norway.
7	MR. SACUTA:	7	MR. M	
8	A. I read the presentation and watched it on	8	0.	Well, no, ExxonMobil and
9		9	MR. SA	
1	MR. MARTIN:	10		ExxonMobil does have operations, I believe, in
11		11		Norway, yes.
12			MR. M	
13		13		But what, if any, observations or thoughts
14		14		have you given, and if you haven't given any,
15		15		that's fine, to how the Board functions in
16		16		Norway?
17			MR. SA	•
18		18		I haven't given any thoughts to that.
19			MR. M	
20		20		Okay. That's all the questions. Thank you
21		21		both for your cooperation in this Inquiry.
22		22		Thank you very much.
23			MR. SA	
1	MR. SACUTA:	24		Thank you.
25			MR. FF	
-			1,111, 11	
١.	Page 102			Page 104
1	MR. MARTIN:	1		Thanks.
2				IISSIONER:
3	, , , ,	3		Thank you, Mr. Martin. Now counsel for the
4		4		families of the pilots.
5	J	-		NTHONY:
6	1 2 1	6		No questions, thank you, Mr. Commissioner.
7	3			IISSIONER:
8	•	8		Okay, thank you. Now then I come to counsel
	MR. SACUTA:	9		for HMDC. Have you any questions, Ms.
10	2 11 2	10		Strickland?
11	1			RICKLAND:
12		12		Just one point of clarification, if I may.
13	1			IISSIONER:
14	•	14		Yes. I think you better go up there, or we'll
15	•	15		be abruptly
16		1		AUL SACUTA, MR. JOHN FRASER - EXAMINATION BY MS.
17	1			Y STRICKLAND:
18	1			RICKLAND:
19	1 ,	19		Mr. Sacuta, I'll be very brief. I just wanted
120		20		to if you could clarify one point for us.
20		1		X7 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
21	safety. Are there opportunities for	21		You were asked about the finding on the
21 22	safety. Are there opportunities for improvement, I'm not going to say we're not	21 22		replacement of the lights on the helideck, and
21 22 23	safety. Are there opportunities for improvement, I'm not going to say we're not going to consider those opportunities, we'll	21 22 23		replacement of the lights on the helideck, and my question to you is I think this was a
21 22	safety. Are there opportunities for improvement, I'm not going to say we're not going to consider those opportunities, we'll certainly be willing to discuss those, but I	21 22		replacement of the lights on the helideck, and

system. If this had been ranked as a medium

do not have any concerns with how the Board is

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1	or significant finding, would that have had	- 1	1	other drilling installations out there as
2	impact on the time within which the		2	well. When I talk to people who use the
3	replacement was undertaken?		3	service, and I talked to them when I was out
4	MR. SACUTA:		4	on the Platform, and people come up to me now
5	A. Absolutely. Obviously, we put higher pri-	ority	5	frequently wherever I might be and talk about
6	on what would be considered a significant	•	6	these matters, the expressed view is not fear
7	medium finding over a lower finding.	Any	7	of flying in the helicopter, the expressed
8	significant finding would be addresse	d	8	concern seems to be very much the frustrations
9	immediately, and from a priority perspect		9	that arise because of delays, the people
10	we would put a higher priority on a med		.0	trying to get home, or people, for example,
11	finding than a lower level finding.		.1	might live in Marystown or somewhere fairly
12	MS. STRICKLAND:	1	2	distant and come up to St. John's and can't
13	Q. That you, Mr. Sacuta. That's all I have.		.3	go, and that seems to lead in any sort of
1	COMMISSIONER:		4	discussion with people to the question of why
15	Q. Okay, thank you. It's not that I have		.5	aren't there more helicopters. Now nobody
16	questions for you so much, but we have		.6	would expect a helicopter to fly when it's not
17	time before half past twelve. I'd like to		.7	safe to fly and that decision is made by
18	talk to you about two or three matters real		.8	pilots and Cougar, and the regulations that
19	to get your views, and also to perhaps give	-	.9	apply to all this, and I think everybody
20	you an idea of how my mind is absorb		20	understands that. If there were more
21	material, because remember at the ver	-		helicopters, and I suppose in future there
22	beginning I said that nobody will be	• 1	22	will be more helicopters as installations grow
23	blindsided, everybody will know the sorts		23	and the whole field off there becomes more
24	things that we're looking at in the Inquiry		24	developed, is there any mechanism, formal or
25	but firstly, I heard what Mr. Earle said this		25	informal, by which the operators discuss the
	<u> </u>	Page 106		Page 108
1	morning about the record of HMDC and so	_	1	need for helicopters and what needs might be
$\frac{1}{2}$	and there's no question from my reading	- 1	2	appropriate, or what the future would seem to
$\frac{1}{3}$	good, and also Mr. Fraser particularly, w		3	be in terms of more helicopters, and if there
4	was my host when I went offshore, you l		4	were, could backlogs be cleared up more
5	it's impossible to go to that Platform and		5	quickly, and I suppose the downside of it is
6	listen and read and take the instructions th		6	when helicopters can't fly, there would be
7	you're given without coming to the conclu		7	more helicopters sitting around presumably
8	that safety is very important in the contex		8	waiting. Talk to me a bit about these
	of that Platform. That really came home to		9	concepts.
10	when I was out there. Now my mandate			SACUTA:
11	course, as we know, is helicopter safety a			I think Mr. Pritchard last week talked a
12	the transportation of people back and fort		.2	little bit about the fact that there are
13	but let me raise another matter. There's	1	.3	circumstances where more helicopters won't
14	community now offshore, and when I so		.4	necessarily help you get people off the
15	community, there are three producin	-	.5	facility sooner if you have these weather
16	installations, Hebron is being worked o	-	.6	conditions that don't allow you to fly, and
17	although according to what I read in th		.7	that's one of the main reasons that certainly
18	papers, that's not expected to come on un		.8	during the fog season that there may be an
19	2017.		.9	additional need for night flights is because
	MR. SACUTA:	1	20	fog generally comes in in the morning and then
21	A. Approximately, yes.	$\begin{vmatrix} 2 \\ 2 \end{vmatrix}$		burns off as you get through the afternoon,
	COMMISSIONER:		22	which then means you're flying window may be
23	Q. Approximately, but there will be work be		23	later into the afternoon into the evening. So
[23	1 de la de marchi	6		in the artifician man 1 1'

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in those situations, more helicopters might not necessarily help you, but the operators

done in the meantime, and there will be

helicopter use, no doubt, and then there are

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1	right now have been discussing we still	1	which has a huge number, of course, of
2	have the Helicopter Steering Committee that	2	installations compared with us, but again as
3	meets at a regular basis, which was put in	3	installations grow out there in our offshore,
4	place after the events of March 12th, and one	4	there are going to be more of them and they
5	of the things we're talking about is do we	5	are going to be not as close together as the
6	need to have more helicopters and that's	6	North Sea, but fairly close, I should think
7	something that we're looking at. Certainly	7	some of them. Is there a role for safety in
8	HMDC has put some restrictions in place when	. 8	craft, and I don't mean small fast rescue
9	it comes to night flying that the other	9	craft, but larger fast rescue craft, 80/90
10	operators haven't because they've got other	10	feet long, that are referred to in the North
11	issues that they have to deal with movement of	f 11	Sea as a place of safety. These things can
12	their vessels that we don't have to deal with,	12	go, you know, 25/30 knots. Where the big
13	but I think looking forward there is a	13	problem is is the jolting to pieces for the
14	mechanism. It's an informal mechanism by	14	individual, they've had to do a lot of work on
15	which the operators communicate, we all have	2 15	that, but I know that British Petroleum has
16	logistics departments, and they're able to	16	these things now that are designated to be
17	communicate with each other and I think that	17	places of safety and can move very quickly in
18	it's one of these things that I would classify	18	the rather confined area of the North Sea. Do
19	as a continuous improvement opportunity that	19	you ever see or think in terms that seagoing
20	we look at, whether or not the number of	20	craft could be used, not perhaps on the long
21	helicopters we have right now, being one for	21	distance between, say, Hibernia, which is the
22	each of the operators, is really what we need	22	nearest installation and St. John's, but out
23	to have looking forward in the basin.	23	there or close to the various installations?
24 COM	MISSIONER:	24 MR.	SACUTA:
25 Q.	Yes.	25 A	. I mean, I think it's something that could be
	Page	110	Page 112
1 MR. S	ACUTA:	1	looked at. Operating in the North Atlantic
2 A.	So there is a mechanism by which we're able t	o 2	for us is a very unique environment, and I
3	discuss that.	3	think to put things in perspective, we
4 COM	MISSIONER:	4	generally think a fairly calm sea is less than
5 Q.	I see, because that's what I am supposed to do	5	three metres. Three metres is still ten feet,
6	also is look forward.	6	and when the back of a boat is moving up and
7 MR. S	ACUTA:	7	down ten feet, that's a lot, but from our
8 A.	Right.	8	perspective, based on the weather conditions
9 COM	MISSIONER:	9	that we operate in day in and day out, that's
10 Q.	It is no good for me to make recommendation	s 10	what we feel is a fairly calm sea. Now there
11	on what's past, and I suppose the costs, in	11	are times during the summer where we may have
12	any event, are shared by all those who use it,	12	very calm seas, but I think you'd have to look
13	not the individuals, but the corporations.	13	at it if you were going to go to that type
14 MR. S	ACUTA:	14	of a boat, sea vessel, you'd also have to look
15 A.	Right, the operators, with the pooling	15	at the risks associated with that because we
		1	

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18 COMMISSIONER:

helicopters.

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19 Q. I see. Now with regard to safety, I'm going to talk about something that we never talk 20 21 about, and it's not part strictly of my 22 mandate, and safety is my mandate also, and 23 that is seagoing craft, ships, boats of some 24 type. Now as I said the other day, I'm 25 reading a lot, reading about the North Sea

principle we have now where we pool

comes to our sea state conditions. 18 COMMISSIONER: Q. One thing -- I grew up, obviously, in Newfoundland, and my own personal knowledge and everything I read leads me to the conclusion that this is probably the most hostile offshore drilling environment. I talked to a man working in Sakhalin Island even, and there they don't have -- the

do operate in a unique environment when it

Page 113 helicopter makes a trip of about 50 miles along the coast, but 12 miles only off, which seems to me to be not as onerous as what happens here. MR. SACUTA: TOMMISSIONER: On In terms of safety, it seems to me there are several aspects, but two main groupings, and correct me if I'm wrong in your views, one is the culture of a corporation, the risk management thing, the risk assessment thing and culture, and you know, of course, that our consultant, Aerosafe, is going to be talking to you at some length right throughout the company, and you've agreed to that, which I appreciate. I won't say anything more about that because I think we have to wait for the consultant so that you have a better idea what Aerosafe is doing, and I have feedback and a crash is a safety, of course, is not only rescue, but What I would call preparation of the helicopter in a floating condition and allow personnel to exit the aircraft, you have a should the aircraft invert. I agree with that. I think it's something that needs to be looked at looking forward. COMMISSIONER: Q. Yeah, and, of course, that plays into also, of course, the suits and something which if a person does survive the ditching, the initial drowning danger, then, of course, protection from the suits. MR. SACUTA: 14 A. Right. SCOMMISSIONER: Q. And the other thing that seems to me, and I'd like your comment, to be vitally important is the speed with which a rescue helicopter can get to the downed—to the site of the downed helicopter for mexorage, but the other area of safety, of course, is not only rescue, but safety, of course, is not only rescue, but what I would call preparation of the safety, of course, is not only rescue, but ago, preparation of the helicopter, because everybody agrees that if a helicopter goes down ditching, and a crash is a different thing, but a controlled ditching and it turns over, the difficulties of those in it are helicopter hand a crash is a different thing, but a controlled ditching and it turns over, the difficulties of thos
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22 safety, of course, is not only rescue, but 23 rescue in terms of let's go with rescue. 24 What I would call preparation of the 25 helicopter, and I averted to this a few days 26 Page 114 27 ago, preparation of the helicopter, because 28 believe, with the cold, particularly 39 down ditching, and a crash is a different 40 thing, but a controlled ditching and it turns 40 thing, but a controlled ditching and it turns 40 thing, but a controlled ditching and it turns 41 the North Sea that even if a suit stays dry, 42 over, the difficulties of those in it are 43 that long, and when I say "all that long", it 44 might be an hour, might be two hours, but if 45 Page 116 4 preparation of the helicopter goes 4 down ditching, and a crash is a different 4 thing, but a controlled ditching and it turns 5 over, the difficulties of those in it are 6 highly magnified, whereas if the helicopter 7 can be prevented from turning over, inverting, 8 then the chances of everybody get very much 9 better, because according to what I read, most 22 about, even with the best suits, and the sea states as they are, a person may not have all that long, and when I say "all that long", it might be an hour, might be two hours, but if Page 116 Page 116 1 not rescued, the chances of survival start, I 2 believe, with the cold, particularly diminishing, and I have read experiences in the North Sea that even if a suit stays dry, in two or three hours even in their temperatures which are higher than ours, in two or three hours the person's core temperature begins to decline and they're in danger of death.
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then the chances of everybody get very much better, because according to what I read, most feet temperature begins to decline and they're in danger of death.
better, because according to what I read, most 9 danger of death.
of the deaths are caused by drowning in 10 MR SACUTA.
helicopter incidents, do you spend much time 11 A. I mean, I think that I don't think that
in your organization together with other anybody is going to argue that less time spent
operators in thinking about ways in which the in the water is better.
dangers of a controlled ditching can be 14 COMMISSIONER:
improved because it's something that my 15 Q. Yeah, yeah.
reading causes me to think, and this isn't a 16 MR. SACUTA:
blindsiding approach, causes me to think that 17 A. I mean, that's one of those ones that if you
there's work that needs to be done there, as can get somebody out faster than slower, it's
is being done in other places. What would 19 to the benefit of the individual. I don't
20 your comment be on that? 20 think we should underestimate the ability of a
your comment be on that? 20 think we should underestimate the ability of a 21 MR. SACUTA: 20 properly fitted certified transportation suit
your comment be on that? 20 think we should underestimate the ability of a 21 MR. SACUTA: 21 properly fitted certified transportation suit 22 A. I think it's certainly an area that will 23 from providing protection for our personnel
your comment be on that? 20 think we should underestimate the ability of a 21 MR. SACUTA: 22 A. I think it's certainly an area that will 23 probably require some focus looking forward. 20 think we should underestimate the ability of a 21 properly fitted certified transportation suit 22 from providing protection for our personnel 23 should they end up in the water.
your comment be on that? 20 think we should underestimate the ability of a 21 MR. SACUTA: 21 properly fitted certified transportation suit 22 A. I think it's certainly an area that will 23 from providing protection for our personnel

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1 MR. SACUTA:	1 MR. SACUTA:
2 A. And I think that depending on who you talk	to, 2 A. Thank you.
3 I've heard at times from I heard a 222	3 MR. FRASER:
4 rule, which was 2 degrees of body temperate	ure 4 A. Thank you.
5 in 2 hours in 2 degrees celsius water. I've	5 COMMISSIONER:
also heard some people say that the suits,	6 Q. As one says at times in court, is there
7 provided they're fit properly, could provide	anything arising, anything arising out of my
greater than six hours of time in the water.	8 discussion that anyone would like to ask a
9 So we shouldn't underestimate the ability o	f question on? No, okay then. So what's the
those suits to protect our workforce, but I	position now, Mr. Roil?
would definitely agree that less time in the	11 ROIL, Q.C.:
water is better than more time in the water.	12 Q. Mr. Commissioner, that completes the evidence
13 COMMISSIONER:	from HMDC. The next presenter is Suncor,
14 Q. Yeah, and the point about the suits and	which is scheduled for tomorrow morning, and I
improved suits, and, of course, this is	don't think we really have the opportunity to
another thing, your suit is being improved a	nd jump that ahead to this afternoon. Besides, I
yet we've heard evidence on the old suits	think this afternoon might be a good
somehow I've got to hear in more detail abo	out 18 opportunity for the parties to be able to
the new suits really, at least I think so, but	review the documentation from Suncor. It has
at any rate. The other thing that this leads	been loaded up as of yesterday afternoon, so
21 my mind back to all the time is response tim	e, 21 all of the parties have access to it. Again
you know.	when we actually load it up into our public
23 MR. SACUTA:	system, there will be limited documents that
24 A. Yes.	will go into public circulation, but all of
25 COMMISSIONER:	25 the confidential documents are now available
Pa	ge 118 Page 12
1 Q. The way it's written, and we talked about it	to the parties. So we'd ready to commence
this morning, or you talked about it with Mr	that examination on Wednesday morning.
3 Earle, an hour, not less than an hour	3 COMMISSIONER:
4 MR. SACUTA:	4 Q. Tomorrow morning at 9:30. Okay, then, and
5 A. Not more than an hour.	5 thank you, gentlemen, once again.
6 COMMISSIONER:	6 (UPON CONCLUDING AT 12:30 P.M.)
7 Q. I'm sorry, not more than an hour, but, of	
8 course, it's possible to get helicopters	
9 wheels up in half an hour or even less, and r	ny
thinking goes, is that something that the	
industry who is providing this first response	
should be thinking of?	
13 MR. SACUTA:	
la a reconstruction of the contraction of the contr	

Q. Okay, okay. Thank you very much.

A. I mean, certainly as part of my closing

statements in the joint panel last week is that we identified -- we'd certainly be

willing to discuss the response time when it comes to first response search and rescue

capabilities. We do realize that less time is better than more time, so it's certainly --

willing to discuss this as part of this

the operators are aligned that we're more than

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Inquiry. 24 COMMISSIONER:

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